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NATO EXPANSION and
ALTERNATIVE FUTURE
SECURITY ALIGNMENTS

JAMES W. MORRISON

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

McNair Paper 40

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Contents

SUMMARY	v
1. PRESENT SITUATION AND TRENDS IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS	1
Introduction	1
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	3
European Union and Western European Union	6
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	8
Commonwealth of Independent States	11
Other Regional and Sub-regional Groups . . .	12
2. NATO EXPANSION QUESTIONS	21
Recent History	21
Precedents	26
Should NATO Expand Its Membership?	28
Should Additional Criteria for Membership Be Specified?	43
Full or Partial Membership?	48
Which States Should Be Considered for Membership?	49
Timing	62
Sequencing	65
Dividing Lines in Europe	66
Partnership for Peace As A Mandatory Route	67
Readiness of Western Parliaments and Publics	68
Impact of Enlargement on NATO Effectiveness	76
The Future of North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace . . .	78
Views Expressed in Different Countries . . .	80

3. ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ALIGNMENTS	117
Alternative Alignments Involving NATO Expansion	118
Alternative Alignments Not Involving NATO Expansion	121
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. AND NATO POLICY	125
Security Alignments	125
NATO Expansion	127
APPENDIXES	131
A. Evolution of Select European Security Institutions Since World War II	131
B. A Growing Institutional Political and Security Network	133
C. Partnership for Peace Invitation and Framework Document	137
D. Chairman's Summary of Meeting of North Atlantic Cooperation Council Meeting, 2 December 1995, and Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1994/1995 (for NACC and PFP)	143
E. NATO Participation Act of 1994	149
F. Bill Under Consideration in U.S. Congress— "NATO Revitalization and Expansion Act of 1995"	155
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	169
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	173

SUMMARY

- NATO expansion is a key issue both within NATO and in the context of alternative future security alignments in Europe involving NATO, the European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
- States in Central and Eastern Europe are seeking membership in NATO. NATO has responded with outreach programs, most recently the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program. NATO leaders have said they expect and welcome NATO expansion as an evolutionary process in which PFP will play an important role. In the public debate, officials and scholars have made many arguments in favor of expansion, against it, and to defer it.
- There appears to be general support in Congress, the American and European publics, and the executive branches in NATO states for inviting Central and Eastern European states, particularly the four Visegrad states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, to join NATO, but no decisions have been made nor dates established. Russian officials have been ambivalent but often object to expansion of NATO to include Central and Eastern European states but not Russia.
- NATO is conducting a study to address how NATO might expand and what the implications would be. Among the issues that may be raised are:
 - whether additional criteria for membership should be specified
 - which states should be invited
 - when and possibly in what sequence, if any, they should be invited
 - how to avoid dividing lines in Europe
 - the impact of enlargement on NATO effectiveness
 - continuation of outreach programs with states not invited
 - the relationship between NATO and Russia.
- Of six illustrative alternative future security alignments in Europe (three involving NATO expansion and three not), the first—NATO expansion to include Central and Eastern European states, adding from 1-11 new members, while continuing outreach

programs with non-members and establishing a unique relationship with Russia and perhaps Ukraine—may be the most supportable.

SITUATION AND TRENDS IN INSTITUTIONS

There is an increasing web of cross membership and interrelationships among many of the security institutions related to Europe. With the revolutionary changes in Central and Eastern Europe beginning in 1989, many states in the area began pressing for membership in NATO and the EU.

NATO has responded by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and the PFP in 1994. In establishing PFP, NATO leaders announced that they expected and welcomed NATO expansion as an evolutionary process in which PFP would play an important role. NATO is now conducting a study to address how NATO might expand and what the implications would be.

The EU and WEU have intensified and expanded cooperation in Western Europe and have also developed outreach programs to the East, which have lead to associate status for many Central and Eastern European states and may lead to full membership for some.

OSCE is becoming increasingly active and institutionalized in human rights activities, helping to prevent or resolve disputes, and promoting security.

The CIS is promoting cooperation among its 12 members.

NATO EXPANSION—KEY ISSUES

Should NATO Expand?

- **Arguments in favor:** NATO expansion could:
 - be responsive to requests for NATO membership made by reform leaders in Central and Eastern Europe.
 - enhance security from the West's perspective, by improving stability in Central and Eastern European and avoiding a security vacuum, nationalization of defenses,

and an East-West clash.

- enhance security from the perspective of Central and Eastern European states, by providing security assurances against what they see as the greatest threat or challenge—instability in and possible challenges from Russia and others in the CIS.
 - provide stability and assistance so Central and Eastern European states can consolidate domestic reform, improve relations in Central and Eastern Europe, and integrate with the West.
 - help keep NATO vibrant and alive.
 - take advantage now of the situation in Russia and expand NATO before that situation possibly worsens.
 - not let NATO expansion be seen as subject to Russian veto.
- **Arguments against NATO expansion:**
- there is now no threat to Central and Eastern European necessitating expansion.
 - Extending membership to some states but not states such as Russia and others in CIS and even some in Central and Eastern Europe could mean drawing new dividing lines in Europe between the West and Russia and even within Central and Eastern Europe which could: undercut reformers in states not invited; set back the goal of a united Europe; and lead to tensions, bloc formations, and possibly confrontations.
 - NATO should not be extending security commitments, particularly when NATO states are reducing resources for defense.
 - Expansion could ruin NATO, in terms of: losing focus, cohesion, and ability to reach consensus; jeopardizing relations between allies in favor of and against expansion; possible introduction of a Trojan horse; increasing pressures to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe if forces are not forward deployed into Central and Eastern Europe; possibly including Russia in NATO, with a veto.

- **Arguments against expansion for at least the next several years:**
 - NATO needs to address other issues first (trans-Atlantic relations) or avoid becoming embroiled in expansion now (given the crisis over Yugoslavia and instability to the South).
 - NATO needs to work out a relationship with Russia, and this will take time.
 - There is too much instability or uncertainty in Central and Eastern Europe now, and reforms are too new and insecure.
 - More examination and debate is needed, and time to see how much candidate states are prepared to cooperate and what they can contribute.
 - Early expansion could discourage reformers in states not admitted and foster complacency in states admitted.
 - NATO will need detailed study of how to expand and implications of expansion.
 - Parliaments and publics in NATO states have not sufficiently debated NATO expansion and extension of security guarantees to the East.
 - If Russia or others threaten Central and Eastern European states in the future, then NATO could extend membership at that time.

SHOULD ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP BE SPECIFIED?

The North Atlantic Treaty's Article 10 provides that for a state to be invited to accede to the Treaty it must be a "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."

In the PFP invitation and framework agreement issued at the January 1994, NATO Summit leaders indicated or implied that to become a member a state must be located in Europe, be able to promote NATO principles and security, be democratic, be located east of NATO, and be an active PFP participant. NATO leaders also implied that to join and be active in PFP a state

would have to: be a member of NACC and/or CSCE(OSCE); be able and desire to contribute to PFP; share the values of democracy, the UN, and CSCE(OSCE); support stability and security through cooperation; support political and military cooperation; be ready to participate in bodies at NATO headquarters and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; support openness and democratic control of defense ministries and forces; support joint planning, exercises, and operations with NATO; plan for and document PFP cooperation; commit resources for PFP cooperation; and be ready to exchange defense information.

Congress has also attempted to establish criteria, primarily democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of armed forces, rule of law, protection of citizens' rights, respect for the territorial integrity of neighbors, and non-support of international terrorism.

NATO may consider specifying additional criteria, guidelines, or precepts. Attempting to agree on and specify additional criteria could suggest both a double standard (since such criteria were not specified for earlier accessions) and moving the goal line of membership further away. It could also cause problems as NATO tries to develop and agree on additional criteria and cause contentious issues to be raised as states apply for membership and some are accepted and others are not. It may be advisable for NATO ultimately to decide on new members using political judgment backed by criteria or guidelines already stated.

FULL OR PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP?

The U.S. Government and NATO appear to be considering full membership in NATO as the only step beyond participation in PFP, unlike the Western European Union which has observers, associate partners, associate members, and full members.

WHICH STATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR MEMBERSHIP?

Most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe have made known their desire to join NATO, some more vocally than others. States in the CIS have been more ambivalent or have not

expressed interest, although almost all have joined NACC and PFP.

Many, including the U.S. Congress, appear to believe that the Visegrad states—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—are the most qualified.

No members of PFP have been excluded from consideration, but many people have expressed reservations about considering membership for Russia and others in the CIS. NATO is working to develop a unique relationship with Russia, apart from relationships in PFP with Russia and other states.

TIMING

Neither NATO nor the U.S. Administration has suggested a timetable for accepting new members. New legislation introduced in the House states that the U.S. and NATO allies should assist the Visegrad states to transition to full NATO membership not later than 10 January 1999.

SEQUENCING

There are a number of sensitive issues involved in considering whether to address membership expansion country-by-country or to consider countries as a group; which countries to consider first; and how long intervals might be between admission of states.

DIVIDING LINES IN EUROPE

Many call for the integration of Europe and a united Europe, but the eastern boundary of Europe is subject to debate. Opponents of NATO expansion argue that adding selected new members to NATO will probably draw a new dividing line between Europe and Russia and the CIS, and/or even lines of division within Central and Eastern Europe. Others may argue that NATO membership (presently 14 European states, along with the U.S. and Canada, out of a total of 40 European states plus another 12 in the CIS) does not constitute a division of Europe, nor would addition of select new members to NATO, particularly if NATO continues to pursue cooperative outreach programs such as NACC and PFP.

READINESS OF PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS

Congress appears to support extending NATO membership to select Central and Eastern European countries, particularly the Visegrad states, but it has not addressed the details. Public opinion polls in the United States and Europe show considerable support for NATO membership for Central and Eastern European states (ranging, by state, from 66% to 42%). Majorities in Europe also believe Russia should be given the option to join when it meets all qualifications.

IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON NATO EFFECTIVENESS

The impact on NATO of adding new members would depend greatly on which states are admitted and how many states are admitted. Smaller states would likely have less impact in terms or requiring changes in NATO and reaching consensus; larger states, however, should have more to contribute to NATO security but would likely also be more influential. As the number of states admitted increases, so will the potential for diluting NATO's focus and creating problems in reaching consensus. States in which reforms have not been consolidated and states with internal or external ethnic group tensions could

pose problems for NATO. Reformers in the Visegrad states generally emphasize the importance of American engagement, and they could add to Atlantic perspectives in NATO deliberations. The impact of enlargement on NATO political and military structures will need to be examined carefully in the NATO study of enlargement and in the context of inviting specific states to join.

THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM

To the extent NATO focuses attention on membership expansion, there could be less attention to NACC and PFP activities. Cooperation in NACC and PFP will be important both as steps toward NATO membership and as cooperation between NATO and states not joining NATO.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States and NATO should pursue an approach extending membership to states in Central and Eastern Europe. While giving primacy to expansion, NATO should encourage and promote a broader web of European-related security organizations, including OSCE, NACC, PFP, the EU and WEU. NATO should pursue unique relations with Russia and Ukraine.

NATO should:

- move forward to expand.
- proceed with utmost care.
- not try to develop and specify new criteria for membership.
- address candidate countries individually.
- be very selective.
- work toward inviting at least one country within the next 1-2 years to join NATO; at present, the first country admitted should probably be the Czech Republic.
- not close the door on possible associations with NATO short of full membership.
- work toward developing a unique relationships between NATO and Russia and Ukraine respectively.

NATO EXPANSION and ALTERNATIVE FUTURE SECURITY ALIGNMENTS

1. PRESENT SITUATION AND TRENDS IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTION

The present NATO agenda contains a key issue: extending membership to countries of the East. NATO summit leaders in January 1994 spoke of expecting and welcoming NATO expansion, and President Clinton has said NATO expansion was "no longer a question of whether, but when and how." Accepting the President's conclusion, this paper makes three assessments of NATO expansion then offers certain recommendations:

- An assessment of the present situation and trends in NATO and other security institutions related to Europe and Eurasia
- An assessment of key issues related to possible expansion of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- An assessment of alternative security alignments in Europe and extending to North America and Eurasia (from Vancouver to Vladivostok)
- Recommendations for U.S. and NATO policy.

In the nearly 50 years since the end of World War II, several agreements and institutions related to European security have emerged and evolved. France and the United Kingdom banded

2 NATO EXPANSION

together in the Dunkirk Treaty of 1946, which led in 1948 to an expanded Brussels Treaty, and later, in 1954, to the Western European Union (WEU). West European cooperation focused more, however, on economic relations, leading to establishment of the European Community, now the European Union (EU). The EU is now broadening its horizon beyond economics to consider a "Common Foreign and Security Policy," and efforts have been undertaken to develop a "European Security and Defense Identity" and to revitalize the WEU and develop a "Common Defense Policy."

Post World War II trans-Atlantic security arrangements were formally set in 1949 when states in Western European and the United States and Canada concluded the North Atlantic Treaty and established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the preamble to the Treaty, parties expressed their determination to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"; stated their intent to "seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area"; and resolved to "unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security". NATO, the EU, and the WEU have expanded over the years to take in new West European countries (see appendix A).

In May 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (the Warsaw Pact) was established for the express purpose of promoting mutual defense among the Soviet Union and seven states of Eastern Europe. Albania withdrew in 1968, and the German Democratic Republic withdrew in 1990. Beginning in 1989, revolutionary changes in Central and Eastern Europe and changes in the Soviet Union led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on 1 July 1991. The organization that Moscow created in 1949 for international economic cooperation among Warsaw Pact members as well as other states—the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (often called CEMA, CMEA, or Comecon)—was dissolved in January 1991.

In 1973, the first East-West institution, with 35 members, was established in the form of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which, now grown to 53 members, was renamed the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995. OSCE fosters security and cooperation in the area of human rights, economic cooperation, and security cooperation.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS quickly expanded, and today the new independent states that were republics in the former Soviet Union are all members of the CIS, with the exception of the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have not sought CIS membership. The CIS deals with political, economic, and security cooperation.

Following the revolutionary changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during 1989-1991, NATO, the EU, and the WEU developed outreach programs to the East. NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program in 1994. NATO's outreach programs have been extended to most all states of Central and Eastern Europe (except some states in the former Yugoslavia) and the CIS. In contrast, the WEU and EU have been more exclusive, particularly in focusing on Central and Eastern Europe and avoiding or restricting their outreach programs to states of the CIS, Albania, and states that were part of the former Yugoslavia (see appendix B).

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Now in its 46th year, NATO was established in 1949 to promote the goals established in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty. The North Atlantic Council is the senior body and meets regularly at the permanent representative level, twice a year at the foreign minister level, and occasionally at the level of heads of government and state. Defense ministers meet regularly twice a year. The NATO Military Committee meets in permanent session with military representatives, and chiefs of staffs of most members meet twice a year. There are many other committees and an integrated military command structure.

The future of NATO is currently being discussed at two levels. At a broad level, scholars and analysts are asking some

4 NATO EXPANSION

basic questions about the purpose of NATO. Some point to the absence of a direct military threat to NATO and raise questions about NATO's direct defense mission. Some question the broadening of NATO's mission, particularly the expectations created by NATO in 1991 when the Rome NATO Summit and the new Alliance Strategic Concept called for NATO to promote stability throughout the trans-Atlantic region; in this regard, they raise a number of problems regarding NATO and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Others raise the issue of the purpose of NATO when they discuss outreach programs to the East and possible NATO expansion. The overall issue has sometimes boiled down to "collective defense" or "collective security"—whether NATO should focus on collective defense, as emphasized in the preamble and Articles 3-6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, or be transformed into or become part of a collective security arrangement (in support of the goal in the Treaty's preamble of seeking "to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area").

At the more operational, government or bureaucratic level, NATO is addressing several key issues. NATO's outreach programs to the East—the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, and the possible expansion of NATO membership, often called NATO enlargement, are addressed in greater detail later.

Other key issues being addressed in NATO include development of the European defense pillar, concentrating on West European integration and cooperation, and further development of the trans-Atlantic relationship between Europe and North America. These issues are often addressed conceptually in work toward a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, and the Common Defense Policy of the Western European Union. The WEU is often seen as the embodiment of the European defense pillar.

The relationship between NATO and the WEU is an important issue, as is the development in NATO and the WEU of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which focuses on organizing multiservice forces from two or more countries primarily for peace operations presumably outside the traditional

NATO area. A CJTF could operate under the auspices of NATO or the WEU and could involve not only forces of allies but also forces of PFP partners from Central and Eastern Europe, West European "neutrals," and the CIS. In addressing the issues involved in developing a European pillar, WEU, and CJTF, there is general agreement that forces of European allies committed to NATO should be "separable" from NATO but not "separate" from NATO. NATO itself is reviewing its missions and the organization of its integrated military structure.

Conflict in the Balkans is another issue in NATO. NATO allies, along with Russia and other states supporting U.N. efforts, are attempting to help resolve or at least contain the conflict in the Balkans. Allies have provided humanitarian assistance and airlift; some allies have deployed forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or have deployed ground forces in Macedonia as a deterrent; NATO and the WEU have conducted maritime interdiction operations in the Adriatic under Operation *Sharp Guard* in support of U.N. economic and arms sanctions, and NATO has conducted Operation *Deny Flight* to prevent use of military aircraft by forces fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Four allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—along with Russia have established an International Contact Group to promote a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In early 1995, NATO announced a new initiative to engage certain states in North Africa in a dialogue on Mediterranean security. In discussing the initiative, NATO Secretary General Willy Claes has said: "For the time being, we are still analyzing the problems with regard to fundamentalism, which are closely connected to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. It is a new mission for NATO."¹ The initiative appears related to concerns expressed particularly by France, Italy, and Spain.

It should be noted that in addition to formal NATO programs and activities, individual member states of NATO are engaged in a wide range of bilateral relations and activities with other NATO allies and with other countries in Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and Eurasia.

6 NATO EXPANSION

EUROPEAN UNION AND WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union has been striving to deepen integration within the EU and expand its membership simultaneously. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 committed EU members to deepen their integration in terms of creating a single market. The EU, also attempting to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy, is looking to the WEU to serve as the basis of the European defense pillar of NATO. The EU encompasses intergovernmental bodies including the decisionmaking Council of Ministers, which is assisted by a Committee of Permanent Representatives, and the European Council, which is a summit level body that meets 2-3 times a year; the EU also comprises supranational institutions, including the Commission, which administers policy decisions, and the European Parliament.

Even as it worked to deepen integration, the EU has pursued expansion of its membership. Three new members—Austria, Finland, and Sweden—joined the EU in early 1995. Norway had signed a treaty of accession, but a public referendum rejected EU accession, so Norway is not expected to join the EU soon, if ever. With three new members, the EU comprises 15 members; with the expanded membership, four or 25 percent of EU members (Ireland, plus Austria, Finland, and Sweden) are states that have traditionally been described as "neutral." This could result in any EU "Common Foreign and Security Policy" being more independent of NATO and the U.S. than in the past.

Six states from Central and Eastern Europe—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia—have signed "associate agreements" with the EU and hope eventually to accede to the EU by treaty. On 15 December 1994 the EU formally opened negotiations with the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on "associate agreements"; the EU Trade Commissioner has noted that the Baltic states will be treated the same way as the other six associate members when the negotiations are completed.² Additionally, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus might be invited to join. Addition of these 12 states would bring the number of EU members to 27.³ Talks on membership between the EU and those states likely to be invited

to join will not begin before the results are known of the 1996 EU Intergovernmental Conference, which will address major issues about the future of the EU.⁴

At its summit meeting in Copenhagen in the summer of 1993, the EU formulated conditions that states would have to meet before being invited to join the EU. These were summarized as the existence of a parliamentary democracy with guaranteed human rights and basic rights for ethnic minorities, as well as existence of market economy structures able to survive in the EU.⁵

Albania, perhaps because of its relatively poor economy and the fact that its population is primarily Muslim, has not been invited to sign an "associate agreement." None of the five new states of the former Yugoslavia has been invited to sign such an agreement.

Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova have signed "partnership and cooperation agreements" with the EU. There is little expectation at this time that these states will become members of the EU. None of the other states of the CIS have signed such agreements.

The WEU has been reinvigorated. It has moved its headquarters from London to Brussels and created a planning staff of some 50 officers. The WEU is working on creating a common defense policy. It has undertaken missions in the Adriatic Sea in connection with establishing an embargo on arms to parties fighting in the former Yugoslavia. The WEU, as well as NATO, is developing a concept for establishment and deployment of Combined Joint Task Forces, which would likely establish the basis for having available forces that are separable but not separate from NATO.

The WEU has also expanded, adding "observers," "associate members," and "associate partners." In December 1991, WEU member states, meeting in Maastricht at the time of the EU meeting, invited members of the EU to accede to the WEU or become observers and invited other European members of NATO to become associate members of the WEU.⁶ In addition to the 10 full members of the WEU, Ireland and Denmark are "observers;" Iceland, Norway, and Turkey are "associate members;" and nine CEE states are "associate partners"—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,

8 NATO EXPANSION

and Slovakia. There are 24 states sitting at the table when, in approximately half the WEU meetings, all these states are invited to participate. Albania and the five states of the former Yugoslavia are the only ones from Central and Eastern Europe not invited.

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established in 1973 as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), is to foster security and cooperation through programs related to press and culture, support for human rights, economic cooperation, conflict prevention, and military security. Since 1990 it has become increasingly institutionalized.⁷

Some view OSCE as a valuable link among the 53 members and the alliances or groups to which they belong. Czech President Vaclav Havel, for example, has said that CSCE could contribute immensely to European security by providing a link for cooperation between NATO and other Western alliances on one side, and Russia or the Russian-led CIS on the other.⁸ Russian President Boris Yeltsin, however, has suggested a more ambitious role for OSCE by observing it could be an umbrella for European security, supported by NATO and Russia.

Origin and Organization

CSCE was established in 1973 as part of a compromise between the Soviet Union and Western allies. The Soviet Union had proposed talks along the lines of what became CSCE, and NATO Allies had proposed negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe. East-West agreement was reached to begin both sets of talks in 1973. In August 1975, after 2 years of negotiations, 35 members of CSCE signed the Helsinki Final Act, described as a politically binding declaratory understanding of democratic principles governing relations among nations. The Act provided for continued discussions among parties on a broad range of issues, and talks have been held over the years in what is often called the "Helsinki process."

The number of participants in CSCE grew, particularly with the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, from 35 to 53. Reflecting a decision taken at a summit meeting of heads of state and government in Budapest on 10-11 December, 1994, CSCE became on 1 January 1995 OSCE.

In recent years, OSCE states have undertaken to institutionalize the "Helsinki process," beginning with the signing of the Charter of Paris at the CSCE Summit in November 1990. A Council of Ministers, comprising foreign ministers, was established as the highest decisionmaking body. A subsidiary working group or executive body, the Committee of Senior Officials, was established at the ambassadorial or foreign ministry political director level. A Permanent Committee was established in 1993 in Vienna to handle day-to-day operational tasks; the Permanent Committee engages in consultation and takes decisions when the Committee of Senior Officials is not in session.

In addition to these policy-related bodies, the position of OSCE Secretary General and an OSCE Secretariat, located in Prague, have been established. A Parliamentary Assembly, composed of legislators from OSCE states, first met in July 1993. An Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which plays informational, educational, and review roles, and the position of High Commissioner on National Minorities, with a mandate to provide early warning and early action on relevant minority problems, have also been established.

An OSCE Conflict Prevention Center has been established in Vienna to oversee the sharing of data on military forces and to host meetings related to OSCE provisions on military activities. It is also to support implementation of the OSCE mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes and provide support for OSCE diplomatic, conflict-resolution, and peacekeeping missions.

An OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation was established in 1992 as the only pan-European forum for security dialogue and arms control negotiations. This forum meets in semi-permanent session and has as part of its mandate the development of further confidence- and security-building measures, exchange of global military information, cooperation on non-proliferation, and cooperation on regional measures.

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

Under the auspices of OSCE, a system of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) applying to the Europe area has been negotiated. CSBMs are intended to provide transparency and understanding about military forces and activities. The first set of negotiated CSBMs were included as part of the CSCE's 1975 Helsinki Final Act document. Further negotiations and agreement on CSBMs continued into the 1980s and early 1990s, and the present CSBM regime was agreed to in March 1992 as part of the CSCE "Vienna Document 1992," supplemented by additional measures agreed in preparation for the December 1994 CSCE Summit. Agreed CSBMs now include measures related to exchange of military information (data on personnel, force structure and training, weapons and equipment, and defense policies, doctrines, and budgets), risk reduction, military-to-military contacts, observers at specified military activities, exchange of military activity calendars, limitations on the frequency of large-scale military activities, evaluation and verification visits, an annual implementation assessment meeting, and enhancing the OSCE communications network.

Conflicts

CSCE/OSCE has also engaged in many endeavors to help prevent, ameliorate, or end conflicts in Europe.

- In the former Yugoslavia, OSCE has sent fact-finding and rapporteur missions and supported U.N. and E.U. sanctions and humanitarian measures. OSCE also has sent missions to establish a presence and provide early warning of possible spillover of hostilities into the Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak regions of Serbia and Montenegro and into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Missions have also been sent into Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to investigate alleged violations of OSCE principles. A preventive diplomacy mission has been established in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Stemming from a request from the August 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, OSCE has sent missions to Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM, Ukraine, and Albania to assist in monitoring compliance with sanctions. A position of "Sanctions Coordinator" was created to oversee OSCE-EU

sanctions missions in countries around Serbia and Montenegro. Regarding the situation in Chechnya, OSCE in early 1995 sent a mission to Moscow and Chechnya to look into a possible OSCE contribution to the observation of respect for human rights, the delivery of humanitarian aid, the restoration of constitutional order, and organization of free and fair elections in the Chechen Republic.⁹

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established in December 1991 in connection with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were the original members, and later other former republics of the Soviet Union were invited to join. Georgia resisted joining but eventually appeared forced to join as the price for Russian assistance to Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze when his government was under attack by rebel forces in 1993. There are now 12 members of the CIS—all the former republics of the Soviet Union except the Baltic states.

Russia has sought to increase the authority of the CIS and to gain international recognition for it as an institution. The CIS has a staff headquartered in Minsk, Belarus. Meetings at Ministerial and Head of State levels are held on occasion. CIS leaders deal with a range of political, economic, and military issues.¹⁰

Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet military essentially became the CIS military. When the other republics moved to set up their own armed forces and refused to subordinate them to a CIS Joint Command, Russia, in spring 1992, established its own military establishment.¹¹ The CIS military became primarily only a headquarters.

In August 1993, the CIS Council of Defense Ministers met to address an agenda of coordinating activity to improve defense capabilities, creation of a collective security system, and deepening of military cooperation. Russian Defense Minister Grachev was reported to have told the group that "no one should

12 NATO EXPANSION

have doubts that the Russian Defence Ministry considers the establishment of combined armed forces of all interested states as the main and long-term goal of military cooperation."¹²

Also in August 1993, the Secretary of the CIS Defense Ministers' Council, Lt. Gen. Ivashov, emphasized the importance of the CIS in an interview and concluded with the statement, "If NATO is the guarantor of stability in Europe, why should the Treaty on Collective Security not become the same guarantor in the CIS? Let these two guarantors, collaborating with one another, ensure security and stability throughout the Eurasian continent."¹³

In late 1994, leaders of the 12 members states convened as the Council of the CIS Heads of State, where they reportedly discussed an agenda to "invigorate the processes of integration within the CIS." An Inter-State Economic Committee is being established to monitor and further CIS economic cooperation within the context of a "Eurasian common market."¹⁴

OTHER REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL GROUPS

There are many other regional or subregional groupings in Europe, including groups with political, economic, security, and/or arms control and arms reductions mandates.¹⁵ Organizations most relevant to security issues are discussed in some detail below.

Some groups, primarily economics-oriented ones, are limited in membership to a relatively small number of West European states, such as the Benelux Economic Union (3 members), the Nordic Council (5), the Nordic Investment Bank (5), the European Investment Bank (12), the European Space Agency (13 + 2 associate or cooperating states), and the European Free Trade Association (7 in 1994, but in flux).

Others have been primarily economics oriented and limited to West European and North American members but have included Japan (e.g., the G-7 or Big Seven, and at recent G-7 Summit meetings Russia has been invited to participate in some of the discussions) and the G-10 or Paris Club (11). Some of these are expanding beyond Western Europe, North America, and

Japan to include other states in the world (the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 25+1 special member, which now includes Australia and Mexico.

Others now include not only West European states but also Central and East European states and some members of the CIS, e.g., the Council of the Baltic Sea States (10 + 2 observers), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (11 + 1 observer), the Central European Initiative (10 + 6 participating non-members), the European Organization for Nuclear Research (19 + 6 observers), the Economic Commission for Europe (54, including most CEE states and all members of the CIS except Tajikistan), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (58, including most CEE states and all members of CIS except Belarus.)

Beyond these organizations are several organizations or groups that deal with issues that are more security related.

Council of Europe

The Council of Europe (COE), established in 1949 with a purpose of promoting increased unity and quality of life in Europe, currently has 33 members (including 9 from Central and Eastern Europe) and 8 "guest" states, from Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, that have applied for membership and for whom accession procedures are underway. COE member states are "committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity." COE Summit leaders in October 1993 declared that the COE is "the pre-eminent European political institution capable of welcoming, on an equal footing, the democracies of Europe freed from Communist oppression." The COE Secretary General has stated that accession of these states to the COE is "a central factor in the process of European construction based on the Organization's values" and has indicated that the COE has a clear mandate to "exercise a policy of openness and cooperation vis-a-vis all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that opt for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law." The COE is active in setting standards and monitoring respect for human rights; promoting judiciary and law enforcement, training civil servants and

14 NATO EXPANSION

lawyers, and aiding in democratic education; and helping to combat crime and drug abuse.¹⁶

Force Reductions and Arms Control Groups

Negotiations for force reductions in Europe have been held in Europe over the past two decades. Agreement to begin negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) and to establish CSCE in 1973 were worked out between East and West as an implicit *quid pro quo*. The two sets of discussions subsequently proceeded on separate tracks. MBFR talks involved all NATO allies and the seven members of the Warsaw Pact, a total of 23 states. These talks focused on Central Europe, particularly forces located in the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg on the NATO side, and the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on the Warsaw Pact side. In 1986, MBFR talks foundered over disagreements on the size of Soviet military manpower.

A new set of negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) "conducted within the framework of the CSCE process" was subsequently opened among the 16 NATO members and 6 Warsaw Pact members.¹⁷ On 19 November 1990 at the CSCE summit meeting in Paris a CFE agreement was signed limiting five categories of military equipment—tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft—in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area, an area broader than MBFR's Central Region but narrower than CSCE's Vancouver to Vladivostok area. Subsequently, a "CFE-1A" agreement was negotiated and finally signed at the July 1993 CSCE summit setting limits on manpower in the Atlantic-to-Urals area of 29 states party to the agreement.¹⁸

French-Initiated Stability Talks

At the initiative of French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in 1994, France proposed a set of talks, called the Conference on Stability in Europe, designed to contribute to good neighborly relations in Central and Eastern Europe. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe has said the conference was "filling a vacuum," and Balladur has said it would provide a "pragmatic and preventive

diplomatic method," which he contrasted to "big institutional maneuvers or arrangements which are often ephemeral."¹⁹ The talks began with a conference in Paris in late May 1994 of foreign ministers or other representatives from 57 countries or international organizations.²⁰ The purpose has been described as designed to help settle potential border disputes and solve problems involving minorities for potential new candidates for membership in the EU.²¹ Balladur has said the aim was to conclude within a year's time a "Stability Pact," which would involve signing of agreements between neighbors recognizing their borders and guaranteeing the rights of minorities. The French have organized two "regional tables" to promote rapprochement among European states, and accords reached in the round tables would be enshrined in the "Stability Pact" and registered with CSCE/OSCE.²² NATO Foreign Ministers have welcomed this initiative, stating that it can make a substantial contribution to stability in Europe.²³

On the other hand, some in the East have expressed reservations. The chief of Czech President Havel's cabinet has been critical of the concept, saying that the initiators of the proposal do not have solid experience in CEE, the exposing of CEE's intimate problems for all the world to see risks opening Pandora's box, and that "the kind of problem the conference is studying cannot be resolved with great pomp."²⁴ In June 1994, then Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski stated, "Our region certainly needs the Balladur plan. But we do not like the idea that its implementation could be a precondition for Poland's entry into the EU. . . . We have signed treaties of good neighborly relations with our seven neighbors. This shows our desire for compromise. But if this desire was lacking in one or two of our neighbors, I do not see why Poland's entry into the EU should be called into question."²⁵

Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev warned the May conference that the proposed "Stability Pact" might conflict with CSCE; French Foreign Minister Juppe said the conference would disappear within a year when the "Pact" was inaugurated, and denied that the conference was duplicating existing organizations such as CSCE, Council of Europe, or WEU.²⁶

The Visegrad States

The "Visegrad States" or "Visegrad Group" is the term used for a cooperative consultative arrangement, begun in 1990 in the Hungarian town of Visegrad, among leaders of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (since January 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia). The original purpose of the consultations was to coordinate efforts to end dependence on the Soviet Union, specifically to terminate activities of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation.²⁷ Consultations have continued even after the dissolution of the two Soviet-led organizations. The Visegrad four have held meetings of state presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and defense ministers to discuss a range of political, economic, and defense issues.

Reluctant to institutionalize this regional grouping, as Czech President Havel has criticized, "Visegrad cooperation should not be institutionalized. There should be no impression that it is some kind of bloc or that it is an alternative to integration into West Europe."²⁸ The Czechs support membership in the EU, NATO, and WEU for all four Visegrad states, but they appear not to want to be bound to a group approach to these organizations. The Czechs may believe that they are ahead of the other states in political, economic, and military reform and that too close of an identification with the three other states might lessen their chances for early membership in Western organizations.

The Hungarian position may be somewhere between that of the Czechs and the Poles. An interviewer summarized the Polish position in an article of September 1994: "It is better when four countries speak together with one voice than separately," while the Czech position was "the Czechs will join the European Union sooner if they do it by themselves." In response, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Istvan Pataki opined that the Polish position was correct, going on to say "When we speak together, our efficiency increases."²⁹ The Hungarians in the fall of 1994, however, appeared to comment in favor of an individual country approach so that no country has to wait for Hungary nor does Hungary have to wait for any other country in order to join.³⁰

Defense Ministers of Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, and the First Deputy Defense Minister of the Czech Republic last met in Bratislava in September 1994 and agreed to meet again in May 1995. The Slovak Minister emphasized that military cooperation among the four Visegrad states had become subdued and that was why the meetings were convened. Responding to the noticeable absence of the Czech Defense Minister, the Hungarian Minister told reporters that the Czech Minister was expected to attend the May 1995 meeting.³¹

The Visegrad states and the United States have discussed regional cooperation on management of airspace in the area. According to an early January 1995 Hungarian press report, the U.S. Government has offered \$25 million to the four Visegrad states to modernize their military air control centers. The Hungarian deputy state secretary of defense was said to have indicated that greater cooperation among the four would be required. The report suggested that such cooperation would be a significant step regarding membership in NATO, if the identification-friend-or-foe system and system of civilian and military control become uniform among the four and if the systems are manufactured to NATO specifications.³²

The Visegrad four signed a Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in December 1992, aimed at creating a common market in 2001 but later moved up to 1998, as a preparatory move toward joining the EU; Czech leaders complained in December 1994 that there had been no visible results.³³ A press report from a Visegrad summit meeting in Poznan, Poland, on 25 November 1994, suggested that Visegrad cooperation was dying, in that leaders had decided only to accelerate the reduction of customs tariffs but had not even mentioned political cooperation.³⁴ On the other hand, another report indicated that at Poznan Visegrad leaders had opened CEFTA to new members who have signed association agreements with the EU and GATT, and Slovenia might become a member.³⁵

Baltic Associations

In March 1992, the Council of Baltic Sea States was established by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. The Baltic states of

18 NATO EXPANSION

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have held conferences of ministers from these three states at least over the last three years. In December 1994, ministers adopted principles of strategy for regional development; ministers expressed support for closer interstate cooperation on economic and social issues and addressed regional transportation issues.³⁶

Notes

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2. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Daily Report*, no. 237, 16 Dec 94, 5.
3. Interview with Albrecht Rothacher, Acting Head of the EU Commission's representation in Vienna, Vienna *Die Presse*, 13 Feb 95, 2, FBIS-WEU-95-032, 16 Feb 95, 4.
4. Interview with European Commission President Jacques Santer, Paris *Le Figaro*, 2 Feb 95, 5, FBIS-WEU-95-024, 6 Feb 95, 6.
5. Rothacher interview in FBIS-WEU-95-32, 16 Feb 95, op. cit.
6. *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures*, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 11th Edition, 1989), 204.
7. This section draws heavily upon fact sheets on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), CSCE Structure, and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, contained in *Dispatch 5*, no. 50 (U.S. Department of State, December 12, 1994), 815-817.
8. Prague *Prognosis Weekly*, 14 Dec 94, 6, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service *Daily Report for East Europe*, FBIS-EEU-95-008, 12 Jan 95, 5.
9. OSCE Press Release, 24 Jan 95.
10. For details, see Center for Naval Analysis Occasional Paper "Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and International Security," a joint paper by the Institute for USA and Canada and the Center for Naval Analysis, June 1992.
11. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Reform in the Russian Armed Forces," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6, no. 12 (Dec 94), 534-537.
12. Moscow ITAR-TASS, 23 Aug 93, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report for Eurasia* (FBIS-SOV-93-162), 24 Aug 93, 1.
13. Interview with Lt. Gen. Ivashov, Secretary of the CIS Defense Ministers Council, Moscow *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 21 Aug 93, First Edition, 5, FBIS-SOV-93-162, 24 Aug 93, 3-4.

14. Dr. Mark Galeotti, "Decline and Fall— CIS Mark Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 6, no. 12 (Dec 94), 530.
15. For a relatively comprehensive listing and short description of international organizations, see the Central Intelligence Agency's publicly available *The World Factbook 1994*, Appendix C: International Organizations and Groups.
16. Daniel Tarschys, "The Council of Europe: Towards a Vast Area of Democratic Security," *NATO Review*, no. 6 (Dec 94), no. 1 (Jan 95), 8-12.
17. John Fry, *The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Europe* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), 322.
18. *SIPRI Yearbook*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbooks for 1990-1993.
19. Paris *AFP*, 27 May 94, in FBIS-WEU-94-104, 31 May 94, 5, and Paris *Le Quotidien De Paris*, 27 May 94, 11, FBIS-WEU-94-104, 31 May 94, 6.
20. Paris *AFP*, 26 May 94, FBIS-WEU-94-102, 26 May 94, 5.
21. Ibid.
22. See NATO Foreign Ministers' Communique, 1 Dec 94, in *NATO Review*, no. 6 (Dec 94), no. 1 (Jan 95), 26-28.
23. See paragraph 13 in the Communique issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 1 December 1994, *NATO Review*, no. 6 (Dec 94), no. 1(Jan 95), 26-28.
24. Interview with Czech cabinet chief Prince Karl Schwarzenberg, Paris *Le Figaro*, 26 May 94, 4, FBIS-EEU-94-122, 24 June 94, 6.
25. Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, Paris *Le Figaro*, 14 Jun 94, 5, FBIS-EEU-94-115, 15 Jun 94, 17-18.
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27. Jiri Payne, Chairman of Czech Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, "How Were Things Regarding Visegrad?," Prague *Denni Telegraf*, 18 May 94, 3, FBIS-EEU-94-127, 1 Jul 94, 5.
28. Interview with Vaclav Havel, Prague *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 3 Nov 94, 7, FBIS-EEU-94-218, 10 Nov 94, 4.
29. "Unauthorized interview" with Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Istvan Pataki, Warsaw *Trybuna*, 21 Sep 94, 7, FBIS-EEU-94-184, 22 Sep 94, 10.
30. Budapest *Magyar Hirlap*, 1 Dec 94, 7, in FBIS-EEU-94-232, 13-14.
31. Bratislava *Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network*, 5 Sep 94, FBIS-EEU-94-172, 6 Sep 94, 1.

20 NATO EXPANSION

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2. NATO EXPANSION QUESTIONS

RECENT HISTORY

With the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe beginning in 1989 and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, many public officials and private citizens in Central and Eastern Europe began expressing the desire for their countries to join NATO. The Visegrad states—Poland, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia), and Hungary—were the first to press seriously for membership in NATO. Largely in response to this, NATO initiated an outreach program.

The efforts of CEE states to gain NATO membership and NATO's outreach responses to these have gone through a series of four stages (these are elaborated in the Europe chapter of *Strategic Assessment 1995*, published by NDU Press).¹

In 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which has grown to 38 members and has an agreed work plan of political and security activities and cooperation.

When Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Poland and the Czech Republic in August 1993, Polish President Walesa and the Czech leadership pressed Yeltsin and appeared to gain his acquiescence on the issue of Polish and Czech membership in NATO. Walesa and Yeltsin on 25 August issued a declaration that in part stated, "The presidents touched on the matter of Poland's intention to join NATO. President L. Walesa set forth Poland's well-known position on this issue, which was met with understanding by President B.N. Yeltsin. In the long term, such a decision taken by a sovereign Poland in the interests of overall

22 NATO EXPANSION

European integration does not go against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia.² Yeltsin reportedly told the press, "In the new Russian-Polish relations, there is no place for hegemony and diktat, the psychology of a 'big brother' and a 'little brother.'"³

After this statement, Polish Presidential spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski stated that "Now the West has no argument to say no to Poland. Until now the West has been using the argument 'We don't want to upset the Russians.' Now that is no longer a viable argument. Now we will see the true intentions of the West toward Poland."⁴

On 26 August in Prague, Yeltsin reportedly stated that Russia "has no right" to hinder the Czech Republic's joining of any organization, indicating that Moscow would not object to a possible accession to NATO by the Czech Republic. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at a meeting with his Czech counterpart reportedly pointed out that the Czech Republic is a sovereign state and that it has the right to join any organization it wishes to.⁵

About the same time, however, Russian officials were making cautionary remarks about NATO. The Warsaw press reported that on 23 August Kozyrev warned that if the countries of Eastern Europe joined NATO, the reactionary nationalist hardliners in Russia would be strengthened. He reportedly said that the East European countries should be friendly to both democratic Russia and democratic Western Europe including Germany, saying, "These states should not become a new 'little entente,' a buffer which could be crushed at any time, but should take on the role of a connecting link."⁶ Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in remarks made to reporters sometime between 25 and 27 August apparently referring to NATO, called for an end to military blocs, suggesting that "blocs" should only be formed to promote joint economic goals.⁷ After Yeltsin returned to Moscow, Russian government officials began speaking out against any NATO expansion that included Central and East European states and not Russia.

In the fall of 1993, Yeltsin wrote a letter to key Western leaders opposing NATO's admission of East European countries. According to the text of this letter as carried in a Prague

newspaper, Yeltsin indicated that the opposition and moderates in Russia would view NATO expansion as a "new kind of isolation" for Russia. He observed that the treaty on German unification bans deployment of foreign troops in the eastern leader of Germany; he assessed that the spirit of these stipulations "rules out any possibility of a NATO expansion eastwards." At the same time he asked that possible eventual membership for Russia not be excluded, stating that "From a long-term point of view, the idea of us joining NATO should not be disregarded either. This notion, however, is presently a purely theoretical one." He called for relations between NATO and Russia to be "several degrees warmer than the relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe."⁸

In late 1993, the United States proposed to NATO allies the Partnership for Peace program, an outreach program to the East going beyond NACC and focused on defense and military cooperation. At the January 1994 NATO Summit meeting, NATO heads of state and governments agreed to the PFP program and invited other European states that were members of NACC or CSCE to join. PFP was seen as a compromise that held out the prospect for later NATO expansion but recognized that some relationship had to be worked out with Russia and that NATO states, parliaments, and publics needed to give greater consideration to the whole NATO expansion issue before making a decision.

At the NATO Summit meeting on 10-11 January, 1994, heads of state and government issued a "Partnership for Peace: Invitation and Framework Document" (see appendix C for the complete text). In this document, NATO leaders declared their commitment to the goal of "enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe" and outlined the PFP program. They also addressed expansion of NATO, reaffirming that the Alliance is open to new members. They referred to the provisions of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding accession by additional states. They avoided delineating among possible new members beyond that new members would be "democratic states to our East." They characterized expansion as an evolutionary process and emphasized PFP participation as important to this process.

NATO Secretary General Willy Claes has indicated that there

24 NATO EXPANSION

is a three-stage process for PFP—a country signs the PFP framework agreement, the country then presents its ideas for an individual partnership program, and, in the third and last state, the proposals are "examined together." Claes has said, "It is up to the partner to make proposals, not NATO. That is the nature of PFP. If a partner wants to take cooperation very far, we say OK. If not, that is fine, too."⁹ As President Clinton said while visiting in Warsaw in July 1994, expansion of NATO was "no longer a question of whether, but when and how." He also said that when time comes to add new members to NATO "a democratic Poland will have placed itself among those ready and able to join" and announced that he would seek from Congress \$100 million to support PFP, with \$25 million going to Poland.¹⁰

By early 1995, 25 states of CEE, Western Europe, and Eurasia had joined NATO's 16 members as PFP partners and had begun to cooperate in military activities. Ten had presented individual partnership programs, and many Eastern states had sent representatives to participate in activities at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and the PFP Coordination Cell at NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium.

NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels on 1 December 1994, tasked the North Atlantic Council in permanent session with the advice of NATO Military Authorities, to begin an examination inside the Alliance to "determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership." The study is also to examine how PFP can contribute to the process. NATO Foreign Ministers are to discuss progress at their spring 1995 meeting and to present results of their deliberations to interested Partners prior to the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1995.¹¹

In early February 1995, a press article related to Austria's joining carried NATO Secretary General Claes words:

There is no formula for an expansion, not even informal agreements within the Alliance. We have only just started the internal debate. The political committee meets every week. Important issues have to be clarified: 'How can enlargement be carried out while avoiding all risks to the Alliance?' The 'budgetary aspect' is open, as are questions regarding institutions. And 'the question on enforcing the principle of mutual assistance has to be

solved'.... It is imaginable that someone joins who does not meet all the conditions. But the contrary is also possible: Someone might not become a member despite fulfilling all the criteria.¹²

Secretary General Claes elaborated on the NATO process a few days later:¹³

We intend to enlarge. But I cannot imagine that those who are willing to join want to have less security and weaker guarantees than the current member states. All this is not quite so easy. How about the problem of the nuclear shield, the guarantee of assistance, or financial contributions? All this must be solved. In doing so, we must respect the principle of consensus. How can this be done with 22 or 24 members? So there are many questions. But we are not wasting time. We want to complete our debate by this fall. We will then inform all parties interested without delay. Then it will be discussed in the Council of Ministers [sic] in December. After that, the 16 member states will discuss the question of who will be admitted and when."

Henry Kissinger articulated a distinction between NATO expansion and PFP and suggested approaches that could be taken on NATO expansion and development of a cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia:

Having started down the road of NATO expansion, the administration must choose between the concept of the NATO alliance, based on defining an area to be protected, and the concept behind the Partnership for Peace, designed—by President Clinton's own statements—to unite the former blocs. NATO is not the instrument to serve both purposes . . . NATO expansion represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia. A wise policy, instead of pretending that Russia has an option for NATO membership, would take two steps. It would proceed with membership for the Visegrad countries and reject a Russian veto. But at the same time it would propose a security treaty between the new NATO and Russia to make clear that the goal is cooperation. Such a treaty would provide that no foreign troops be stationed on the territory of new NATO members, on the model of the arrangement for East Germany (or, better, no closer than a fixed distance from the eastern border of Poland.)¹⁴

PRECEDENTS

There are three precedents for NATO expansion, involving accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. In each of the three cases, a protocol, entitled "Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of" was negotiated. The protocols themselves are relatively short and *pro forma*, stating that parties to the Treaty, being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced, agree that on entry into force of the protocol an invitation to accede to the Treaty is to be communicated to the prospective new member and this prospective member will become a party to the Treaty upon depositing its instruments of accession. Other articles deal with entry into force of the protocol (upon notification of acceptance by each of the parties to the treaty) and depositing and copying the protocol.

Accession by Greece and Turkey

According to Dean Acheson's memoirs, Greece and Turkey felt abandoned when, in March 1949, Italy, not a North Atlantic state in terms of geography, was issued an invitation to become an original signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty and they were not; they lamented their status for the next 2 years until they were invited to join NATO.¹⁵

In January 1951, the U.S. Government began considering collaboration on establishing a Middle East Command. According to Acheson, "Greece and Turkey insisted upon being associated in the common defense through NATO and not indirectly through some regional organization. Furthermore, Turkey would not cooperate with a Middle East organization until her admission to NATO had been assured."¹⁶ In September 1951, at a regular NATO Foreign Ministers' meetings, Acheson and U.S. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace presented arguments for inviting Greece and Turkey to join NATO. After much private exhortation, NATO Ministers voted in favor of extending invitations.¹⁷ In October 1951, NATO Deputy Ministers signed the protocol on accession by Greece and Turkey.¹⁸ The U.S. Senate voted approval in early 1952.¹⁹ With the approval of other NATO allies and ratification by the parliaments of Greece and Turkey, on 18 February 1952,

Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty by depositing their instruments of accession.²⁰ The Soviet Union condemned the extension of membership as a violation of U.N. principles,²¹ and Bulgaria and Romania protested Turkish accession.²²

Accession by Germany

In September 1950, after the start of the Korean War, the United States, France, and United Kingdom called for a German military contribution to NATO. Given French concerns about German rearmament, a plan was developed to put German troops under the control of a continental European Defense Community (EDC) within NATO.²³ The EDC was to merge forces of six states—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

In May 1952, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States concluded an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany restoring its sovereignty, and on 27 May the Treaty of Paris setting up the EDC was signed. During the ratification process for the EDC Treaty, however, the French parliament defeated the treaty. The United States then began considering substitutes, including one that provided for establishment of an independent German military and admission of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO as a sovereign state.²⁴ Europeans began to work on creating the Western European Union as a substitute for the EDC.

The admittance of Germany to NATO was worked in parallel to admittance to the WEU. Germany's Bundestag approved admission to both NATO and the WEU in late February 1955;²⁵ the U.S. Senate in early April 1955 ratified agreements for FRG rearmament and NATO membership.²⁶ With the approval of other Allies, and despite Soviet objections, the FRG became a member of NATO and the WEU in May 1955.

Accession by Spain

The process of Spanish accession has many interesting aspects, some more relevant than others for future NATO accession. As early as 1952, in connection with accession by Greece and Turkey, Portugal, an original NATO member, urged that Spain also be admitted into NATO.²⁷ In the mid-1970s, the possibility of joining

NATO was discussed in Spain, and a poll taken in Spain in 1975 reported that 57 percent of respondents favored joining NATO and 24 percent were opposed.²⁸ In 1981, the possibility of Spain applying for NATO membership must have received increased attention, as the Soviet Union reportedly sent a message in September 1981 suggesting that Spain not enter NATO.²⁹

It was not until October 1981, however, that Spanish President Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo and Foreign Minister Perez Llorca introduced for parliamentary debate the NATO accession issue.³⁰ Several reasons have been advanced to explain Spanish interest in NATO membership and the timing of the raising of the issue. First, President Calvo Sotelo, described as an advocate of Atlanticism as the focal point of Spanish foreign policy, took office early in 1981.³¹ Secondly, the military base agreement with the United States was up for renewal, and the Spanish leadership wanted to determine whether Spain should become a member of NATO and move the bilateral relationship with the United States into that context, or move to neutrality and break defense ties with the United States.³² Finally, some have emphasized that the Spanish President believed that Spain's membership in NATO would improve prospects for Spanish entry into the European Community, which France had blocked.³³ In October 1981, the Spanish Congress of Deputies approved the application to join NATO by a vote of 185 for and 146 against, and about a month later the Senate approved it.³⁴ The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) then began a large scale anti-NATO campaign.³⁵

NATO began its process of considering Spanish accession in November 1981,³⁶ the Protocol of Accession was signed a month later at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting.³⁷ Following ratification by all the Parties, in May 1982 Spain deposited its instruments of accession, thereby becoming a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty and a member of NATO.³⁸

SHOULD NATO EXPAND ITS MEMBERSHIP?

There are several issues regarding possible expansion of NATO membership. The fundamental question is should NATO expand its membership? If the answer is yes, there are many questions or issues related to which states to consider, how and when to move on expansion, and resultant implications.

Yes to Expansion

Many expansion advocates call for extending NATO membership soon to the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Some of these advocates envision including in NATO most all of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States; they do not advocate extending NATO membership to Russia and other new independent states of the former Soviet Union, although they do see a need for some form of treaty between NATO and Russia. Advocates of NATO expansion include many key political and military leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. In the United States, the administration has declared its support for NATO expansion and Congress has passed legislation in support—but in both cases without proposing a timetable. A new bill introduced into Congress calls for working toward expansion by January 1999. Among those who have written publicly in support of expansion are former Senator Richard Lugar, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Presidential National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Council official Peter Rodman, columnist William Safire of *The New York Times*. The following are some of the arguments in favor of expanding NATO membership.

Be responsive to requests for NATO membership made by reform leaders in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). NATO expansion is a critical issue now because leaders of CEE states have pressed for NATO membership. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, calling NATO expansion "the most sensitive immediate issue" in the Alliance, stated, "The expansion issue arose because Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (the Visegrad countries)—all victims of Soviet occupation—sought NATO membership."³⁹ Not only leaders of the Visegrad states, such as Czech President Vaclav Havel and Polish President Lech Walesa, but leaders of most all CEE states have now asked that their countries be allowed to join NATO and have emphasized the importance of this.

Peter Rodman wrote, "The newly independent Central European states—particularly Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia—consider themselves part of the West; they

categorically refuse to be relegated to a Russian sphere of influence or to a no-man's land between Western Europe and Russia. After a 60-year nightmare, they have finally had the chance to express their free sovereign will: They are morally and politically partners of the West, seeking membership in the European Union for their economic well-being and in the Atlantic Alliance for their security."⁴⁰

Not to act positively on such requests could undercut these reform leaders. It could suggest that the West is not sympathetic to these states and their perceived vulnerability, and that the West does not view these states as part of Europe or as important.

Enhance security from the West's perspective—by improving stability in Central and Eastern Europe and avoiding a security vacuum, nationalization of defenses, and an East-West clash. Including CEE states in NATO—rather than leaving them in a security vacuum or area of neutrality—could extend stability to this important area that has been fought over through the centuries. Including CEE states in the 16-member Alliance could provide security from uncertainties to the east, help obviate renationalization of defenses in the West, and avoid an East-West clash.

Senator Richard Lugar wrote, "Defining the current problems in terms of the future of Europe as a whole helps clarify the issue of vital American national interests. The United States cannot afford to allow Europe to unravel for the third time this century. Projection of stability to the East is a prudent investment to secure the peace in Europe."⁴¹

Henry Kissinger, cautioning against allowing a "vacuum between Germany and Russia that has tempted so many previous conflicts," wrote, "If this request [the Visegrad states requests to join NATO] is rejected and the states bordering Germany are refused protection, Germany will sooner or later seek to achieve its security by national efforts, encountering on the way a Russia pursuing the same policy from its side."⁴²

Peter W. Rodman wrote, "If the history of this century proves anything, it is that ambiguity about the status of these small Central European states is exceedingly risky for peace. It would only invite future revisionist temptations. In the interest of European stability, the uncertainty should be foreclosed by their

admission to the alliance." He views NATO expansion as a misnomer and suggests the issue is really "the consolidation of the new status quo in Central Europe that followed the Soviet withdrawal from Stalin's ill-gotten conquests."⁴³

Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan emphasized what the Czech Republic could contribute to European security: "In addition to being aware of the limitations of our own defense forces, we want to be part of Europe. This then leads to the duty to do something for Europe, to take part in protecting of its values . . . Participation, for instance, in NATO peacekeeping forces. There is also the air defense . . . Air defense is nowadays an affair of larger regions. Therefore, we can very well imagine joint coverage of airspace."⁴⁴

Rand analysts Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee have argued that including the Visegrad states in NATO would be in America's interests because the Visegrad leaders are pro-American, their views on security issues closely coincide with those of the United States and other Atlanticist members such as the United Kingdom, Portugal, and the Netherlands, and their inclusion in NATO "would strengthen the Atlanticist orientation of the alliance and provide greater internal support for U.S. views on key security issues."⁴⁵

Enhance security in Central and Eastern Europe from the perspective of CEE states, providing assurances against what they see as their greatest threat or challenge, i.e., instability in and possible challenges from Russia and other states of the CIS. Instability and uncertainty in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in the CIS and possible Russian imperialistic or expansionist tendencies are viewed in CEE as the greatest threats to their national security. Individual states see themselves as incapable of coping alone with the magnitude of these challenges. They see NATO as the most capable security institution to help protect them against these threats, particularly because of U.S. involvement.

While Russian military capabilities may have diminished, many in Central and Eastern Europe, supported by some in the West, are concerned about Russia's efforts to gain increased influence in the member states of the CIS and to arrange for Russian forces and bases in many of these states.

The Russian use of force in Chechnya is probably increasing concerns in CEE and CEE interest in early NATO membership. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel was described in early January as thinking this "likely and logical."⁴⁶ Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for International Affairs, has claimed that the recent use of force in Chechnya has increased the desire of East European countries to become members of NATO as soon as possible,⁴⁷ and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle, who opposes NATO expansion, has observed that "This remedy may seem all the more urgent as Russian forces keep inflicting wanton destruction on Chechnya."⁴⁸

Indeed, Czech leaders have suggested that Russian activities in Chechnya might influence NATO expansion, but largely in terms of NATO recognizing the importance of expansion. Referring to Chechnya, which he described as "very rash and very dangerous," Czech President Vaclav Havel has said that "Perhaps they (Western politicians) have been too credulous. Now they may better understand why the Czech Republic wishes to join the alliance."⁴⁹ Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan has commented that "I think that throughout recent history, including this situation in Chechnya, all those who have any say about these matters have come to realize that it is necessary for the Central European countries to become a part of NATO."⁵⁰

Provide stability and assistance so that CEE states can consolidate domestic reform, improve relations in CEE, and integrate with the West. NATO membership could benefit the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe by helping to create a stable environment in which they could internally advance and consolidate democracy, economic reform with market economies, and military reform. CEE states appear to be aware that their prospects for joining NATO, the EU, and the WEU will depend in part on their efforts to improve relations with their neighbors in CEE.

NATO membership could also help the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe achieve their goals of being integrated with the West. Many believe that Central and Eastern European states were abnormally separated from the West after World War II and that to be integrated with the West is not only natural but

offers the best promise for their political, economic, social, and security future. They generally believe that inclusion in the EU and WEU will help but that NATO is the preeminent security institution and only NATO membership provides American security assurances.

Senator Lugar wrote, "Membership in NATO is a way to strengthen domestic forces committed to democracy and market economies. Western policy-makers and analysts tend to overlook the link between democracy and security."⁵¹ And Rand analysts Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee wrote,

East-Central Europe's democrats well understand that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic, and military community. The West, too, previously understood this link—as demonstrated with the case of West Germany. That nation might never have become a stable Western democracy had it not been accepted into NATO's fold. Similarly, NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey. Those who insist that democratic credentials must be presented prior to alliance membership should remember that the need for a stable security framework is greatest when democracy is most fragile and threatened.⁵²

Help keep NATO vibrant and alive. Some supporters of NATO emphasize that, with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the main threat to NATO has disappeared and that NATO will go out of business if it does not take on missions outside the NATO area and does not further develop programs to reach out to former adversaries in the East. Some make a more direct link between expanding NATO to include states of CEE and maintaining NATO as a viable Alliance.

Zbigniew Brzezinski argued, "The absence of a long-range design for Europe could deprive it (NATO) of its historical reason for being" and that "Hesitation, inconsistency and weakness will not only discredit American leadership but probably doom NATO altogether."⁵³

Take advantage now of the situation in Russia and expand NATO before that situation possibly worsens. Some appear to believe that it is now much more feasible to

34 NATO EXPANSION

expand NATO while Russia is relatively weak and preoccupied with issues at home and in the "Near Abroad" and while there is a relatively cooperative leadership in Russia; they believe that it would be much more difficult to pursue NATO expansion successfully if leaders less willing to cooperate with the West were to come to power in Russia or if Russia were to become more powerful and assertive. Henry Kissinger said that if a decision on expansion is deferred until an acute Russian threat in fact appears, "Pressures against NATO expansion will grow more insistent at that point, compounded by the fact that a skillful Russian challenge will be made to appear ambiguous. It is not wise to defer obtaining fire insurance until the house is actually on fire."⁵⁴

Zbigniew Brzezinski observed, "Westernists" are not gaining ground in Russia and that a faction is rising in Russia that argues "Russia is destined to exercise geopolitical sway over Eurasia" and Russia's "special political status must be asserted—directly in Eurasia and indirectly in Central Europe." Brzezinski, at the same time, however, notes that there is no imminent threat from Russia and that "expansion should not be driven by whipping up anti-Russian hysteria that could become a self-fulfilling prophecy." Brzezinski and others also emphasize the importance of NATO pursuing as a second track some form of security arrangements with Russia.⁵⁵

William Safire, observing that Kissinger and Brzezinski see Russia as "authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit," calls for extending NATO membership now to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, which he sees as the most Westernized nations of Eastern Europe. Safire argues, "The time to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would be an insufferable provocation to a superpower."⁵⁶

Not let expansion of NATO membership be seen as subject to a Russian veto. Some argue that NATO has announced its intention to accept new members and must not be seen as giving Russia a veto on expansion.

Peter Rodman argued that it is morally and politically objectionable to deny membership to the four Visegrad states over concern about provoking Russia. He also said, "Our failure to proceed would be more dangerous than to proceed" and suggests

that Russian resistance to NATO expansion cannot be interpreted as anything other than a desire to restore its former sphere.⁵⁷ Others might suggest that it is at least an effort not to let a former adversary expand eastward.

Arguments Against Expansion in General

Many are opposed in general to expanding membership in NATO, to include some or all states in CEE and the CIS. Some argue that expanding NATO is not necessary and would be counterproductive and even dangerous. Some make the point that it is only because the CEE states have pressed for NATO membership that the issue of NATO expansion has arisen, and that NATO would not have pursued expansion on its own initiative. In arguing against NATO expansion in present circumstances, some say that NATO could expand if and when Russia or other states present a military threat to Central and Eastern Europe. Many Russians oppose expansion of NATO, arguing that NATO should be disbanded, just as the Warsaw Pact was disbanded. In the United States, foreign affairs specialists who have written in opposition to NATO expansion include Fred C. Iklé, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Charles Kupchan, a former member of the U.S. National Security Council Staff, and Michael Brown of Harvard University. Some of the arguments that have been or could be advanced against expanding NATO follow.

There is now no threat necessitating expansion of NATO. Neither Russia nor any other state appears to present a military threat to states in Central and Eastern Europe at this time. Were Russia or some other state to attempt to develop a threat, there could be sufficient warning time and willingness for NATO to react and take in new members for protection.

Michael Brown has developed this argument, writing that "Russia's military is in disarray at both the operational and ministerial levels." Observing that Poland and Hungary are reducing military conscription and the Czech Republic is reducing its mechanized and infantry forces, he concludes, "These are not the actions of states worried about military threats." Brown also reports, "Western defense experts believe that it would take Moscow at least a year or two to field an offensive military capability, should it be inclined to do so." He concludes that

NATO leaders will therefore have ample time to extend security guarantees to Central Europe if and when this becomes necessary.⁵⁸

For those who might argue that this course of action is too risky because NATO would not extend membership in a building crisis, Brown argues, "NATO is more likely to expand if and when real threats to vital interests emerge, than now—when the Russian military threat to Europe is nonexistent. Whatever risks NATO would run by holding off can be minimized by developing a strong consensus with the alliance on its expansion strategy." Brown recommends a strategy of having NATO offer membership to as many states in the region as possible if Russia takes threatening steps such as withdrawing from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, building up its forces near western neighbors, using military threats, discontinuing denuclearization, violating pledges on Ukraine's sovereignty, absorbing Ukraine or Belarus into the Russian Federation, or transforming the Commonwealth of Independent States into a federal entity.⁵⁹

Expanding NATO membership could mean drawing a new dividing line in Europe, excluding primarily Russia but also others. Instead of moving toward a Europe united and free, NATO enlargement that includes some states in Central and Eastern but not Russia and others could create a new division. Russia particularly could be resentful, less cooperative, and perhaps adversarial.

President Clinton raised the issue of a new dividing line when he made his intervention at the NATO Summit meeting in January 1994 in support of the Partnership for Peace program and against immediately admitting the Visegrad states to NATO:

Why should we, now, draw a new line through Europe just a little further east? Why should we, now, do something which could foreclose the best possible future for Europe? The best possible future would be a democratic Russia committed to the security of all its European neighbors. The best possible future would be a democratic Ukraine—a democratic government in every one of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, all committed to market cooperation, to common security, and to democratic ideals. We should not foreclose that possibility.⁶⁰

The President went on to say that the Partnership for Peace "enables us to prepare for and to work toward enlargement of NATO when other countries are capable of fulfilling their NATO responsibilities" and "enables us to do it in a way that gives us time to reach out to Russia and to other nations of the former Soviet Union . . . in a way that leaves open the possibility of a future for Europe that breaks totally from the destructive past we have known."⁶¹

Charles Kupchan wrote, "Pushing NATO's boundaries eastward promises to resurrect Europe's dividing lines, not erase them. . . . The chance to build a European security community that included Russia would be lost. The West might be larger and stronger, but Europe would again be divided into hostile halves."⁶²

Michael Brown wrote, "A new line would be drawn in Europe, a new Cold War could ensue, and the West would have itself to blame for bringing this about."⁶³

Expanding NATO could create not just a division between the West and Russia but divisions even within Central and Eastern Europe. While the most serious consequences could come from exclusion of Russia and other states in the CIS, adverse consequences could also flow from not including at least initially all states within Central and Eastern Europe. There could be resentment and perhaps even worse from states not invited to join NATO, both initially and even more so as time goes by as other states are invited to join. States in CEE who perhaps have felt more secure because they have joined PFP but who are not among those invited to join NATO could then feel less secure and more vulnerable.

If only one to four of the Central European "Visegrad" states were allowed in NATO initially, this could appear at a minimum to draw a temporary line within Eastern Europe. Competition, not sub-regional cooperation, could be stimulated if not all four "Visegrad" states were admitted initially. The Romanians may be concerned that Hungary might gain membership first and block an invitation to Romania. If almost all Central and Eastern Europe states are allowed in, some NATO allies might demand that Albania be excluded, as it has been excluded from associate partnership in the WEU. Would NATO admit the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—states that used to lie

within the former Soviet Union (although the United States did not recognize their incorporation into the USSR) and which continue to have sizable Russian ethnic populations?

Fred Iklé, in addressing the argument that NATO expansion would fill a security vacuum in Eastern Europe, has asked: "If, say, Slovakia is a vacuum, why not Slovenia; if Slovenia, why not Macedonia, Moldova, or Belarus? By expanding eastward, NATO would merely shove the vacuum ahead of itself." He also suggests that advocates of expansion who propose ruling out deployment of allied forces onto the territory of new member states as a step to reduce Russian opposition to expansion would fill an "alleged political vacuum" with "a real military vacuum."⁶⁴

Extending membership to some Eastern states, but not to all—such as Russia and others—could be counterproductive and have adverse political and military consequences in states not included. Expanding NATO membership to some but not all Eastern states could make the states not included feel less secure, undercut reformers in states not included, stimulate Russian influence over neighboring states at least within the CIS and perhaps beyond, and lead to increased military efforts in Russia and the CIS.

Charles Kupchan has made many of these points. He argued, "Enlarging the alliance would alter the balance of power on the continent and make Russia feel less secure. The problem is that NATO is still a military alliance that concentrates power against an external threat; this is precisely why the Central Europeans want to join." Kupchan also said, "An expanded NATO would lead Russia to reassert control over its former republics and to remilitarize" and predicted "Even if NATO held open the prospect of eventual membership for Russia, nationalists would react to Central Europe's entry into NATO by charging that Russian reformers had sold out to the West and had jeopardized Russia's security" and that pro-Western forces in Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, finding themselves "outside the West's new defense perimeter, . . . would look to Moscow to meet their security needs."⁶⁵

Sergei Karaganov, a former advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin now serving on the Russian Federation's Security Council, wrote that if "NATO expands eastward, Russia under any

government will become a revisionist power striving to undermine the already fragile European order."⁶⁶

Michael Brown argued that if the four Visegrad states are admitted then "In all probability, Russian leaders would interpret NATO expansion as a delineation of spheres of influence in Central Europe, and they would move to establish greater control over non-NATO areas. Russian aggression would be encouraged, not discouraged, by NATO expansion. Four countries would be brought into NATO, but eight—including the Baltic states—would be left out. Russian withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty is not inconceivable."⁶⁷

Charles William Maynes believed that Ukraine and the Baltic states would feel wronged if only CEE states were admitted to NATO.⁶⁸

Russia's President Boris Yeltsin has opposed expanding NATO membership while excluding Russia; to do so could undercut him within Russia. In general, such expansion could undercut reformers in Russia and give grist to the mill for ultranationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Such expansion would tend to isolate Russia and other states in the CIS, compared to scenarios that did not expand NATO or opened NATO to states of the CIS. A senior U.S. official reportedly has acknowledged this concern by stating, "We certainly don't want to do anything that would do serious damage to the forces of reform" in Russia.⁶⁹

On 19 December 1994, Belarusian First Deputy Foreign Minister Valerii Tsypkalo told a Russian news service that NATO's plans to expand were prompting a possible decision that might be made soon in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine to disavow their commitments under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. He was reported to have said that "If NATO draws nearer to the CIS borders, the CIS countries located in Europe will probably have to revise the agreement on cuts in conventional arms in Europe and stop scrapping their tanks, planes, and the like."⁷⁰

NATO should not be extending security commitments to help defend the territory of other states, particularly at a time NATO members are reducing resources devoted to defense. Commentator and politician Patrick Buchanan wrote, "The United States cannot, and must not, give Poland and the other East European countries the guarantee that it would go to war

because of their eastern borders, as would follow from their admission into NATO."⁷¹

Charles Kupchan argues that countries are focusing on domestic priorities, that the willingness of electorates to sustain, let alone expand, commitments is contracting, that military spending in NATO countries is likely to decline, that it would cost billions of dollars to prepare for the defense of Central Europe, that it is hard to imagine parliaments of all 16 NATO members approving extension of new security guarantees to Central Europe, and that rejection by one or more parliaments would be a crushing blow.⁷²

Expansion could ruin NATO. Specialists have advanced several arguments why including Central and East European states in NATO would ruin NATO. Fred Iklé wrote, "Far from solving an alleged crisis, expanding NATO would fatally weaken it."⁷³ Some of the arguments on weakening NATO include:

- Adding new members to NATO could mean that NATO would lose focus and cohesion and find it harder to reach consensus and decisions.
- Pressuring NATO allies who may be reluctant to expand NATO could jeopardize relations within the Alliance.
- New members might introduce a Trojan horse into NATO.
- Pressures might increase to withdraw U.S. troops completely from Europe, if NATO decides it does not need to station forces forward in CEE states admitted to NATO, thereby undercutting the concept of forward deployment.
- Expanding NATO membership might eventually lead to membership for Russia, giving Russia a veto in NATO.

Arguments Against Expansion For at Least the Next Several Years

Some may oppose NATO expanding in the next several years but hold an open mind to expansion after several years or if a serious threat arose in the meantime. The following arguments have been or could be used in support of deferring expansion:

NATO needs to address other issues first or avoid becoming embroiled in NATO expansion. NATO should focus now on developing a new Trans-Atlantic relationship between North America and West Europeans working to build up the European pillar through development of an EU Common

Foreign and Security Policy, a European Security and Defense Identity, and a WEU Common Defense Policy.

This may not be a good time to move toward NATO expansion. Some NATO states appear reluctant to push too far too fast on NATO expansion. There are serious issues now in NATO over former Yugoslavia. Many NATO allies are focusing on instability south of NATO, especially in North Africa.

Former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher wrote, "What is required is a key concept for stable relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and those of the former Soviet Union, including Russia. Hasty and insensitive debates on an expansion of NATO merely cloud the Alliance's internal cohesion and decision-making capability, as well as undermining the requirement for comprehensive security cooperation in the entire zone between Vancouver and Vladivostok."⁷⁴

U.S. officials have been reported to hope to assuage Russian fears of NATO expansion by first locking Russia into a series of cooperative relationships with the West; these officials are said to reason that once these relationships with Russia are developed, Russia will not see NATO expansion as threatening. Examples of such relationship are said to be inviting Russia to participate in portions of G-7 meetings of the heads of major developed countries, opening a direct line on consultations with NATO, and the EU's offering Russia a "partnership and cooperation agreement."⁷⁵

There is too much instability or uncertainty in CEE now. Taking in any states from CEE now risks embroiling NATO in one or more potential ethnic conflict situations in CEE or to defending CEE states against potential threats from Russia and other CIS states. The next several years will determine whether the situation will become more stable or less stable.

Reforms have been underway in CEE for fewer than 5 years, and they could be reversed. CEE states need to work more on reforms, and focusing on NATO could distract them from economic reform and economic integration with the West. In some states in CEE, non-Communists who led the revolutions and the initial reform efforts have been voted out of power and former Communists, now generally called socialists, have been voted in.

What this means for progress on reforms remains to be seen.

Charles William Maynes, Editor of *Foreign Policy*, reportedly argued that the CEE states are not ready for NATO membership, the results of the Polish elections demonstrate the possibility of communists being elected to power again, and the membership debate should at least be postponed.⁷⁶ Maynes also argues that CEE states "need integration into Western economic institutions more than they need NATO, so that the quest for NATO membership turns them away from the main target—economic integration."⁷⁷

Poland, for example, has been seen as a leading candidate for NATO membership but recently has had a crisis among the president, prime minister, and defense minister over which elected officials control the military, and a former Communist may become Prime Minister. Poland is trying to work out civilian control over the military in a new constitution, but this will take time, perhaps 1 or 2 years or more.

One report indicates that Pentagon officials have worried that a state admitted to NATO too soon might revert to authoritarian or communist leadership or provoke ethnic conflict, leaving NATO in the position of having to defend a government with ignoble aims.⁷⁸

More examination, debate, and time is needed. PFP was initiated only in January 1994. Partner states are sending representatives to NATO and SHAPE Headquarters. There have been two PFP exercises. There has not been time enough to assess which of the 23 PFP partners have shown the most interest in cooperating with NATO.

Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry both wrote, "If we arbitrarily lock in advantages now for some countries, we risk discouraging reformers in countries not named and fostering complacency in countries that are."⁷⁹

NATO has only recently begun a study of how it might expand and what the implications might be of expansion. This study may take considerable time and should not be rushed.

The U.S. Congress appears to be the only legislative body in NATO states to have passed legislation favoring NATO expansion. In discussions in the Congress, there have note been extensive hearings or debates on the details of possible NATO expansion and the extension of NATO security guarantees. Senator William S.

Cohen has argued that NATO expansion has not even begun to be debated in the United States and any vote would have failed in the Senate if it had been raised as of early February 1995.⁸⁰

If Russia or others threaten CEE states in the future, then NATO could extend membership to CEE states.

Some, such as Charles Kupchan and Michael Brown, hold open the option for NATO to expand if and when Russia or other states present a serious military threat to Central and Eastern Europe. Kupchan, for example, argues, "Expanding NATO makes sense only if Russia again poses a military threat to Central Europe. To act now might give the Poles and their neighbors a boost, but by alienating the Russians and undercutting the reformers, NATO would set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy." He goes on, "There is no need to take that risk when Central Europe does not now face a serious external threat and when NATO can always expand later. Since it would take Russian years to rebuild an army that could invade and occupy Central Europe, NATO would have ample time to extend its protective umbrella eastward."⁸¹

SHOULD ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP BE SPECIFIED?

Should NATO attempt to specify criteria beyond that which has already have been specified? If so, what criteria? The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949 by the original 12 members of NATO, provides criteria for use in determining whether to invite other states to accede to the Treaty. Article 10 of the Treaty, which deals with accession of new parties to the Treaty, specifies that "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."

At the 1994 NATO Summit, heads of state and government issued statements specifying additional criteria for inviting states to become members of NATO and joining and participating in the Partnership for Peace program, which has been suggested as a prerequisite for joining NATO *per se* (see appendix C).

Existing Implied Criteria for NATO Membership

The January 1994 NATO Summit document on PFP suggests that for a state eventually to become a member of NATO it must be located in Europe and be east of NATO, must be a democracy, must be able to promote NATO principles and security, and must be an active PFP participant.

Implied Criteria for Joining and Cooperating in PFP

Elements of the NATO Summit document on PFP that could be regarded as suggesting criteria for joining PFP and cooperating in PFP, which the above suggests are prerequisites to being invited to join NATO, include:

- NACC and/or CSCE membership and ability and desire to contribute to PFP.
- Share values of democracy, UN, and CSCE/OSCE.
- Support for stability and security through cooperation.
- Support for political and military cooperation.
- Readiness to participate in bodies at NATO headquarters and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.
- Support for openness and democracy in defense establishments and joint planning, exercises, and operations with NATO.
- Plan for and document PFP cooperation.
- Commit resources for PFP cooperation.
- Readiness to exchange defense information.

Attempting to specify additional criteria for NATO membership could present problems. No additional criteria beyond Article 10 appear to have been specified when Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, Germany joined in 1955, and Spain joined in 1982; to specify additional criteria now would go beyond past precedent, and some might accuse NATO of having double standards. In documents establishing PFP, NATO implied criteria for joining PFP; to specify additional criteria for NATO membership could suggest that NATO was unfairly moving the goal posts for NATO membership further away more than a year after the game had started.

Additional criteria could be so general as to be meaningless or

to permit to qualify for membership states which NATO members might not want in NATO. NATO flexibility would be greater if NATO could merely say that NATO states had assessed the entire situation and made a judgment that selected countries should be invited to join NATO; they would avoid pitfalls involved in trying to justify the decision in terms of specific criteria and how some countries met the criteria and others did not. It is conceivable that additional criteria might be so specific and stringent that questions would arise as to whether all present members of NATO meet or have met these criteria. Finally, in trying to develop and agree upon additional criteria, NATO would have to expend much time and effort and run risks of internal conflict among allies in trying to reach consensus.

There are arguments in favor of having NATO specify additional criteria for membership. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, has called for NATO early in 1995 to declare criteria and indicate which countries appear to meet these.⁸² Another approach would suggest that enumerating criteria would help ensure that the new democracies pursue reforms desired by NATO. An argument can also be made that additional criteria could be used as visible benchmarks on the path to NATO membership, instilling increasing confidence in those following the path that they will ultimately gain NATO membership. Specifying additional criteria could also be useful if NATO wants to delay accession for one reason or another.

One report in the fall of 1994 indicated that the U.S. Government, in an attempt to acknowledge East European continued efforts to join NATO while avoiding adverse consequences in Russia, had proposed to NATO allies that at the December 1994 North Atlantic Council Meeting of NATO foreign ministers NATO announce new guidance in the form of "precepts" for NATO expansion. U.S. Presidential National Security Advisor Anthony Lake was said to have ordered the development of the precepts because President Clinton and he wanted at least to give the appearance of movement toward expansion. The precepts were said to be a compromise between no further guidance and providing clear criteria. U.S. officials were said to have described the precepts as rules meant to provide more concrete guideposts to NATO membership but not to guarantee it. One U.S. official was

46 NATO EXPANSION

quoted as saying, "Precepts are things we will take into account for membership. That doesn't mean you get in if you meet them all, or are locked out if you don't." A U.S. official was also quoted as saying, "Don't make too big a deal of what we're up to. The near-term goal is to get the alliance to agree to begin a formal process, aimed at defining what it will take to expand. The potential new partners have to know what they must bring to the table."⁸³

Another report suggested that NATO would offer guidelines but not specific dates for membership and that the guidelines would be sufficiently stringent that no country would be able to meet them for several years. The guidelines were said to include either an "irreversible commitment to democracy" or a "full functioning democracy." They also would include full civilian control of the military, including civilianization of defense ministries and militarization of the military in the sense of eliminating security organs from the military. Another guideline was said to be military equipment and communications interchangeable with those of NATO members.⁸⁴

The U.S. Congress, in its NATO Participation Act of 1994, expressed the sense of the Congress on NATO expansion, citing six criteria—democratic institutions, free market economy, civilian control of the military, rule of law, protection of citizens' rights, and respect for neighbors' territorial integrity. The legislation stated that it was the sense of the Congress that:

Full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area should be invited to become full NATO members in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty at an early date, if such participants -

- (A) maintain their progress toward establishing democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, and the rule of law; and
- (B) remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens and respecting the territorial integrity of their neighbors.⁸⁵

This legislation established another criterion for designating countries as eligible to receive U.S. assistance in transitioning to full NATO membership. This criterion requires a Presidential determination that the country is not:

Selling or transferring defense articles to a state that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.⁸⁶

A bill introduced 4 January 1995 in the House of Representatives, H.R. 7, given the short title of "National Security Revitalization Act," includes as Title VI a proposed "NATO Revitalization and Expansion Act of 1995," which proposes additional new criteria for NATO membership (see text at appendix F.) This bill emphasizes that "In particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have made significant progress toward establishing democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, police, and intelligence services, and the rule of law since the fall of their previous Communist governments." The bill goes on to state that these four countries should be invited to become full NATO members no later than 10 January 1999 provided they:

- (A) meet appropriate standards, including
 - (i) shared values and interests;
 - (ii) democratic governments;
 - (iii) free market economies;
 - (iv) civilian control of the military, of the police, and of intelligence services;
 - (v) adherence to the values, principles, and political commitments embodied in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
 - (vi) commitment to further the principles of NATO and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area;
 - (vii) commitment to accept the obligations, responsibilities, and costs of NATO membership; and
 - (viii) commitment to implement infrastructure development activities that will facilitate participation in and support for NATO military activities; and
- (B) remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens and respecting the territorial integrity of their

neighbors.

The bill also states that any other countries would have to be "European countries emerging from Communist domination," and defines which states meet this definition.

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, speaking at a conference in Munich in early February 1995, reportedly suggested criteria along the following lines: "New members must be prepared to defend the alliance and have the capable, professional military force to do it." They would have to "uphold democracy and free enterprise, protect freedom and human rights inside their borders, and respect sovereignty outside their borders." They would have to agree to decision-making by consensus, and their armed forces would have to be compatible with NATO's, working under civilian control, sharing common views of strategy and tactics, and having interchangeable equipment, especially in communications.⁸⁷

FULL OR PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP?

Is full membership in NATO the only option, or is some form of partial or associate membership, similar to the approach taken by the WEU, a possibility for NATO?

The U.S. Government and NATO may earlier have considered the possibility of some form of "associate membership" in NATO, but they appear more or less to have abandoned such a concept, at least temporarily if not permanently. In January 1994 NATO adopted PFP and the concept of "partners." Leaders now appear to be thinking of progression from "partnership" to "full membership." The communique issued by NATO Foreign Ministers in connection with their semi-annual meeting in December 1994 stated that "All new members of NATO will be full members of the Alliance, enjoying the rights and assuming all obligations of membership."⁸⁸ The new legislation in Congress, H.R. 7, calls for "full" membership for the four Visegrad states no later than 10 January 1999 (see appendix F).

The WEU has four categories of association. In addition to the WEU's 10 full members, the WEU has three "associate members" (Iceland, Norway, and Turkey), two "observers" (Ireland and Denmark), and nine "associate partners" (the Visegrad four, three Baltic states, and Bulgaria and Romania). The WEU permits associate members, observers, and associate partners to participate

in approximately half of its Council meetings.

Additional forms of association with NATO short of full membership, such as associate membership, could conceivably, provide provisions designed to enhance security. Such provisions could stop short of providing the Article 5 security guarantees (assist if attacked) available to parties to the Treaty. In section 8 of the PFP Framework Agreement, NATO has already come close to extending to PFP partners the benefits of Article 4 of the Treaty which promises consultation if a party believes it has been threatened. Section 8 reads, "NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security."⁸⁹

In late 1993 Senator William S. Cohen proposed expanding NATO step by step. He called for "growing selected NATO institutions into NACC ones and opening up certain others to countries meeting appropriate conditions. This would help those countries capable of it to grow into NATO step by step, give them a more secure place to anchor during the transition period, and minimize concerns of those unlikely ever to qualify for full membership that NATO is seeking to isolate or exclude them."⁹⁰

WHICH STATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR MEMBERSHIP?

Of the 25 states that have joined together with NATO's 16 members in PFP, most from Central and Eastern Europe have indicated interest in joining NATO. Some have been very vocal and desire membership as soon as possible. Others have been more reserved, perhaps believing that they are not realistically candidates for early membership. Among the 25 PFP partners, those who appear to desire NATO membership are Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Austria, Finland, Slovenia, and Sweden have not indicated an interest in acceding to the NATO Treaty. Russian officials have made ambiguous statements about joining NATO. Perhaps with the exception of Ukraine, no other state in the CIS has indicated an interest in acceding to the Treaty.

When they adopted PFP in January 1994, NATO Summit leaders did not differentiate among states, appearing to suggest that

any NACC or OSCE participant could join PFP and any PFP participant might be considered for NATO membership. U.S. officials have generally avoided suggesting that some PFP participants might become NATO members and others would likely not. Some allies, particularly the Germans, have been outspoken in suggesting that it is almost inconceivable that Russia would ever be invited to join NATO.⁹¹

U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, in response to a question during Congressional testimony appears to have gone beyond previous U.S. statements when he indicated that many PFP participants would never qualify for NATO membership. Secretary Perry's statement was made in response to a question from Rep. Herbert H. Bateman, who had suggested that administration statements had been misleading and should not deceive people into thinking that PFP is going to bring them to NATO membership "when it would be irrational to extend NATO that far." Mr. Perry reportedly replied that "For those countries qualified to become NATO members, and only those countries, the Partnership for Peace is a path to NATO membership. Many members of the Partnership for Peace will never qualify for NATO membership. . . Thank you for the opportunity to clarify that point."⁹² Another article indicated that Mr. Perry said that PFP was "a necessary but not a sufficient condition for NATO membership."⁹³

The Washington Post article reporting this exchange also reported that a Pentagon spokesman had indicated that Mr. Perry's remark "is not a policy statement as much as it is a statement of the obvious," and that a Pentagon official has said that countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are among the least likely to be invited to join NATO, and that Secretary of State Warren Christopher has insisted that giving preference to certain countries over others would demoralize those left in waiting.⁹⁴

Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, reportedly has prepared an article for a forthcoming issue of *Foreign Affairs* in which he wrote, "The PFP will be a permanent part of the European security scene even as NATO expands to take in some, but not all, PFP members."⁹⁵

Henry Kissinger has criticized proposals for exploring NATO expansion with all members of PFP, saying this will lead either to stalemate or confrontation. He has written that "Russia will either

veto expansion or approve it only if Russia itself becomes a member. In that case, NATO would stop being a defensive alliance and turn into a system of general collective security similar to the United Nations.⁹⁶

The U.S. Congress, in the NATO Participation Act of 1994, expressed the sense of the Congress that "in particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have made significant progress toward establishing democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, and the rule of law since the fall of their previous communist governments." The legislation provides authority so that "The President may establish a program to assist the transition to full NATO membership of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia." It also provides authority for the President to designate for assistance other Partnership for Peace countries emerging from communist domination when the President determines and reports to the relevant committees of Congress that these countries meet criteria specified by Congress.⁹⁷

Central and Eastern Europe

Most advocates of NATO expansion view the Czech Republic and Poland as two of the most qualified states. Many would add Hungary and possibly Slovakia to any "most qualified" list. Some would add the Baltic states, and some would add Bulgaria and Romania, and perhaps others.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, in an interview published in early February 1995, stated, "The security needs of the Central and East European countries and of the Baltic states have been taken into account relatively strongly. It has been clarified whether they should join NATO. Now the question is only when and how they will join. And pursuing this when and how together with Russia—and certainly not against Russia—is also in the interest of the Central and East European countries."⁹⁸ Kinkel did not elaborate on when NATO made any such clarifications regarding CEE and Baltic states.

The Czech Republic. The Czech Republic has established what appears to be a solid foundation for democracy and is moving forward relatively aggressively on economic reform toward establishing a market economy. Czech President Havel has

indicated that he does not see any danger of Communist forces being strengthened again in the Czech Republic and has said that so far about 80 percent of the Czech economy has been privatized.⁹⁹ The Czechs have pursued military reform in terms of developing a defensive doctrine and defensive orientations for the armed forces and have been working to establish a framework for civil-military relations under which the military will be responsible to duly elected civilian authorities.

Poland. U.S. Ambassador to the United States, Madeleine Albright, reportedly told Poland's President Lech Walsea in the fall of 1994 that Poland would be among the first to be allowed to join NATO.¹⁰⁰ Poland, however, has faced several changes of governments and continuing disputes of a constitutional nature between the Polish president and successive defense ministers appointed by the prime minister over control of the defense establishment. These disputes have continued and may not be resolved until after Polish elections later in 1995. Also, in recent months, former Communists have been named to positions in the Polish government. President Walesa is reported to have approved the nomination for Prime Minister of Jozef Oleksy, "a leader of the liberal wing of Poland's post-communist Democratic Left Alliance," who would be "the first former-Communist official to serve as prime minister since the Communist Party lost power to Solidarity in 1989."¹⁰¹

Hungary and Slovakia. Hungary and Slovakia have generally been considered the third and fourth most qualified candidates for NATO membership. Their progress on reform is generally judged to be slightly behind that of the Czech Republic and Poland but ahead of most other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Slovakia, to its leaders' dismay, is sometimes omitted from lists suggested by various individuals of states believed to be qualified for early NATO membership, including lists containing the names of the other Visegrad states.

Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria and Romania were slower to implement reforms than the Visegrad states, and they do not appear to enjoy as much international support as the Visegrad states.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Baltic states enjoy considerable sympathy and support in the West, but they generally

do not receive the priority given the Visegrad states, as witness U.S. legislation and their sequencing in association with the EU and WEU. Some may be concerned that extending NATO membership to these states at an early stage could provoke adverse reactions within Russia and within the Russian ethnic minority populations in these Baltic states, reactions beyond any that might arise regarding accession by the Visegrad states. A *New York Times* report in early February 1995 stated, "Senior diplomats and NATO officials made it very clear that extending NATO membership into the former Soviet Union, even to the Baltics and Ukraine, was almost inconceivable for the next decade or more."¹⁰² A similar report stated that as for the Baltic nations, one official said: "NATO will have a hard time accepting countries that are militarily indefensible."¹⁰³

Albania. Many states in Western Europe, including NATO allies, appear to regard Albania as in a separate category from the majority of Central and East European states. With the exception of states of the former Yugoslavia, Albania is the only CEE state not invited to enter into an "associate agreement" with the EU or to be invited to become an "associate partner" in the WEU. European NATO allies might not accord Albania high priority for NATO membership.

Eurasian States

Russia and all members of the CIS have joined NACC, and all CIS states except Tajikistan have joined PFP. Russian officials have made conflicting statements as to whether Russia wants to join NATO. Some in Ukraine might want to join NATO, but others may not. Other CIS states have not pressed for NATO membership.

Over 40 years ago, in March 1954, the Soviet Union, via a diplomatic note, sought membership in NATO in a move that at least one analyst has called a diversion, following Soviet proposals for an alternative all-European security treaty.¹⁰⁴ In a responding note of May 1954, France, the United States, and the United Kingdom rejected Moscow's bid for NATO membership.¹⁰⁵ According to the draft approved by foreign ministers of the three allies, the rejection was to have referred to "the completely unreal character" of the Soviet suggestion, characterized the suggestion as

contrary to the principles of the Western defense system and security, referred to the principle of individual liberty and the rule of law, and concluded that: "All [NATO's] decisions are taken by unanimous consent. The Soviet Union as a member of the organization would therefore be in a position to veto every decision. None of the member states is prepared to allow their joint defense system to be disrupted in this way."¹⁰⁶

Whether Russia or CIS members located east of the Ural Mountains could be invited to accede to the NATO Treaty is a question that might require legal review. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that parties to the Treaty can invite to accede to the Treaty "any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." Definitions of Europe usually suggest that Europe extends eastward only to the Ural Mountains and Ural River and southeastward to the Transcaucasus.¹⁰⁷ Much of Russia—nearly three-quarters of its land mass—lies in Asia, east of the Urals. Accession of Turkey to the NATO Treaty in 1952, however, would seem to offer a precedent for a state like Russia, which lies partially in Europe and partially in Asia, to be eligible to accede to the Treaty, other issues notwithstanding. With regard to the Treaty's criterion of being able to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, a case could also be made, from a purely geographical standpoint, that Russia is physically located where it could contribute as much if not more to security of the North Atlantic area than some other candidates.

A narrow definition of Europe and a strict interpretation of Article 10 might disqualify from NATO membership those states of the CIS lying fully east of the Ural Mountains, including Kazakhstan (which is south and mostly east of the Urals), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Whether Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan lie partly within or outside Europe is debatable.

All these successor states to the former Soviet Union have been accepted as members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—but then the United States and Canada, clearly geographically outside Europe, are also members of OSCE. Moreover, these successor states were accepted as members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and further, NATO

declarations and statements since the end of 1993 opened PFP to any member of NACC and CSCE/OSCE and have implied that PFP participation is a prerequisite for NATO membership.

The issue of admission of states of the CIS, as well as other states in Europe, has also arisen in the Council of Europe (COE). The Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Daniel Tarschys, in a recently published article, has indicated that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova—all now COE "guests"—are considered "European" and could become members of COE, as could Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia if they indicate their willingness to be considered as part of Europe. With regard to states in Central Asia, he did not mention either "guest" status or membership but only assistance in democratic reforms if they are interested.¹⁰⁸

Tarschys wrote that membership in the COE is "in principle open only to states whose national territory lies wholly or partly in Europe and whose culture is closely linked with European culture." Further, he suggested that "The boundaries of Europe have not yet been comprehensively defined under international law. The Council of Europe therefore should, in principle, base itself on the generally accepted geographical limits of Europe." Continuing his line of reasoning, Tarschys said that all present members of COE (33 in number) are "European," and so are states whose legislative assemblies enjoy special guest status with the COE Parliamentary Assembly, specifically, within the CIS, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, as well as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Latvia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. All these "guests," except Bosnia-Herzegovina, have applied for COE membership, and accession procedures are underway.

Tarschys also stated that "In view of their cultural links with Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia would have the possibility of applying for membership provided they clearly indicate their will to be considered as part of Europe." COE ministers in 1992 indicated that closer relations with COE would require democratic reform and commitment to resolving conflicts by peaceful means. Finally, with regard to the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Tarschys, mentioning a goal of enhancing stability in the region, wrote that COE ministers considered that relations

between COE and these states should be "based on flexible and practical arrangements with a view to helping the purposes of democratic reforms if the countries concerned have expressed a desire for such cooperation."

The European Union has entered into "partnership and cooperation" agreements with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. These agreements do not imply potential membership in the EU, as do "associate" agreements, which have been concluded between the EU and the four Visegrad states and Bulgaria and Romania and are being negotiated with the three Baltic states. The WEU has accepted these nine Central and East European states as "associate partners" but has not extended such invitations to any states from the CIS.

Russia. There appears to be considerable sentiment in NATO member states that Russia should not be permitted to join NATO but that some form of unique relationship between NATO and Russia should be established. It is not clear whether or not Russia would even want to join NATO. While President Yeltsin has hinted that some day Russia might want to join, Defense Minister Grachev has indicated that Russia has no plans to apply, saying, "We will go our own way."¹⁰⁹ Arguments that have been or could be used for not inviting Russia to join NATO include the following:

- Russia is not a North Atlantic or European state, but a Eurasian state. (Turkey, of course, is a Eurasian state and a member of NATO.)
- Russia is too large. Russia is far larger than any other European member of NATO and admitting it to NATO would change the balance.
- Russia is too instable to be considered now for NATO membership.
- Russia might never be prepared to cooperate to the extent needed in NATO. It is difficult to imagine Russia permitting detailed examination in NATO of its force planning and forces under the Defense Planning Questionnaire process, or of Russia integrating its forces under a NATO commander. NATO could also feel constrained in opening membership doors to Russia, given Russia's aggressive intelligence services.
- Russia might not be as willing as present NATO allies are

to compromise to reach consensus in NATO on many sensitive issues.

- Membership would, in effect, give Russia a right of veto within NATO.
- NATO would find it difficult if not impossible to consider extending NATO security guarantees, as in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to Russia, particularly as some three-quarters of Russia's territory lies east of the Ural Mountains and Russia has a long border with China as well as with Mongolia and Kazakhstan.

In an interview in June 1994, then-NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner stated, "I do not envisage Russia's full membership in NATO being possible in the foreseeable future."¹¹⁰

German officials, particularly Defense Minister Volker Ruehe, have been among the more vocal opponents to considering possible NATO membership for Russia. Minister Ruehe is reported to have told a German-American business conference in early September 1994 that Russia would never achieve the "homogeneity" required of NATO and EU members. He reportedly said: "If Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart. It would be like the United Nations of Europe—it wouldn't work. The Poles are learning English for NATO but the Russians want us to learn Russian. I just don't see Russia, long-term, being governed by Brussels. It cannot be integrated."¹¹¹

Former Czech Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier spoke out in opposition to Russian membership in NATO and the EU, reportedly saying that Russia is an unstable country and its membership would not reinforce security but become a disturbing factor.¹¹²

Henry Kissinger argued, "Russian membership in NATO would dissolve the Atlantic Alliance into just such a vague system (general collective security system similar to the United Nations) without meeting the security concerns of Europe, especially of Eastern Europe, or of America. It would remove NATO as a shield of Western Europe because the NATO obligation does not run to protecting its members against each other. Instead, it would place NATO's frontiers at the borders of China. This is why Russian membership in NATO and in the European Union was standard fare in Communist times."¹¹³

U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry reportedly told the

German-American business conference referenced above that, while he did not see Russia "as an early candidate" for NATO membership, he was "not prepared to close the door on that issue."¹¹⁴

Then-President of the EU's European Commission Jacques Delors, when asked during an interview in December 1994 about Russia and the EU, stated, "I think the Russia is a great power in itself, but its entry into the European Union would take us to the borders of Asia—inside Asia even—and this is why few people with common sense intend to include Russia in the EU. Yet we must have a close agreement for partnership and cooperation with Russia."¹¹⁵

Many believe that NATO will have to develop with Russia some form of unique relationship of one kind or another if NATO is, without offering NATO membership, to have cooperation from Russia. This relationship would likely reflect Russia's importance in terms of the size of its territory, population, resources, and defense establishment, including its strategic nuclear capability.

German Defense Minister Ruehe reportedly proposed to NATO Defense Ministers in May 1994 offering Russia a "partnership without adjectives" such as "strategic," "pragmatic," "cooperative," or "privileged."¹¹⁶

In June 1994, following Russia's signing the PFP framework agreement, NATO released publicly a document entitled "Summary of Conclusions of Discussions Between the North Atlantic Council and Foreign Minister of Russia Andrey Kozyrev." The document contained four main points:

- (1) calling for constructive, cooperative relations
- (2) development of an extensive PFP Individual Partnership Program corresponding to Russia's size, importance, and capabilities
- (3) agreement to set in train development of a far-reaching, cooperative NATO/Russia relationship both inside and outside PFP
- (4) agreement to pursue broad, enhanced dialogue and cooperation in areas where Russia has unique and important contributions to make, commensurate with its weight and responsibility as a major European, international, and nuclear power.¹¹⁷

NATO Foreign Ministers, in their December 1994 Ministerial communique, addressed NATO relations with Russia. In addition

to emphasizing the need to address security issues on a Europe-wide basis and not make new divisions in Europe, they affirmed their support for reform in Russia and called for active Russian participation in a "cooperative European security architecture." They welcomed an initial program of consultations and cooperation between NATO and Russia on the basis of conclusions from a June 1994 meeting between the North Atlantic Council and the Russian Foreign Minister regarding areas where Russia has a unique or particularly important contribution to make. They proposed to use the opportunity of their regular NATO Foreign Ministers meetings to meet with Russian ministers whenever useful. They also proposed that experts meet to discuss key issues.¹¹⁸

The Russian Foreign Minister, however, surprised NATO Foreign Ministers during their December 1994 meeting by refusing, at the last minute, to sign an individual partnership program related to Russia's participation in PFP, saying he did not understand NATO's policy of expansion.¹¹⁹ Kozyrev said he was acting in protest of NATO's planned expansion into Eastern Europe, saying "Moscow's strategy is partnership. If the strategy of NATO has changed and is now aimed at enlargement, that requires future discussion and maybe further decisions. So we have to come back later to implement."¹²⁰

NATO Secretary-General Claes in an interview apparently in late January 1995 indicated that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Afanazevskiy on 30 January had conveyed to him Russia's desire to reach agreements with NATO beyond those in PFP and an additional document for a "broad and consolidated political dialogue" between Russia and NATO. Claes indicated that, despite the conflict in Chechnya, he thought if Russia were ready to sign, the NATO Council would still vote in favor of signing these two agreements. Claes described the second agreement as "a deal concerning a broad and more intensive political dialogue that involves, apart from a mutual exchange of information and consultations, also political cooperation as laid down in the basic document." He cites Afanazevskiy's statement, "In view of your intentions to expand NATO, we might require something else in order to settle our relationships." Claes' response: "I have no authority to provide an official response, but I suppose we are prepared to provide additional elements." Claes indicated that he

had advised Afanazevskiy to carefully look at the document on intensified cooperation, but, while Afanazevskiy "did not exactly say no . . . he insisted on a few additional structures and on the conclusion of a few agreements dealing with quite specific topics." Claes concluded that he still had not received any concrete indication that Moscow was prepared to sign the PFP and intensive political cooperation documents.¹²¹

The United States was reported to be ready to press the Russians on PFP participation during talks in Washington in late February. A Clinton administration official reported that Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott would hand Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov a letter from President Clinton specifying the need for Russia to join the PFP program (or sign up to a PFP individual partnership program) before moving on to a special relationship.¹²²

In February 1995 German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe reportedly told the Bundestag Defense Committee that NATO intends to conclude an "agreement on a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia." Ruehe reportedly said that Moscow has specific expectations for new consultation instruments that guarantee Russia "co-determination" in European security. Ruehe apparently also suggested that it was "absolutely necessary" that a more intensive cooperation with Russia accompany not only the acceptance of new members by NATO but also "the path leading there," and he indicated that practical organization of the partnership has already "progressed quite far" and could lead to specific results in the first 6 months of this year, "for instance to formal correspondence on the further handling of this important issue." Ruehe indicated it was important for Moscow not to be confronted with faits accomplis or surprises on NATO expansion, but he said NATO could not accept a Russian right of veto. He suggested the formula for the negotiations has to be "No veto—no surprises."¹²³

A unique relationship between NATO and Russia could be manifest in the form of a treaty. This could be a treaty of friendship and cooperation or a more strategic one. Provisions might be made to keep each side informed of the other's activities, to help prevent suspicion or misunderstanding. Some form of structure to the relationship might be negotiated, to help with

consultation, coordination, and communication. NATO would want to avoid any suggestion of a Russian veto over NATO activities.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, who opposes Russian membership in NATO, proposed a "treaty of alliance and cooperation" between NATO and Russia, to be coupled with inclusion in NATO of several Central European democratic states. He suggested that such a treaty would "provide the Russians with a gratifying recognition of their country's status as a major power while embracing Russia within a wider framework of Eurasian security."¹²⁴

Christoph Bertram, currently a diplomatic correspondent for the German newspaper Die Zeit, argued in an article that Russia must not be invited to join NATO but that a new "Russia-NATO forum" must be created:

Russia cannot join NATO without destroying it, hence all talk about that eventuality are eyewash. Nor can Russia be treated like just another 'Partner for Peace.' Since Russia does not fit into any of the existing organizations, a new one should be created—a Russia-NATO forum. This would have to be a formal arrangement, designed to allow for day-to-day dialogue and consultation and capable of establishing a tradition of close security cooperation. For this, it would have to have all the trimmings of a proper international institution—two secretary-generals, a political and a military committee, a council of permanent representatives, etc. Thus Russia's need for status would be respected, and NATO's eastward extension could even less be misconstrued in Moscow as an anti-Russian strategy.¹²⁵

Lothar Ruehl, formerly German State Secretary of Defense and now a writer for Die Welt, suggested a European security treaty between NATO allies, the Russian Federation, and all other interested European states. On the basis of such a Treaty, which could be within the OSCE framework or some new framework, a European Security Council could be established, comprising the United States, Russia, and the EU or Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.¹²⁶

Ukraine. If some form of special relationship is established with Russia, what form of relationship might there be with

Ukraine? NATO might want to enter into some form of similar relationship with Ukraine, given its size and importance. Other options might include a NATO-Ukraine relationship less structured than that with Russia but more structured than the Partnership for Peace, and, finally, a continued PFP and NACC participation for Ukraine.

Other Eurasian States. What type of relationship is established between NATO and Russia and Ukraine may impact on the types of relationships between NATO and other states in the CIS. It would be difficult to imagine that, if Russia is not invited to join NATO, any other states of the CIS would be invited to join.

States in Western Europe.

Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Austria, Finland, and Sweden have joined PFP but have not to date sought membership in NATO. Austria only joined in early 1995. Government leaders seem to regard NATO membership as unnecessary. These established Western democracies, generally viewed in past years as "neutral," would, from a political standpoint, seem strong candidates should they ever seek NATO membership.

Slovenia. Slovenia has joined PFP. Two factors militating against NATO membership for Slovenia are Slovenia's strategic relationship to former Yugoslavia and a political-economic dispute with Italy dating back to World War II, which has impacted on closer EU-Slovenia relations.

TIMING

When should new members be admitted to NATO? To what extent is timing of CEE states' accession to NATO affected by the timing of their joining the EU and WEU and by consideration of NATO relations with Russia?

The U.S. administration and NATO have avoided suggesting any timetable for accession by new members. NATO Foreign Ministers announced at their 1 December 1994 meeting that they had agreed, "It is premature to discuss the timeframe for enlargement or which particular countries would be invited to join the Alliance."¹²⁷

An article in *The New York Times* reported, "German and

American policymakers tend to think that Central European countries might qualify for NATO closer to five years from now. French, Spanish, and Italian experts prefer a slower approach, and the British are somewhere in between.¹²⁸

The issue of whether CEE states should join NATO first, the EU/WEU first, or all nearly simultaneously appears to be lying just below the surface of public debate. A press report on a December 1994 meeting of German and Polish experts suggests this issue has become a bone of contention. The report indicates that inviting CEE states to join NATO first is supported by the CEE states, German Defense Minister Ruehe, and the United States primarily for reasons of security and relative ease of joining NATO. France is reported to be the primary opponent of this, arguing that EU membership should come first, as security guarantees will not be credible if they have no solid political and economic foundation. The German government was said to adhere to a diplomatic formula of "close links" between NATO and EU expansion. Bonn was said to believe that combining NATO and EU membership for CEE states could dispel Russian fears.¹²⁹

Another press report indicates that German Foreign Minister Kinkel and European colleagues have always linked EU accession with NATO membership. Kinkel is said to have a concept of moving the states that wish to join closer to the EU and NATO "without a time constraint." French diplomats are said to see no reason to speed up the NATO accession process, and Foreign Minister Juppe is said to believe the end of 1996 would be the earliest date for starting EU membership negotiations.¹³⁰ A press report in mid-February 1995 suggested that Kinkel was now more favorable to NATO expansion.¹³¹

On the other hand, a Dutch press report referring to a "golden rule" that CEE states would have to follow the "royal path" of first joining the EU, then the WEU, and only after that, NATO, indicated in early November 1994 that the EU's Commissioner for External Affairs, Hans van den Broek, believes that CEE states, which he sees not joining the EU before the turn of the century, might join NATO before they join the EU and WEU. The same report suggested that the United States was inclined to allow CEE states to join NATO earlier and not wait for EU membership.¹³²

Others seem to tie timing of NATO accession more to Western

leaders concerns about Russia and its reactions. Czech President Havel said, "Regarding NATO membership, which we desire, I have seen too much restraint and carefulness in the West so far. I would not dare to interpret this hesitation as an indication of a new Yalta, but I would rather say it is proof of accustomed stereotypes in thinking and a lack of courage for new solutions."¹³³ Henry Kissinger argued: "Failure to expand NATO in the near future is likely to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may drift out of their association with Europe."¹³⁴ Former NSC Staff official Peter Rodman suggested the Clinton administration's approach has been "gradualist to a fault" and argued, "It's time to accept the fact that NATO expansion is inescapable and necessary, that a negative Russian reaction is also unavoidable and that we might as well do it quickly and get it over with."¹³⁵

Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs on the U.S. National Security Council Staff, is reported to have told foreign reporters in fall 1994 he could foresee NATO expansion in the first half of a second term for President Clinton.¹³⁶ A press report in early November 1994, prior to the NATO Ministerial meeting that launched the year-long study of NATO expansion, indicated that U.S. and Western diplomats were suggesting that NATO would set forth guidelines for joining NATO and that even the four leading candidates—Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia—were unlikely to be able to meet these for several years and were unlikely to be admitted before the year 2000, perhaps waiting until 2005.¹³⁷

With NATO's decision to study and discuss the expansion issue through most of 1995, it seems clear that, unless circumstances arise resulting in accelerated action, there will be no new NATO members in 1995. After NATO consultations internally and with Partners in 1995, it is an open question whether or not states may be invited to join NATO between now and the beginning of the 21st century.

German Defense Minister Ruehe's report to the Bundestag in February that within the next 6 months a formal exchange of letters between NATO and Russia for a bilateral security treaty could

indicate that progress with CEE states on NATO expansion could be accelerated. Central and East European leaders appear to believe that NATO will make decisions on NATO expansion by the end of 1995, when the NATO study is reported to December NATO foreign ministers' meeting. Some have also suggested that Russian military operations in Chechnya may have influenced thinking about moving forward with expansion. Czech President Havel was reported in mid-January to have said that the thought of security integration of former Eastern bloc states into NATO was near and that he envisaged Czech integration into the EU by the end of this millennium.¹³⁸

An early February report on NATO expansion by *The New York Times* stated, "In private, Western diplomats and NATO officials make it clear that expansion will not be quick—four or five years away—and that it will be limited to the four so-called Visegrad countries."¹³⁹

SEQUENCING?

The issue of sequencing admission of new members is a particularly sensitive one. Should one or two members—probably the Czech Republic and/or Poland—be admitted initially, with others to follow, or should several—perhaps the Visegrad four or even more—be admitted at the same time? Should decisions be made and announced on an ad hoc basis, or should there be some overall timetable or plan.

At their 1 December 1994 meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed "That, when it occurs, enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis and that some nations may attain membership before others."¹⁴⁰

Czech radio, reporting on a meeting between Czech President Havel and British Prime Minister John Major in early December 1994, stated that Major had repeated that the fundamental decision on NATO's expansion has been made and that candidates would be accepted individually, not suddenly but slowly and carefully.¹⁴¹

Following a September 1994 meeting among the Defense Ministers of Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, and Czech First Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil, Pospisil reportedly said that the Czech Republic was blocking the idea of joint action by the four states regarding NATO and that was why the Czech Defense

Ministry had recommended Defense Minister Baudys not attend the meeting.¹⁴² Following the same meeting, Slovak President Michal Kovac reportedly said that although all four states might not join NATO at the same time, there should not be too big a gap between their joining.¹⁴³

The implications of decisions on sequencing will depend in part on who is invited to join and who is not, the expectations of states and the extent to which all parties were consulted in advance, and the existence of other forms of cooperation between NATO and states not invited to join at the outset.

In the states not admitted, the position of reformers could be undercut, particularly if the reformers were advocates of NATO membership, and if prospects for NATO accession were very uncertain or dim.

States not admitted early on might be suspicious and upset and could create problems. They might be particularly distrustful if a state they view as a rival or possible threat is admitted and they are not. Some could challenge what criteria NATO use in selecting new members and how NATO made its assessment of which states met the criteria. Some might be concerned that if a rival were admitted to NATO and they were not, the rival, once admitted, might block their subsequent admittance. For example, given ethnic tensions between Romania and Hungary, the Romanians could be concerned that Hungary, if admitted first, might try to block Romanian accession.

DIVIDING LINES IN EUROPE

Opponents of NATO expansion have emphasized the risks of creating new dividing lines between Europe and Russia, or Europe and the CIS, or even within Central and Eastern Europe.

Supporters of expansion appear to recognize the risks but believe they can be managed. Allied officials appear to want to place NATO expansion in a broader security context for Europe and Eurasia, one without dividing lines.

NATO Foreign Ministers, at their December 1994 meeting, attempted to do this in the communique that they issued. They spoke of the Alliance's ability to "contribute to stability and cooperation in the whole of Europe," and its ability to offer "a broad approach to building political, military and economic

stability for all European countries," and consultation with Partners "about the evolution of the security architecture of Europe." They also stated, "Enlargement, when it comes, would be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe. It would threaten no one and would enhance stability and security for all of Europe." They added,

- The enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracies in the East.
- Enlargement should strengthen the effectiveness of the Alliance, contribute to stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area, and support our objective of maintaining an undivided Europe.
- Enlargement should be seen in the context of reinforcing cooperative structures of security which can extend to countries throughout the whole of Europe.
- Having just overcome the division of Europe, we have no desire to see the emergence of new lines of partition.
- A cooperative European security architecture requires the active participation of Russia." Ministers also made reference to Ukraine, CSCE, the WEU, and the French initiated Stability Talks, among other things.¹⁴⁴

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS A MANDATORY ROUTE

It seems clear that states wanting to join NATO will have to demonstrate their interest and qualifications through participation in PFP. The PFP invitation, issued by NATO Summit leaders in January 1994, includes the statement that "Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO." The key questions now appear to be what will a state desiring to join NATO have to do in PFP to demonstrate that it has the interest and is qualified to become a member of NATO, and how long will this process take.

Since the initiation of PFP in January 1994, 25 states have

become "partners" by signing framework agreements. As of January 1995, some 10 states had taken the next step and signed Individual Partnership Program documents, announcing what they were prepared to do as part of PFP. Each document was initiated separately by the respective state and worked separately with NATO.

PFP partner states have been given office space in a new wing constructed at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and a Partnership Coordination Cell has been established, with offices in a separate building, at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A good number of the PFP partners have already assigned liaison personnel to man these offices and participate in PFP activities at these NATO headquarters. PFP is designed to build closer relationships between NATO and PFP partners. NATO Secretary General Willy Claes wrote, "Through PFP we seek to build the habits of consultation, trust and cooperation which the Allies have developed among themselves for many decades.¹⁴⁵ Mr. Claes also indicated that much of the cooperation will be in the military area. NATO and PFP partners have planned and conducted exercises of forces, including exercises in both Poland and the Netherlands involving ground force units from many countries, and additional ones have been held or are planned. Partner states will nominate forces and assets that they will bring to the Partnership, and, related to those forces, approaches will be built to peacekeeping and humanitarian support operations. NATO will help share expertise on creating democratically organized and accountable Ministries of Defense. A defense planning and review process based on the NATO system will be introduced.¹⁴⁶

READINESS OF WESTERN PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS

What views do parliaments and publics in NATO states have on the issue of NATO expansion? How much attention has been given to the issues, particularly the issue of extending the security guarantees of NATO to countries of the East? How strong is parliamentary and public support for NATO in general?

United States

In the United States, the Congress and the American public appear to be strong supporters of NATO, and there is considerable support for extending NATO membership to selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The U.S. Congress. On 2 November 1994 the President signed into law the NATO Participation Act of 1994, Public Law 103-447, Title II. This legislation expresses the sense of the Congress that NATO leaders are to be commended for reaffirming that NATO membership remains open to PFP countries and encourages NATO membership for the Visegrad states and any others that meet six criteria specified in the legislation (see appendix E for enumeration of these criteria).

The legislation authorizes the President to designate PFP countries to receive U.S. assistance if they meet the six criteria plus a criterion against having provided defense articles to terrorist states. The U.S. assistance program is to facilitate the transition of states to full NATO membership by supporting and encouraging *inter alia* (1) joint planning, training, and military exercises with NATO forces, (2) greater interoperability of military equipment, air defense systems, and command, control, and communications systems, and (3) conformity of military doctrine. The legislation authorizes the President to provide security assistance in the form of transfer of certain types of excess defense articles, International Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military Financing. Finally, the legislation expresses the sense of the Congress that designated countries should be included in activities related to increased standardization and enhanced interoperability of equipment and weapons systems through coordinated training and procurement activities as well as other means undertaken by NATO and other allied countries.¹⁴⁷

In September 1994, Republican candidates for election to the U.S. House of Representatives issued a legislative plan, the Contract with America,¹⁴⁸ that contains a two-page "contract" indicating that the Republicans would introduce into the House a "National Security Restoration Act," which, in part, would be designed to "accelerate the expansion of NATO." The book spoke of renewing the U.S. commitment to a strong NATO by "urging the Clinton administration to proceed with full NATO partnership

discussions with nations that are striving to embrace democracy, enact free market economic reforms, and place their armies under civilian control.¹⁴⁹ The book further indicated that the legislation would express the sense of Congress that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia should be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area no later than 10 January 1999, that the U.S. should assist these nations as they work toward NATO membership, and that other European countries should be invited to join NATO if they agree to contribute to NATO security. The book also said that the legislation would give the President authority to assist these four states and other European states working toward full NATO membership.¹⁵⁰

In January 1995, a bill that addresses NATO and NATO expansion was introduced into the House of Representatives by Republican leaders and others (appendix F).¹⁵¹ The bill, H.R. 7, bears the short title, "National Security Revitalization Act." The bill states that one of its purposes is to "reemphasize the commitment of the United States to a strong and viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization." (See appendix F, Title VI, Sec. 602, Findings.)

The bill would amend the NATO Participation Act of 1994, specifically portions of Title II of Public Law 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928. Among the more important amendments:

- Instead of leaving it to the President's discretion to establish a program to assist designated states in the transition to full NATO membership, the bill would mandate it ("The President may establish..." would be changed to "The President shall establish...").
- States authorized (subject to Presidential designation) to receive assistance, in addition to the four Visegrad states, would be amended to "other European countries" instead of "other Partnership for Peace countries" emerging from communist domination.
- The Congress would "hereby" designate the four Visegrad states as eligible under this legislation, instead of stating that the President "may designate countries emerging from communism and participating in the Partnership for Peace, especially Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia" if the President

determines that they meet specified criteria and reports to relevant Congressional committees.

- With respect to the countries other than the four Visegrad states, the President would be given discretion ("may designate") to designate other states, but, again, the countries would have to be "European countries."
- The bill would add "Economic Support Fund" and "Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund" to the types of assistance programs a designated country could receive.
- It would modify the language prohibiting assistance to states that have cooperated with states supporting international terrorism.
- The bill would require an annual report from the President.
- Presidential reports would have to be sent not just to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Foreign Relations (now International Relations) Committees as in the 1994 legislation but also to the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and the House National Security and Appropriations Committees.

A version of the bill, said to be significantly changed in some sections, was passed in the House of Representatives in February 1995. Press reports did not indicate any changes were made to Title VI dealing with NATO revitalization and expansion. The press reported, however, that prospects for the legislation are poor because in the Senate there is no companion bill and there is support for only some of the bills key elements. Moreover, the White House was reported to be opposed to the bill, and the President suggested he might veto it.¹⁵²

In mid-February, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William J. Perry wrote a piece criticizing the National Security Revitalization Act, including Title VI "NATO Revitalization and Expansion Act." Regarding the NATO portion of the bill, they wrote,

The bill unilaterally and prematurely designates certain European states for NATO membership. NATO should and will expand. NATO expansion will strengthen stability in Europe for members and nonmembers alike. But new members must be ready to undertake the obligations of membership, just as we and our allies must be ready to extend our solemn commitments to them. Our present steady and

72 NATO EXPANSION

deliberate approach to NATO expansion is intended to insure that each potential member is judged individually, according to its capacity to contribute to NATO's goals.

* * * * *

That approach gives every new European democracy a strong incentive to consolidate reform. But if we arbitrarily lock in advantages now for some countries, we risk discouraging reformers in countries not named and fostering complacency in countries that are. Indeed, the effect of the measure before Congress could be instability in the very region whose security we seek to bolster.¹⁵³

Senator William S. Cohen in a speech to a conference in Munich, Germany, in early February 1995 claimed that the NATO expansion issue needs much more debate in the U.S.

He argued, "Stability is not a concept that is easy to sell. What we need is a thorough public debate, but in the United States it hasn't even begun." He stated that if a vote were to come up in the Senate now, "The answer today would be no. The public hasn't even started to think about what expansion would mean."¹⁵⁴

American Public. A Gallup/*USA Today* poll conducted in January 1994, just prior to the January NATO Summit meeting that agreed on the Partnership for Peace Program, reflected considerable support for allowing Central and East European states to join NATO.¹⁵⁵ The poll listed only seven CEE states; the results reflect general distinctions among the states. Gallup specifically raised the security guarantee issue and identified Russia as a possible threat in phrasing the question: "As you may know, NATO is committed to defending its members against a military attack by any other nation, including Russia. Which, if any, of the following countries do you think should be allowed to join NATO?"

	<i>Yes, Allowed to Join</i>	<i>No, Not Allowed</i>	<i>No Opinion, Depends (Vol)</i>
Poland	66%	18%	16%
Hungary	60	21	19
Romania	53	28	19
Czech Republic	52	28	20
Lithuania	51	25	24
Bulgaria	47	30	23
Albania	42	32	26

As for American support for NATO, polls of the American public in recent years have indicated relatively strong support for NATO and U.S. membership in it.

USIA has reported a number of interesting points about such polls, including:

- A majority in nearly every U.S. population group wants to maintain NATO. Support is somewhat greater among Republicans and the college educated than among Democrats and those with no college education (about 70 percent vs. 60 percent).
- Surveys in the past have shown that many Americans do not recognize the term "NATO" and that the level of support for the Alliance obtained on surveys depends considerably on whether the American-Western European alliance connection is spelled out.
- At least prior to 1994, support for NATO came more from a desire to maintain close U.S.-European ties than from the perception of an external (Soviet) threat.

A 4-7 December 1993 *Los Angeles Times* poll indicated that 61 percent of the American public favored maintaining NATO. People were asked, "As you may know, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—known as NATO—is an alliance of U.S. and Western European military forces set up after World War II to resist aggression by the Soviet Communist bloc. Now that Soviet communism has collapsed, some people think NATO is unnecessary and should be disbanded while others feel it still provides an important security alliance for the United States. Do you favor or oppose disbanding NATO? (If *favor* or *oppose*, do you (*favor/oppose*) that strongly or somewhat?"

Maintain NATO	61%
Strong opinion	33
Somewhat	28
Disband NATO	26
Somewhat	15
Strong opinion	11
Don't know	13

According to the January 1994 Gallup/*USA Today* poll, 70 percent of the American public believed that the "NATO military alliance of Western Europe and the United States" should be maintained (vs. 18 percent who said it was no longer needed).¹⁵⁶

A January 1994 American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)/*The Washington Post* poll indicated that 73 percent of Americans believed the United States should remain a member of the "NATO alliance between most of the Western European countries and the United States" (vs. 15 percent who said the United States should not remain a member of NATO).¹⁵⁷

Western Europe

There has been no legislation developed in West European parliaments specifically related to NATO expansion. In November 1994, however, North Atlantic Assembly Parliamentarians from NATO states reportedly expressed their favor for the fastest possible admission of new states to NATO.¹⁵⁸

In November 1993, the United States Information Agency (USIA) commissioned surveys in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom asking questions about extending security guarantees and using their own nation's troops to defend Central and Eastern Europe and admitting to NATO certain CEE states and Russia and Ukraine.¹⁵⁹ With respect to security guarantees, majorities in these West European states—except for Germany—believed that "NATO should provide a security guarantee to the countries of central and eastern Europe—that is Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania—to use NATO forces to defend them if they were to come under attack." The majorities ranged, by country polled, from 76 percent to 56 percent; in Germany, 45 percent said "yes" and 45 percent said "no." Somewhat similar majorities (generally 2-9 percentage points lower) also were willing to use their nation's troops to help NATO defend these CEE states (for Germany, 47 percent said "yes" and 47 percent said "no"). On admission to NATO, people were asked if they favored or opposed admitting into NATO eight specific Central and Eastern European States, Russia, and Ukraine. Averaging the results, individual Eastern countries received the following percentages of West European support for NATO membership: Poland, 63 percent; Hungary, 62 percent; Bulgaria, 54 percent; Czech Republic, 53 percent; Russia, 53 percent; Lithuania, 53 percent; Romania, 52 percent; Slovakia, 51 percent; Estonia, 50 percent; and Ukraine, 48 percent.

Polls commissioned by USIA in 1994 provided the following information on public opinion in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.¹⁶⁰ For Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, majorities ranging from 64 percent in Germany to 54 percent in both France and the U.K., believed that admitting Central and Eastern European states to NATO would benefit overall European security. The four Visegrad states and the three Baltic states received the greatest support for NATO membership, generally ranging between 78-60 percent of those polled. Majorities (74-58 percent) believed that Russia should be given the option to join NATO when it meets all qualifications.

Germany. In Germany, 64 percent of the public polled believed that admitting Central and East European states into NATO would benefit the overall security of Europe. Some 25 percent, however, believed NATO expansion would harm European security because it might overburden the Alliance and draw NATO into unwanted conflicts. Told to keep in mind that Germany must defend any NATO member that is attacked, the percentages favoring NATO membership for specific states were: Hungary, 78 percent; Czech Republic, Poland, the three Baltic states, and Slovakia, roughly 66 percent; Bulgaria, 55 percent; Slovenia, 54 percent; and Romania, 46 percent (with 44 percent opposed). Some 58 percent of Germans favored giving Russia the option to join NATO when it meets established qualifications; 34 percent opposed. Those in the eastern laender were more favorably inclined than those in western Germany. (Compared to Germany, polls showed more support for Russian membership in NATO in Italy (65 percent), France (67 percent), and the United Kingdom (74 percent)). Germans were hesitant to defend CEE states so long as they were not members of NATO. Without NATO membership, only some 25 percent of Germans polled would grant security guarantees to the Visegrad four and the three Baltic states, and the figure was only 17 percent with respect to Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia.

France. In France, 54 percent of those polled believe admission of CEE states to NATO would benefit European security. About 30 percent believed expansion would be harmful.

Reminded that France must defend any NATO member attacked, the percentages of those polled favoring membership for

specific states were: Poland, 75 percent; Hungary, 70 percent; Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, and the three Baltic states, about 60 percent; and Slovenia, 55 percent. Those opposed ranged from 19 percent to 31 percent. Some 67 percent favored giving Russia the option to join NATO when it met all qualifications, while 27 percent were opposed.

The French were hesitant to defend CEE states so long as they were not members of NATO. Some 38 percent were willing to defend the Visegrad four, and 35 percent were willing to defend Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia.

United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, 54 percent of those polled believed admission of CEE states to NATO would benefit European security, while 27 percent believed it would be harmful by overburdening the Alliance and drawing it into unwanted conflicts.

Told to keep in mind that the United Kingdom must defend any NATO member attacked, the percentages of those polled favoring membership for specific states were: Poland, 75 percent; Hungary, 66 percent; Czech Republic, 62 percent; the three Baltic states, Bulgaria, and Romania, 57-60 percent; Slovakia, 55 percent; and Slovenia, 52 percent. Some 74 percent favored giving Russia the option to join NATO when it meets all qualifications.

IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON NATO EFFECTIVENESS

The impact on NATO of adding new members would depend greatly on which states are admitted and how many states are admitted. Looking at the extremes, smaller states would likely be less influential and more willing to join a consensus in NATO on most issues. Large states, such as Russia, with a population nearly double that of Germany, armed forces larger than any other European state, and a history of influential foreign policy would likely change the political calculus in NATO; many have cautioned that membership would give Russia a veto in NATO.

NATO Secretary General Claes has suggested that one of the issues to be addressed in NATO's expansion study is whether or not the "principle of unanimity" should continue to apply with 22, 25, or 26 NATO members. He also suggested that another

question to be addressed was how to preserve the credibility of nuclear guarantees. Another question was the costs of NATO expansion, with Claes saying, "I am not one of those who think that the expansion of NATO will not cost any money. It would be naive to think so. In order to preserve the credibility of Article Five, extra military and financial outlays are required from both old and new NATO member countries."¹⁶¹

States that have consolidated democracies likely to endure, sustainable market economies, an in-place system of rule by law foreign policies reflecting respect for international law and mutual cooperation with neighbors and other states, and defensively oriented military doctrines and forces will likely enhance the Alliance. Admissions of states that do not have these characteristics, or states that, once admitted, lose these characteristics could pose serious problems for the Alliance and its cohesion.

NATO would likely want to avoid to the extent possible bringing into the Alliance territorial or ethnically based confrontations or conflicts. Such tensions might exist between two new members, a new member and an existing member, or a new member and a state not being asked to join NATO. If such tensions exist, NATO might want to carefully analyze the situation and seek as much assurance as possible that the tensions would be resolved or dealt with peacefully.

The number of states that might be asked to join NATO would also be an important variable. Again, at the extremes, for NATO to increase from 16 to 17 members would likely have little impact. Increasing NATO to the size of OSCE with 53 members—more than tripling the size of NATO—would create significant turmoil and disruption in NATO and require major changes in the way NATO now handles consultations, planning, and operations. There are major differences in preparing for and conducting not only NATO ministerial and other meetings with 16 member states, but also NACC meetings with 38, PFP meetings with 41, and OSCE meetings with 53 member states.

Depending on which states are admitted, there could be significant geostrategic implications for NATO, including new territory to defend or made available for planning defensive operations, forces to be brought into NATO's integrated military

command, and bases and infrastructure that might be available or need to be supported.

As NATO conducts its study related to expansion, it will need to address many of these and other issues. NATO will likely need to consider the implications of expanding somewhere beyond 17 members but far short of the 53 members in OSCE and probably even far short of the 38 to 41 members in NACC and PFP, respectively. NATO will also need to address the impact of expanded membership on the NATO committee system and on the integrated NATO military command. There will be many difficult issues to address regarding force commitments, planning, command and control, infrastructure, standardization of strategies, doctrines, tactics and equipment, and deployments. NATO would want to avoid a division between what is done in Western Europe and what is done with new states from the East.

THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

To the extent that NATO and other states turn their attention to membership in NATO, will there be less interest in and attention to NACC and PFP? If so, will this exacerbate the divisions between, on one hand, NATO and its new members, and on the other, states participating only in NACC and PFP?

NACC predated PFP, and, indeed, NATO Summit leaders in January 1994 announced that PFP was being established "within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council." What exactly this means is not entirely clear, but as indicated below NACC Foreign Ministers, with the participation of Ministers from states that have joined PFP but not NACC, have reviewed both NACC and PFP activities and approved a Work Plan for 1994 and 1995.

With the launching of PFP, less attention, at least publicly, seems to be accorded to NACC. On 1 December 1994 NATO Foreign Ministers met and issued a communique that mentions NACC only in passing and focuses primarily on PFP. The

following day, however, the semiannual NACC Ministerial was held and attended by Foreign Ministers and representatives of NACC member states and the WEU Secretary General and foreign ministers and representatives of states that have joined PFP but not NACC. The NACC Chairman issued a relatively short six-paragraph summary of the meeting which gave approximately equal attention to NACC and PFP; Ministers were said to have reviewed NACC and PFP activities based on reports from chairmen of the relevant NACC and PFP committees and to have exchanged views on the relationship between NACC and PFP with a view to achieving maximum efficiency and effectiveness between them. They were also reported to have consulted on the "evolution of the European security architecture and ways to strengthen mutually reinforcing cooperation between different institutions concerned with security issues."¹⁶²

Also released at the meeting was a "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1994/1995," approved by Ministers participating in the meeting. This relatively extensive work plan summarizes topics and activities addressed by both NACC and PFP. In general, it appears that NACC will address political, economic, scientific, environmental, and informational issues; PFP will address peacekeeping and most defense planning and military issues; and NACC and PFP will both address civil emergency planning/humanitarian assistance and air traffic management. In outline form, the headings for the topics and activities in the work plan are:

- Political and security related matters
- Policy planning consultations
- Economic issues (defense conversion, security aspects of economic development, and defense expenditures and defense budgets and their relationship with the economy)
- Science
- Challenges of modern society (including environment)
- Information
- Peacekeeping (only PFP topics and activities)
- Defense planning issues and military matters (NACC topic and activity is air defense; PFP topics cover a broad range of issues, also including air defense, and PFP activities include many exercises)

- Civil emergency planning-humanitarian assistance (both NACC and PFP topics and activities)
- Air traffic management (both NACC and PFP topics and activities).

The NACC and PFP have a relatively rich menu of topics and activities to address. Most of the NACC and PFP member states have officers or liaison officers located at NATO Headquarters, and many have officers at SHAPE, where they can participate in consultations, planning, and reviews. The success of NACC and PFP will depend on the attention and resources devoted to these activities by NATO Allies and other NACC and PFP participants.

VIEWS EXPRESSED IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

Central and Eastern Europe

The majority of political leaders and publics in CEE states appear to favor strengthening ties to or joining NATO. According to a fall 1993 USIA survey of five CEE states, sizeable majorities of people polled favored "strengthening ties" between their country and NATO. Approval rates were as follows: Poland, 73 percent; Czech Republic, 67 percent; Slovakia, 60 percent; Hungary, 60 percent; and Bulgaria, 54 percent.¹⁶³

Czech Republic. Czech President Vaclav Havel as early as November 1993 set forth the rationale for why the Czech Republic wants to join NATO—basically, no large European conflict has left Central Europe untouched, the Czech Republic is part of West European civilization and shares NATO's values, and the Czech Republic's geopolitical situation is precarious.¹⁶⁴

Havel, in an interview published in February 1995, discussed the timing of joining NATO, saying that "For reasons of security, being accepted into NATO is indeed more urgent for us than being accepted into the European Union. No one knows what the further developments in Russia will be like and whether we will not experience unpleasant surprises there. Now time is really ripe to seriously negotiate about our membership in NATO; it alone offers a security guarantee. Integration in the European Union remains a long-term process."¹⁶⁵ In December 1994 Havel reported that he had talked to German Chancellor Kohl who "had said that he could

envision the Czech Republic joining NATO before joining the EU.¹⁶⁶ Havel has supported NATO membership for other Visegrad states but not necessarily joining NATO as a group, saying, "The sequence in which individual countries will be admitted into NATO will be, naturally, up to NATO. It is up to the countries themselves whether they meet NATO's conditions."¹⁶⁷

Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus, on the other hand, told the EU Summit on 9 December that joining the EU was his country's main strategic goal.¹⁶⁸ Klaus has, however, emphasized the unique importance of NATO in terms of the U.S. relationship and the budgetary implications of NATO membership, saying: "When I emphasize our ambitions regarding NATO, I emphasize the demand for an American presence in Europe . . . admission to NATO would necessarily entail a process of fundamental rearmament stretching over several years, which would require an appreciable reinforcement of the Ministry of Defense budget."¹⁶⁹

Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan implied a distinction between being ready to join NATO politically and militarily. In November 1994, he reportedly said that his country was politically prepared to join NATO and that, while the Czech Army still has to complete restructuring, this will soon be the case in certain areas.¹⁷⁰ The same month he wrote, "If our admission to (NATO) indeed depended only upon our Army's organizational readiness, I would say that this could happen shortly after the completion of the Army's transformation. Starting in 1996, we could be ready for admission. Nevertheless, I am afraid that the situation is much more complicated. Admission to NATO on our part or acceptance into NATO from the point of view of our partners is primarily a political matter. It demands respect for common values and defense of common interests . . . our endeavor for integration into structures such as the European Union and NATO is natural and uncompromising and, apart from extremists, something on which both the coalition and the opposition parties concur."¹⁷¹ Holan also was reported to have said that the Czech Republic will join NATO before the year 2006 and that it is possible that Czech activities in PFP will be so high that they will virtually equal NATO membership.¹⁷²

Both Havel and Klaus have said that Czech membership in NATO should be the subject of a referendum in the Czech

Republic, but on 24 January 1994, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec said that he did not think admission to NATO should be the subject of a referendum because a referendum in the Czech constitutional system is an exceptional thing.¹⁷³

Poland. Poland was one of the first states to press for NATO membership, and President Lech Walesa has been one of the most outspoken advocates of NATO expansion. The majority of Polish citizens support NATO membership. Pressures on the defense budget may hurt the effort for NATO membership.

Walesa argued, "Our goal is to participate fully in NATO. There cannot be a region of insecurity in the center of Europe. Our participation in NATO is not only in our interests. It is in the interests of Europe."¹⁷⁴

Walesa has also been an advocate of joint Visegrad approaches to the EU and NATO, saying, for instance, in January 1995: "Since the formation of the Visegrad Group, Poland has believed we should discuss strategic questions together and enter jointly into the dialogue with the European Union and NATO. This could be our trump card in the process of integration into these institutions."¹⁷⁵

In mid-January 1995, then Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak stated that there was a general consensus in Poland regarding foreign policy priorities and the first of these was integration into the EU and NATO.¹⁷⁶ Speaking before the Polish parliament on 19 January, Pawlak said Poland regarded participation in PFP as a road to full NATO membership, that Poland did not subject its NATO membership to the development of the situation abroad, and that Poland wanted to take to NATO its own defense potential, which was that of a democratic state, one economically developed and politically stable, with an efficient and quite modern army; he said Poland expected to become an equal partner.¹⁷⁷

Also, however, in mid-January 1995, Poland's Foreign Minister, Andrzej Olechowski, resigned, citing irreconcilable policy differences with the government led by Pawlak. Olechowski, who has been appointed by Walesa, viewed Polish membership in NATO and the EU as of the utmost importance to Poland's foreign policy: "My feeling is that the Government does not want to do, and will not actively and convincingly do, what I regard as being in the state's interest: the fastest possible membership of NATO and the European Union." Olechowski, in an interview reported

in December 1994, had already expressed fear that, regarding NATO membership, "In two or three years the door that is now open to us may be closed again."¹⁷⁸ Walesa agreed.¹⁷⁹

Asked in October 1994 about Russia's joining NATO, Olechowski said Poland was lobbying to get Russia into the G-7, was working toward a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and would have "no objection at all to Russia's participating in a collective security system, the core of which would be NATO."¹⁸⁰

With regard to the Defense Ministry, in June 1994, First Deputy Minister of National Defense Jerzy Milewski reportedly emphasized that Poland should make efforts to be admitted to NATO structures gradually, with political integration now, and military integration taking some time, given the necessity of defense planning and adapting the Army. After all, Spain had signed six agreements on gradual integration before it was actually admitted to NATO.¹⁸¹ In July 1994, he said that Poland was counting on full NATO membership before the end of the decade.¹⁸² In August, Milewski stated, "The bad state of our Army and the lack of financial prospects is undoubtedly a very strong negative political factor, which may delay Poland's membership in NATO."¹⁸³ The press spokesman for the Polish General Staff in August 1994 said that the Army needs no less than 3 percent of the gross domestic product, but even that would not be enough to reach the armament level found in NATO.¹⁸⁴ In February 1995, an article in the Polish press reported that it is difficult to find in the 1995 Polish defense budget enough money to cover the 50 million zlotys that the General Staff estimates will be needed to fund PFP participation.¹⁸⁵

The Polish populace today supports membership in NATO, but in June 1993, only about half those interviewed favored Poland's participation in NATO military structures.¹⁸⁶ Results of a poll taken in Poland in February 1994 indicated that 79 percent of those interviewed favored Poland seeking NATO membership, while only 7 percent were opposed and 14 percent had no opinion. Some 66 percent believed PFP enhanced Poland's security, and some 41 percent believed the West had betrayed Poland and other CEE states by refusing them immediate NATO membership. As for the timing of Poland's entry into NATO, 6 percent thought it

would be in 1 to 2 years, 42 percent thought several years, and 23 percent thought a dozen or so years.¹⁸⁷ A poll in summer 1994 indicated that 71 percent favored striving for NATO membership, 10 percent opposed, and 20 percent had no opinion; 40 percent believed Poland would be accepted into NATO but not for several years, and 25 percent thought Poland would perhaps join NATO but not for many years.¹⁸⁸

A poll taken of Polish military officers showed that 80 percent of those interviewed favored Polish membership in NATO, and 79 percent expressed positive opinions of Polish participation in NATO's military missions. Some 75 percent said that Russia poses a danger to Poland, and 79 percent stated that Russia intends to return to its empire policy.¹⁸⁹

Hungary. Views in Hungary about joining NATO appear more ambiguous than those in the Czech Republic and Poland. Although many Hungarian political leaders have spoken in favor of NATO membership, and Hungary is a member of PFP as well as NACC, there is sufficient or desire to defer NATO membership, that a referendum has been proposed. Defense and military officials cite costs of PFP and NATO membership and budgetary reasons for not participating in a PFP exercise last year.

Prime Minister Gyula Horn, the first post-Communist leader to advocate NATO membership,¹⁹⁰ has proposed a referendum on the issue of joining NATO, explaining that the public has split views on the issue—some wondering why, after 40 years in the Warsaw Pact, Hungary should join another alliance, and some idealistically favoring neutrality. Horn said he will argue feels he will argue in favor of NATO.¹⁹¹ He feels there is a national consensus on joining the EU, but the consensus does not apply to NATO.¹⁹² On 6 February 1995, President Arpad Goncz, who views NATO as "the anchor with which to cling tightly to the West," predicts that the referendum "would be approved with 70 to 75 percent of yes votes" and, if undertaken, "will confer greater force and legitimacy to our joining."¹⁹³

According to a press report on the views of leaders of seven political parties in Hungary, four favored NATO membership, one (Workers Party) opposed it, and two said it was too soon to join NATO and that membership would require a referendum.¹⁹⁴ Government leaders have also expressed differing views on

priorities for Hungarian policy. President Goncz in September 1994 said that "The Hungarian Government's priority task is to resolve minority issues through international agreements."¹⁹⁵ In November 1994, Prime Minister Horn said that EU membership is the main goal of his government, but that Hungary's most urgent foreign policy task was to eliminate tensions with its neighbors and negotiate basic friendship treaties with Romania and Slovakia.¹⁹⁶ In December 1994, Kovacs said: "The number one aim of Hungarian foreign policy is the country's adjustment to the Euro-Atlantic institutional system. It equally means joining the EU and NATO. We examine these two matters in unity, because these are complementary processes that reinforce each other."¹⁹⁷ In an interview published on 9 February 1995, Kovacs listed the three principal aims of Hungary's foreign policy to be integration into the West European and North Atlantic community—full membership in the EU and NATO, creation of the best possible relations with Hungary's neighbors, and support for Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbian Vojvodina.¹⁹⁸

On the timing of joining NATO and the EU, Prime Minister Horn has stated that Hungary will join NATO before joining the EU, as NATO will decide on enlargement in December 1995. Horn was said to expect that the EU Intergovernmental Conference in 1996 would determine conditions for CEE accession to the EU, then negotiations on accession would begin in 1997, thus Hungary could join the EU by the year 2000.¹⁹⁹ In an interview published on 13 February 1995, Horn suggested, "Admission to NATO might take place first, because NATO does not have long-term economic conditions as does the EU. The relevant NATO decision—for orientation, if nothing else—might be made as early as the end of 1995 or the first half of 1996."²⁰⁰ Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti also thinks NATO membership will precede EU membership.²⁰¹

On the issue of sequencing of Visegrad states into NATO, former President Josef Antall suggested in 1993 that all four Visegrad states should enter NATO together, at one time. Foreign Ministry official Istvan Gyarmati explained the reasoning: "By this, the security and stability of NATO would become stronger. This is also in our interest because our integration with NATO will be much smoother if we have a land connection with the current NATO member countries, and also because we are convinced that

we could solve our existing problems with Slovakia in a much more civilized way if both countries were NATO members. Hungary is interested in the simultaneous NATO membership of these four countries, because this can be a guarantee that Slovakia, with which Hungary is striving for the best possible neighborly relations, is also a partner in these efforts.²⁰²

Hungarian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ferenc Somogyi expressed a different view on the issue of Hungary having a land connection to NATO states. In an interview published in mid-January 1995 he said, "This factor has not yet been raised as something important in assessing the accession. In my view, we could even become a NATO member as an 'island.'²⁰³

Chairman of the Hungarian National Assembly's Defense Committee Imre Mecs has emphasized the importance of Hungary's neighbors being admitted to NATO in time, saying: "We should not only think in terms of Hungary, but in terms of the entire region. From this point of view, it is important that, if we are admitted to NATO, the neighboring countries should also be admitted to NATO within a certain period, depending on how they can fulfill conditions set by Europe and NATO."²⁰⁴

Defense Minister Keleti indicated in November 1994 that Hungary favored approaching NATO membership by itself, not hand-in-hand with others. Speaking about Hungarian-Romanian relations, he said, "We are looking for forms of cooperation that will promote this, but in all cases the given country's circumstances and opportunities have to be taken into account."²⁰⁵

Hungarian defense and military officials have often emphasized that the military establish supports joining NATO but may lag behind the political impetus to join NATO and sees budget problems impacting on participating in PFP and joining NATO. Defense Minister Keleti said,

All of those who work at the Defense Ministry or at the headquarters of the Hungarian Army are working for Hungary's becoming a full member of NATO and for the modernization of the Army²⁰⁶. . . . By declaring its firm intention to join NATO, the Hungarian government provided enough proof that it is serious and will do everything in its power to succeed in this endeavor. I think that the Hungarian public also agrees with this. The army does not yet fully agree, but this has nothing to do with the spirit of this intention to join²⁰⁷. . . . We do

not intend to launch a race to join NATO, because such a race might lead to the consequence that too much money will be spent on these programs.²⁰⁸

The Hungarian military has significant budgetary problems, which have impacted on their participation in PFP exercises and are a consideration in joining NATO. Hungary cited budgetary problems in deciding not to participate in a PFP exercise in Poland last year, as Defense Committee Chairman Mecs has said, "We must accept that membership in NATO involves considerable extra expenditures."²⁰⁹ When a Hungarian journalist asked NATO Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino if NATO members held a grudge against Hungary because of its nonparticipation, Balanzino said it would be a mistake to speak of grudges but that "We count on the Hungarians' participation in the next exercises, or at least in a few upcoming exercises. If Hungary failed to participate in these exercises—and I speak here absolutely hypothetically—this would show that the Partnership for Peace program does not mean much to you. However, we do not expect this."²¹⁰

Slovakia. The government of Slovakia strongly favors NATO membership, but less than half the population polled support Slovakia joining NATO. Slovaks are sensitive to sometimes not being given equal mention with the other Visegrad states.

A broad policy statement on foreign and domestic affairs issued by the Slovakian government on 20 January 1995, stated, "The purposeful rapprochement with the European Union, with the aim of obtaining full membership around the year 2000, is a priority," and later said, "The fundamental course of the Slovak Republic's security orientation is represented by the endeavor to obtain membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and the Western European Union. . . . We are linked to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary by our shared interest in admission into Western European and Trans-atlantic structures. Therefore, we are prepared to continue building our mutual relations so that they correspond to the standard of relations between the individual member countries of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance."²¹¹ Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, as early as September 1993, stated, "It is our goal, program, and intention, to

become a part of NATO, which currently is the only efficiently operating defense alliance in Europe," adding "The problem is for our Army to join NATO as a partner able to meet the demanding tasks of this military alliance."²¹²

In November 1993, President Michal Kovac said, "For me NATO, and its guarantee of security, is my top priority. I am concerned about the situation in Russia and Ukraine . . . the lack of a guarantee for the future is creating a climate of insecurity in Central Europe."²¹³ Also in 1993, Kovac, not expecting NATO and WEU expansion at the moment, expressed interest in an alternative of associate membership in NATO and the WEU, without full military integration and the guarantees of Articles 5 of the two treaties.²¹⁴

Defense Minister Pavel Kanis in November 1994 assessed political views in Slovakia on NATO membership as follows: "I think the individual political parties do not have identical ideas on our becoming members in West European and NATO security, economic, and political structures. There are differences between parties, but, all in all, one can say that basically the orientation toward European and transatlantic structures is intrinsic to all of the parties, with a few exceptions."²¹⁵

Chief of the Slovak General Staff, General Jozef Tuchyna, has conditionally endorsed NATO membership, saying that "The military is prepared to enlarge the NATO umbrella provided we find some common ground in communications—and I can say that about 50 percent of this common ground definitely exists. Then the military is indeed prepared." He also stated, "Any act of joining a certain entity, even NATO, as it were, will generate a legitimate need to surrender a certain part of one's sovereignty for the benefit of the entity. If we join NATO, we must count on the fact that we will have to respect some of this organization's requirements. Therefore, if we sign an agreement to join NATO, we will have to meet the obligations we have undertaken."²¹⁶

Polls taken in Slovakia show that less than half those questioned favor Slovakia joining NATO. The press reported different figures apparently from the same poll taken in July 1994 sponsored by the Foreign Ministry and Slovak radio. One report indicated only 27 percent favored Slovakia's entry into NATO and the EU, while 25 percent preferred neutrality.²¹⁷ Another report,

apparently based on the same poll, indicated that over 48 percent favored joining NATO. According to this report, the numbers in favor increased in 1994 over 1993. The figures (for, against, don't know) for 1994 were 48.4 percent, 18.4 percent, and 33.2 percent; for 1993 they were 44.7 percent, 20.2 percent, and 35.1 percent.²¹⁸ Another report indicated that Slovaks trust the United Nations the most (53.9 percent), and that 23.1 percent trust NATO and 55.4 percent describe NATO as more or less the only guarantor of European security.²¹⁹ Some have called for a public referendum on joining NATO, and Prime Minister Meciar has said that the actual joining of NATO would be preceded by a referendum.²²⁰

The Slovaks appear generally to support a coordinated approach to NATO by the Visegrad states, and there appears to be concern that Slovakia might not fare as well as the other Visegrad states in gaining NATO membership. In October 1993, then Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak was said to have bemoaned the absence of a unified belief among the Visegrad states that close cooperation among them would get them NATO membership faster than if they worked alone.²²¹ In 1993, then Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik took this position: "I must say unequivocally that no one from the official representatives of member countries or from the NATO headquarters has ever stated that a different approach would be applied to Slovakia than to other member countries of the Visegrad Four."²²²

In mid-1994, Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan addressed alleged slights of Slovakia. In an interview in July 1994, following a meeting in Warsaw involving U.S. Secretary of State Christopher and 7 other foreign ministers, a Slovak television correspondent asked Kukan for a response to the fact that U.S. officials and Polish TV had recently indicated that Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic enjoyed the best prospects for being admitted quickly to NATO. Kukan replied that his response was one of indignation, that he had been "given assurances everywhere that Slovakia would not be forgotten and that Slovakia has a firm place among these four countries," and that "Warren Christopher always spoke about four countries. Even when he spoke about prospects for NATO membership. . . . He named these countries and Slovakia was one of them."²²³ When asked in May 1994 about former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew

Brzezinski "forgetting" to include in one of his articles Slovakia as a Visegrad state candidate for NATO membership, Kukan said that politicians who have made this mistake have assured him it wouldn't happen again, that he was unable to explain Brzezinski's repeated "errors," and that Brzezinski's "views and political analyses do not carry all that much weight in the United States today."²²⁴

Bulgaria. Bulgarian leaders seek membership in NATO but often perceive that the West views them with less priority than the Visegrad states. Bulgarians may feel a greater attachment to Russia than do the Visegrad states.

Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev stated in November 1993 that he thought "Bulgaria stands equal chances of joining NATO with the Visegrad Four."²²⁵ Commander of the Bulgarian Army General Staff Army General Lyuben Petrov, when asked in March 1994 if he thought Bulgaria would be the first new member of NATO, responded, "This is our wish and we would like to think that it will be so." In September 1994, however, President Zhelev stated that sometimes Bulgarians have the feeling that they "have been left in the lurch by the West." He suggested that this might have something to do with the war in neighboring former Yugoslavia, saying, "In the minds of European investors, this creates the impression that Bulgaria is a risky country, too, because no one knows what can happen in this unpredictable Balkan state." Zhelev said this has led to a feeling of "isolation, marginalization from the West."²²⁶

Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov, when asked during a recent interview reported in the Bulgarian press whether the Bulgarian Defense Ministry would look toward Russia or toward NATO with regard to arms sales, replied, "We will look both toward Russia and NATO. To think that we can avoid integration into the European structures is an illusion. On the other hand, Russia has been our ally for centuries. The issue is not about being 'for' or 'against' NATO but about the road along which we would march toward NATO. In addition, it must be remembered that 95 percent of our weapons were made in Russia."²²⁷

Romania. Romanians seek full membership in NATO and the WEU, as well as the EU. They were the first to sign up to PFP, but are less vocal than the Visegrad states in seeking NATO

membership.

Romanian President Ion Iliescu stated that Romania wants "full integration" into NATO, but at the same he realizes that "NATO must not be a threat for Russia" and regards "future NATO membership as a step . . . toward a strategic and security balance in this part of Europe.²²⁸ Chairman of the Senate Defense Committee Radu Timofte has expressed his support for Romania joining NATO.²²⁹

In December 1994, Ioan Mircea Pascu, State Secretary of Defense, expressed concern that NATO might first invite the Visegrad states to join NATO as a group, and that others would be left out for good.²³⁰ While relations between Hungary and Romania have improved, Romanian officials may be concerned that if Hungary were asked to join NATO before Romania, Hungary, as a new NATO member, might block Romanian entry or use the NATO admission issue to gain leverage on other issues between Romania and Hungary.

Albania. Albanian Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova has stated that Albania supports PFP as a program that brings Albania closer to NATO and that "Albania wants to be integrated into the NATO structures."²³¹ Albania also seeks membership in the WEU.²³²

The Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania appear to favor membership in NATO but are not vocal on the issue. U.S. congressional legislation has suggested that the Baltic states might be considered in a second category of priority after the Visegrad states.

On 8 December 1994, Estonian President Lennart Meri told journalists that Estonia would become an associate member of the EU in 1995 and that the West should not delay incorporating East European states into Western organizations because "Russia is on the brink of chaos, and it is possible that the West does not have much time to act."²³³

Latvian President Algirdas Brazauskas, during a visit to the Czech Republic in December 1994, when asked if he regarded the Czech Republic as a competitor in joining the EU and NATO, responded, "No, I do not think we are competing. We know that the Czech Republic is several steps ahead of us. We can make use of your experience and take the well-tried path. I know we are

heading in the same direction, but we will try not to lag too far behind."²³⁴

United States

The U.S. administration position is reflected primarily in the NATO Summit declaration and PFP invitation of January 1994 and speeches by President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher, some of which have been quoted earlier.

Congress appears to be supportive of NATO expansion. The NATO Participation Act of 1994 encourages NATO expansion, although the Act calls for the President to report to the Armed Services Committees and the Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations Committees on, among other NATO issues, "The desirability of expanding the alliance to include traditionally neutral nations or the new democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that wish to join NATO." The "NATO Revitalization and Expansion Act of 1995" goes even further in support of NATO expansion. (See appendix F for more details.)

In February 1995, the Clinton administration announced a program permitting sales of jet fighter aircraft, tanks, and other sophisticated weapons to the four Visegrad states, the three Baltic states, and Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania.²³⁵

Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and other foreign affairs specialists have advocated NATO expansion. Other former U.S. Government officials and foreign affairs specialists have opposed expansion. A poll conducted in January 1994 indicated that a majority of those interviewed supported NATO membership for at least five CEE states.

Western Europe

Germany. The German Government in general has been supportive of NATO expansion in principle, but there appear to be differences of view between Defense Minister Volker Ruehe and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Polls of the German populace show support for NATO expansion.

Some have described the German and French Governments as "eager for neither a timetable nor criteria to be laid down" and as hesitant both to "provoke an even greater right-wing upsurge in

"Russia" and to forge "a new political line of demarcation between East and West." The German Government apparently prefers to view Central European military integration with NATO as an afterthought to its economic integration with the EU.²³⁶

Defense Minister Ruehe has been one of the leading advocates of expanding NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia and to determine the new members soon.²³⁷ He has also been very vocal on excluding Russia. General Klaus Naumann, Chief of Staff of the German Armed Forces, has also suggested that "possibly Ukraine and certainly Russia, have no realistic possibility of membership" in NATO.²³⁸

Foreign Minister Kinkel appears to differ with Ruehe, particularly in terms of timing and singling out states now. He appears to see NATO expansion as a general goal and one that must be linked to larger processes in Europe. He is also said to be concerned that by adding 3 to 5 states to NATO now, the security status of other states, such as the Baltics and Ukraine, will be reduced. Kinkel has been reported to have argued in October 1994 that anyone who takes the Maastricht Treaty with its vision of a common European defense policy seriously must oppose "zones of unequal security within the EU."²³⁹ The Foreign Ministry has argued, "The more the issue of NATO is related to the issue of European Union, the lesser the danger of confrontation between NATO and Russia."²⁴⁰

Nevertheless, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in a television interview in December 1994 stated, "It makes sense to develop NATO further by allowing our neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe—the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians—to become members of the European Union and members of NATO." Kohl denied suggesting any simultaneity in expanding EU and NATO membership. He referred to the interests of Russia and Ukraine, said he would reject any measures unilaterally directed against Russian interests, and said it was "quite possible for NATO to reach accords with Russia by which mutual fears can be reduced." He said he would fully agree with using the CSCE framework to bring Russia, Ukraine, and the other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States closer to the West.²⁴¹

A newspaper report on the February 1995 Wehrkunde conference on European security in Munich suggests that Kinkel

is now more favorable to NATO expansion, having stated that "we must expand NATO eastwards because there can be no economic development without external security." Rudolf Scharping, the leader of the Social Democrat opposition party, reportedly said much the same.²⁴²

France. The French Government has been relatively quiet on the issue of NATO expansion. It evidently shares some of the views attributed to the German government and is said to be "not keen on NATO expansion."²⁴³ In the fall of 1994, both Prime Minister Edouard Balladur and outgoing European Commission President and potential French Presidential candidate Jacques Delors both criticized what they regarded as U.S.-led efforts to expand NATO hastily.²⁴⁴

Defense Minister Francois Leotard wrote, "Our partners in East Europe—who were only forced away from our community of nations by a tragedy—have the authority to join NATO if they wish. I do not see what egoistic pretext we could use to refuse them this right."²⁴⁵

Great Britain. Britain's Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd was reported to have predicted in early November 1994 that Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic "will succeed" in becoming NATO members, while stating, "No dates have been fixed."²⁴⁶ In a speech in early February 1995, Mr. Hurd reportedly advocated forward progress on enlargement of the EU and NATO, saying, "The process of reaching out must not lose steam. It must not fall prey to doubt."²⁴⁷ Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind, however, seems more cautious. He was quoted in early February 1995 as saying: "We wanted to have the conditions for expansion defined first. We cannot occupy ourselves with individual applicants and their problems right now. We have to begin by examining the impact of expansion on NATO and by formulating conditions."²⁴⁸ In mid-February 1995, he was reported as saying NATO must look at candidate new members individually: "Nothing is automatic here. It is not that at one time we would accept a whole group of countries or not accept any of them."²⁴⁹

Belgium. Belgian Defense Minister Leo Delcroix during a visit to Bulgaria in December 1994 stated, "I think that in four to five years, Bulgaria should become a full-fledged NATO member."²⁵⁰

Netherlands. Netherlands Defense Minister Joris Voorhoeve in fall 1994 reportedly agree with the German Defense Minister that only the four Visegrad states would come into consideration for rapid NATO membership.²⁵¹

Spain. Spanish authorities reportedly have urged that NATO expansion not be rushed, reasoning that the more members in NATO, the less weight Spain will carry, and rapid enlargement could weaken defense of NATO's present 16 members.²⁵²

Scandinavia countries. Sweden and Finland have become PFP partners. Swedish Defense Minister Andres Bjork, noting that Sweden is a PFP partner, has ruled out NATO membership for Sweden over the long term and said Swedish relations with the WEU would depend on the EU Intergovernmental Conference in 1996.²⁵³ Swedish Moderate Coalition Party leader Carl Bildt has taken this view: "There is no immediate reason for us to join NATO, and NATO is not interested in having us join. As long as we can pay for a Swedish defense capability that makes us strong enough to defend ourselves there will be no urgent need for foreign help. . . . We prefer strong national defenses to a weak NATO membership, and those are the two real alternatives. . . . It is possible Sweden will end up there as a result of making savings on defense, but we prefer the other possibility."²⁵⁴ Finish Defense Minister Elisabeth Rehn in September 1994 stated, "We have not yet decided what attitude we are to assume toward the Western European Union and NATO. I personally believe we should first become WEU observers. Apart from that, all doors for all possibilities should remain open."²⁵⁵

Austria.. Austria joined PFP in early 1995. Austria's new membership in the EU has given rise to a debate on membership in the WEU; Chancellor Vranitzky said that the issue will be considered after the EU Intergovernmental Conference in 1999.²⁵⁶ Defense Minister Werner Fasslabend suggested that Austria might move even beyond an observer status in the WEU to become a full member.²⁵⁷ Fasslabend indicated he does not consider it necessary for Austria to become a full member of NATO.²⁵⁸ The head of Austria's Freedom Party called for full membership in NATO for Austria.²⁵⁹

Russia

Russian leaders and foreign affairs specialists generally oppose NATO expansion eastward, particularly if countries of Central and Eastern Europe or other new independent states of the former Soviet Union are admitted into NATO either before Russia or without Russia.

Russia also opposed the WEU's decision to invite only CEE states and not Russia or other states of the CIS to become associate partners of the WEU, but Russian objections in the final analysis appear to have been mild. The Russians may, of course, be more concerned about NATO, which, in comparison to the WEU, they may see as more important in terms of power, prestige, and American involvement.

There appears to be in Russia political circles considerable mistrust of NATO and fear of isolation or encirclement. Some have argued that NATO should have been dissolved when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. Many Russians advocate a broader security architecture for Europe based on CSCE or some other structure, with NATO either playing a subordinate role or eventually being disbanded. How receptive Russians would be to establish a unique relationship between NATO and Russia, perhaps through a treaty, remains to be seen. Beyond this general view, there is a range of positions.

President Yeltsin and His Advisors. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has made ambivalent statements regarding NATO expansion, initially appearing prepared to acquiesce in Central European states joining NATO, but later taking a harder line.

In August 1993, during his visit to Poland and the Czech Republic, Yeltsin appeared ready to acquiesce in Central European states joining NATO. On 25 August, he and Polish President Walesa issued a declaration that indicated that Poland's intention to join NATO "was met with understanding" by Yeltsin and that "In the long term, such a decision taken by a sovereign Poland in the interests of overall European integration does not go against the interests of other states, including the interests of Russia." Yeltsin reportedly told the press that "in the new Russian-Polish relations, there is no place for hegemony and diktat, the psychology of a 'big brother' and a 'little brother.'" On 26 August in Prague, he stated publicly that Russia "has no right" to hinder the Czech Republic's

joining of any organization.²⁶⁰

In February 1994, however, Yeltsin, in an address to the Russian parliament, said, "While respecting the sovereign rights of states and organizations, Russia is opposed to the expansion of NATO with various countries of the European continent, but without Russia. This is the path of new threats to Europe and the world. Russia is not a guest in Europe; she is a full-fledged participant in the European community."²⁶¹ In September 1994, in a speech to the UN, Yeltsin cautioned against creation of a "Cordon Sanitaire" or an "Iron Curtain" between Russia and Europe.²⁶²

In August 1994, however, Yeltsin told reporters that Russia might join NATO in the future, indicating that it was "a question of time."²⁶³

In a 5 December 1994 address to the CSCE Summit, Yeltsin called for a pan-European security organization and expressed concern over possible NATO expansion. Warning that "Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace," Yeltsin declared that it was a "dangerous delusion to consider that the destinies of continents and of the world community as a whole can be decided from any one capital alone. Blocs and coalitions will likewise not provide genuine security guarantees. What has become a vital essential in Europe is the creation of a full-blooded pan-European organization with a firm juridical basis."

Yeltsin stated further, "The plans for NATO expansion run counter" to bringing European unity closer and not creating new demarcation lines. He asked, "Why sow the seeds of mistrust, after all we are no longer enemies, we are effectively all partners." He went on to say, "It is too soon to bury democracy in Russia," and that "No single major country is going to live according to the laws of isolation, and will reject any such game."²⁶⁴

On 10 December 1994, Yeltsin, speaking on television, set forth terms for Russian acceptance of NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, saying "first, no rush; second, very severe conditions for admission into NATO." He indicated that he thought the American side "will agree" to the first condition and "may agree" to the second condition after discussions with Russia. He stated that the third term, "the crux of the matter," was Russia's

eventual admission to NATO's political structures. Yeltsin claimed to have understood President Clinton as having held out that prospect in their talks "in small company."²⁶⁵

Adranik Migranian, an advisor to Yeltsin, wrote an article for the Polish press, published in October 1993, in which he viewed NATO expansion as an attempt to isolate Russia even further and suggested NATO membership for the Visegrad states could open the gate for former Soviet republics such as Ukraine which he said had been flirting with NATO. He opined that the Western rumor that Russia could soon join NATO was groundless and nothing but a Western propaganda trick.²⁶⁶

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. In August 1994 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin emphasized to reporters that military blocs should be ended and suggested that "blocs" should be formed only to promote joint economic goals.²⁶⁷ On a visit to Slovakia in February 1995, Chernomyrdin said Russia could not forbid anything to anybody, but no one had explained to Russia "Why is it necessary to join NATO in such haste? What is behind it? Does somebody really want to see confrontation again?"²⁶⁸

Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Kozyrev emphasized the potential destabilization that could come from NATO expansion, or at least precipitous expansion without Russia. During the August 1993 Yeltsin visit to Central Europe, Kozyrev spoke of the right of the sovereign Central European states to join any organization they wanted but called for East European states to take on the "role of a connecting link" between a democratic Russia and democratic Western Europe and warned that Central Europeans' joining NATO would strengthen the reactionary nationalist hardliners in Russia.²⁶⁹ In September 1994, he wrote in a German newspaper that if the West tried to isolate Russia through new "iron curtains" and "buffer zones," this would contribute to nationalist and imperialist extremism in Russia.²⁷⁰ In November 1994, Kozyrev stated, "Probably, Russia itself will become a member of that organization [NATO] with time," but he warned against any "hasty" expansion of NATO, saying that would be exploited by Russian, ultra-nationalists, and Russia is against "leaping over natural phases of establishing closer relations," and that it "would be far better to have a frank discussion of burning issues today than confrontation tomorrow".²⁷¹ Kozyrev also

suggested that enlarging NATO could undermine CSCE. He has said that enlarging NATO could be the "simplest solution" to creating a European security structure but that it might be the "worst" solution.²⁷²

In June 1994, shortly after he had visited Brussels to sign the PFP Framework Agreement and concluded discussions with NATO foreign ministers, Kozyrev, asked whether Russia would object to Poland joining NATO, responded "As equal partners within NATO, we shall have an equal right to say what we think."²⁷³

Kozyrev and Russian foreign ministry officials emphasize their preference for CSCE as the basic structure for European security. Kozyrev wrote, "In principle, the CSCE must aim to coordinate the efforts of NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the West European Union, and the CIS in strengthening stability and security, peacemaking, and protecting the rights of ethnic minorities. Naturally this does not mean establishing a hierarchical leadership or any kind of "command" on the part of the CSCE."²⁷⁴ Some have argued that internal ethnic conflicts are the primary source of conflicts at present and that CSCE is a better instrument than NATO to deal with these.²⁷⁵ Foreign Ministry officials, nevertheless, have generally supported Russian participation in PFP as a way of building relationships with the West and helping to control the future of NATO.²⁷⁶

Kozyrev was reported on 9 December 1994 as having called NATO expansion "mindless," "egotistic," and "cynical," and as implying that Russia's apprehensions about NATO expansion could be laid to rest if Russia were also admitted.²⁷⁷

The Russian ambassador to Poland, Yuriy Kashlev, stated that the Russian position on NATO expansion is that they do not "understand why one military-political bloc should be consolidated and expanded if its adversary, the other bloc, has ceased to exist. In addition, why should such importance be given to a military organization in today's Europe?"²⁷⁸

The Military. Russian military officials generally appear to be suspicious of NATO and have spoken out against NATO expansion. The Russian military may have played a key role, in the immediate aftermath of Yeltsin's visit to Central Europe in the summer of 1993, as Moscow adopted a hard line against incorporation of Central Europe into NATO. In August 1994,

officers from the General Staff wrote publicly that NATO expansion to include former Warsaw Pact states and even former republics of the Soviet Union would constitute the "world's largest grouping—with an enormous offensive potential" in proximity to Russia's borders and would necessitate a "radical reevaluation of all defensive concepts for Russia."²⁷⁹

Defense Minister Grachev, who said Russia has no plans to apply for NATO membership and "will go our own way," went so far as to warn that "Russia will object strongly to attempts by certain countries to join NATO. We will react negatively to such events."²⁸⁰ More specifically, he has said that "Russia cannot allow Poland to be admitted into NATO."²⁸¹ He also observed that some Central and East European states have used what he sees as anti-Russian arguments in seeking NATO expansion.²⁸² He is opposed to PFP being used as an "intermediate stage" to NATO expansion and has said PFP in such a case could jeopardize Russian fulfillment of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Agreement, especially flank limitations.²⁸³

In June 1994 Former Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov criticized Russia's joining PFP, asking "How can we be satisfied with the expansion and strengthening of the NATO military bloc when we, the Russians, have made concessions beyond anything that the international community could have imagined!" Shaposhnikov said he was still in favor of cooperation with the West but "this cooperation has started badly" and "bears the stamp of an extremely dangerous imbalance."²⁸⁴ The Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, told a Russian news service on 8 December 1994 that NATO countries were maintaining only "superficial contact" with Russia and had not changed their Cold War doctrine of military superiority.²⁸⁵

Russian Parliament. Chairman of the State Duma Foreign Committee Vladimir Lukin reportedly expressed disagreement with NATO expansion and suggested the security situation in Europe would deteriorate if NATO territory is extended to Russia's western border.²⁸⁶ Two Russian parliamentary leaders in November 1994 urged CEE states to consider the WEU as an alternative to NATO and suggested that the further the distance between these states and NATO the friendlier would be relations between Russia and Western countries.²⁸⁷

The Russian Public and Moscow Elites. According to surveys in November-December 1993 reported by USIA:²⁸⁸

- More Russians view Russia as a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States than as a part of Europe (51 percent to 34 percent); Moscow elites, however, chose Europe over the CIS (48 percent to 28 percent).
- Regarding reliance on other states, some 65 percent said Russia should rely on itself, and 31 percent said Russia should work with other countries; a great majority of Moscow elites chose some form of alliance.
- Asked to choose between five ways in which Russia might provide for its security, 36 percent favored an alliance with CIS countries only, 15 percent favored full membership in NATO; 14 percent favored an alliance with European countries only; 12 percent favored Partnership for Peace with NATO; and 10 percent favored no alliance. For Moscow elites, about a third favored a military alliance with states in the CIS, and another third favored some form of cooperation with NATO, either PFP or full NATO membership.
- Most Russians said they have heard or read very little (52 percent) or nothing at all (18 percent) about NATO; about 20 percent have heard or read a fair amount, and 6 percent have heard or read a great deal about NATO; for the Moscow elites, 60 percent felt poorly or not at all informed about NATO, while 40 percent felt at least somewhat informed.
- Asked if NATO were essential for Europe's security, about 40 percent didn't know, one-third replied affirmatively, and a quarter thought NATO was not needed; for Moscow elites, half thought NATO was essential to Europe's security and a third felt it was not.
- Some 23 percent expressed at least a fair amount of confidence in NATO, compared to 65 percent for the United Nations, 36 percent for CSCE/OSCE, and 33 percent for the EU; for Moscow elites, it was 28 percent for NATO, 79 percent for the United Nations, 57 percent for CSCE/OSCE, and 52 percent for the EU.
- Given a set of choices, about a third said an alliance with other CIS states would provide the best security arrangement for Russia;

- Many preferred closer ties with European countries and/or NATO, through either full Russian membership in NATO (15 percent), an alliance with European countries (14 percent), or the U.S.-endorsed Partnership for Peace with NATO (12 percent).
- Asked separately if Russia should join NATO, one-third were in favor, one-third opposed, and one-third had no opinion.
- Slightly more Russians opposed (between 35 and 38 percent) than supported (29-32 percent) NATO membership individually for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, or Bulgaria.
- Some 44 percent opposed NATO membership for Ukraine, while 27 percent favored it. Again, 44 percent opposed NATO membership for Lithuania, while 24 percent favored it.
- For Moscow elites, half were against NATO membership for Russia itself as well as for Poland, Hungary, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria; 59 percent opposed NATO membership for Lithuania, and 63 percent opposed NATO membership for Ukraine.

Other Eurasian States

Views in Ukraine appear mixed. Some oppose NATO expansion in general. Others oppose any expansion that does not include Ukraine as one of the first new members of NATO. Finally, some welcome expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe, arguing that the closer NATO is to Ukraine's borders, the more secure will be Ukraine.

According to surveys commissioned by USIA in November-December 1993, more Ukrainians see Ukraine as primarily part of the CIS than as part of Europe (47 percent to 32 percent). Most support some form of alliance as the best security guarantee (only 4 percent favor no alliance). Given a choice of three distinct security arrangements, 38 percent preferred an alliance with Russia, 32 percent favored an alliance with NATO (19 percent favored full membership in NATO for Ukraine while 13 percent favored PFP), and 10 percent favored a Europe-only alliance. When asked separately about joining NATO, Ukrainians supported Ukraine joining NATO by a two-to-one margin (48 percent to 25 percent). Some 62 percent of Ukrainians were very receptive to NATO providing Ukraine a security guarantee, namely to "use NATO

forces to defend Ukraine in case of an attack." About 10 percent did not think NATO should provide a guarantee. Some 47 percent of Ukrainians had confidence in NATO, while 24 percent did not and 29 percent had no opinion. On the subject of NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania, close to half the Ukrainians (44 percent-48 percent, depending on the CEE state) refrained from expressing a view; about one-third favored NATO entry for each CEE state and a fifth or fewer opposed it.²⁸⁹

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3.

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ALIGNMENTS

From the perspective of NATO expansion, there is a range of alternative alignments that might emerge to address security in the broad area of the North Atlantic, Europe, and Eurasia—from Vancouver to Vladivostok. If NATO expands, key variables would include which states join NATO and what type of relations NATO has with states not invited to join. If NATO does not expand, a key variable would be whether NATO remains vibrant. In either case—expansion, or nonexpansion—NATO's relations with non-member states and with other security institutions will be important factors, as will be what programs and activities NATO pursues internally as an alliance.

If NATO expands, three general, illustrative subalternatives are:

- NATO extends membership only to states from Central and Eastern Europe (NATO at 16 + 1-11).
- NATO extends membership to CEE states and perhaps four states from the CIS, including Russia (NATO at 16 + 10-11 CEE + 4 CIS).
- NATO extends membership to all PFP partners (NATO at 16 + 25 and maybe more).

Under the broad alternative of *no NATO expansion*, three illustrative sub-alternatives are:

- NATO remains at 16, and pursues continued cooperation with the East under NACC and PFP.
- The focus of European security turns to OSCE as the overarching security umbrella, supported by two pillars—NATO

(at 16) and Russia/CIS—as the Russians have proposed.

- The European security focus shifts to the EU and WEU, which expand to include most of CEE; NATO remains at 16.

ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENTS INVOLVING NATO EXPANSION

NATO Extends Membership Only to CEE States (NATO at 16 + 1-11)

In the first alternative, NATO would extend membership only to CEE states. As to which CEE states would be invited to join NATO, among the options are the following:

- One state at a time, e.g., beginning perhaps with the Czech Republic, with invitations to others depending on a number of factors internal to and external to the possible candidates (NATO at 17 and then perhaps more).
- The Visegrad Four (NATO at 20).
- The Visegrad Four plus the three Baltic states (NATO at 23).
- The Visegrad Four plus Bulgaria and Romania (NATO at 22).
- The Visegrad Four plus the three Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Slovenia (NATO at 27).

NATO might handle accession one country at a time or might invite several states to join simultaneously. In principle, NATO would be prepared to invite additional CEE states consistent with factors used in agreeing to invite the first state or states. Members of the CIS would not be invited to join NATO at least in the initial years, although NATO would not go on record with any statement specifically excluding them from eventual consideration.

Inviting one country at the outset and any others serially might ease objections from states not included, both those in CEE and in CIS. The more states admitted, the fewer would be CEE states complaining about not being admitted, although those states in CEE and the CIS not invited would likely object increasingly to their not being included.

Inviting only one or a very few states to join initially might make it easier for NATO to make the transition and let NATO

learn from the experience before more states were admitted. This would apply to the many issues that NATO faces with expansion, including considerations stemming from extending security guarantees, expanding NATO's military structures, and opening NATO's committees to new members.

This alternative to move forward on NATO expansion, which NATO Summit leaders have welcomed and said they expected, would be designed to help extend security into CEE and keep NATO vibrant. It would help demonstrate that NATO can take and follow through on initiatives and is not subject to veto by any outside powers.

This alternative would reflect the interests of CEE states to have security guarantees that include the United States. It would reinforce efforts to keep the U.S. engaged in European security and to maintain U.S. forces in Europe.

On the issues of whether or not this alternative would establish dividing lines in Europe, much would depend on NATO's outreach to states not included and those states' reactions. If NACC and PFP remain active and if they engage those not invited to become NATO members, then concerns about dividing lines might be mollified. If NATO develops unique, effective relationships with Russia and Ukraine, concerns might be further mollified.

NATO Extends Membership to CEE States and Perhaps 4 CIS States (NATO at 16 + 10-11 CEE + 4 CIS)

In this alternative, NATO would extend membership not only to states in CEE—10-11 states—but also to states in CIS—probably including at least 4 states in the CIS (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) and possibly more.

This alternative would be designed to extend security eastward while taking into account concerns expressed about NATO expansion by Russia, Ukraine, and others in the CIS and concerns about drawing new dividing lines at the borders between states in Central and Eastern Europe and those in the CIS.

If a decision were made in principle to invite CEE and CIS states to join NATO simultaneously, this could delay any

invitations, as it would probably take much longer to assess issues and make decisions on which states to invite.

Admission of Russia would mean a fundamental change in the NATO Alliance. This approach would likely lead to a larger, more disparate Alliance, which could increase the difficulty in making decisions and in managing the Alliance. If the large Russian armed forces were to be included in the integrated NATO military command structure, this would require fundamental changes in military strategy, planning, organization, and command and support arrangements.

Inclusion of states from the CIS would significantly increase the size of NATO territory to be defended and raise major issues about commitments to defend territory of CIS states, especially Russian territory along borders with states of the Middle East and China.

U.S. influence in NATO would likely be diminished, while the United States would face increased demands on it in terms of security commitments in Eurasia. U.S. relations with states in Asia and the Middle East might undergo major change as the United States allied itself to Russia and other CIS states through NATO.

The relatively greater instability in states of the CIS, compared to that in states of CEE, could pose significant problems for NATO.

NATO Extends Membership to All PFP Partners (NATO at 16 + 25 and Maybe More)

In this alternative, NATO would invite or be prepared in principle at least eventually to invite all PFP partners to join NATO, which could mean that NATO would have 41 members and maybe more if more states join PFP. As PFP is open to all NACC and OSCE members, this could mean that NATO might eventually increase to 53 states, the number in OSCE.

This alternative would be designed to pursue NATO vibrancy and expansion while conceptually emphasizing a united Europe and avoidance, at least in principle, of steps that might appear to make distinctions or draw lines between states in Europe and Eurasia.

Expansion to 41 or 53 members—more than doubling or

tripling the number of present members—would fundamentally alter the NATO Alliance as it exists currently. Instability in many of these states could pose major problems for NATO.

New policies and strategies would be required; decisionmaking would be greatly complicated; and summit and Ministerial meetings, as well as meetings of permanent representatives, would be diluted. Management of the civilian bureaucracy and integrated military command would also be complicated, not only in sheer numbers of representatives working in NATO headquarters and commands, but also in terms of the functioning of committees and planning staffs and preparation of studies and processing of papers.

NATO security guarantees and the territory to be defended would be greatly expanded, stretching far out into Asia and into border areas with Asian and Middle Eastern states. Fundamental changes in military strategy and planning, military command organization and arrangements, and support functions would be required.

U.S. influence in NATO would be diluted, while demands in terms of the number of states enjoying security guarantees would be greatly expanded.

NATO would survive and perhaps be the center of security planning for Europe and Eurasia, but it would be a far different NATO from the one that has existed for more than 45 years.

ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENTS NOT INVOLVING NATO EXPANSION

NATO Remains at 16, and Pursues Continued Cooperation with the East Under NACC and PFP

This alternative would be designed to retain the essential character of NATO and avoid appearances of creating new dividing lines in Europe or between Europe and Eurasia, while continuing with NATO outreach programs to the East through NACC and PFP. The option would avoid the many risks or complications that might be involved in expansion, including complications in NATO in adjusting to new members and complications with Russia and perhaps other CIS states that might not be invited to join NATO.

On the other hand, this alternative could have a number of adverse consequences. NATO's credibility could be called into question, as it could appear to be backing down from the NATO Summit leaders' position of welcoming and expecting NATO expansion. Some might say NATO policy had been reversed in the face of external opposition and that NATO decisions were subject to an outside veto. This approach would not be welcomed by CEE states who might continue to press for NATO membership. Furthermore, as the EU and WEU expand their membership, NATO might be seen, in comparison, as stagnating and not adjusting to the changing environment. NATO could slip from its central, leading role.

The prestige of the United States, which has been at the forefront of NATO's outreach programs and the expansion issue, could suffer if NATO retreated from expansion. If it appeared that the European allies had worked against the United States in reversing U.S. and NATO policy on expansion, critics of the European allies in the United States could press for U.S. withdrawal from Europe.

OSCE-Type Umbrella for Europe with NATO (at 16) and Russia/CIS as Pillars and Security Guarantors, as Russia has Proposed

This alternative is essentially what Russian President Yeltsin has proposed—an OSCE-type umbrella over Europe and Eurasia supported by both NATO and Russian/CIS pillars or security guarantees.¹ This alternative would inhibit NATO from expanding. Moreover, NATO's prestige and position would shift from being the leading security institution in Europe to that of a supporting institution. Russia could strengthen its position within the CIS and help establish the CIS as an international organization. Russia or the CIS would be elevated to equality with NATO.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel sees the Russian proposal as undermining NATO and argued, The Russians must accept being told that NATO remains the nucleus of the new European security architecture, in which we want to include Russia and from which we must not exclude it. We must not

agree to the Russian concept that the OSCE should replace NATO.² He also rejected any subordinating NATO to OSCE, saying "There will be no relations of superiority or inferiority between CSCE, the NATO Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, and NATO."³ (At the June 1994 meeting in Istanbul of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin, the Russians proposed but NATO rejected turning "the NACC into an independent organization from NATO, in fact, into a superior organization to NATO."⁴)

Some, particularly the CEE states, could view this as an effort to establish a NATO and Russian/CIS condominium over CEE. CEE states might be regarded as a neutral, buffer zone between the two pillars. They would almost certainly oppose such an alternative, preferring as they do closer relations with and even membership in NATO. U.S. prestige and influence would be diminished in CEE and within Europe in general.

European Security Focus Shifts to the EU and WEU, Which Expand to Include Most of CEE, While NATO Remains at 16

This alternative would emphasize efforts to enhance the European pillar of the trans-Atlantic relationship and to develop in the EU a "Common Foreign and Security Policy" and in Western Europe a "European Security and Defense Identity," with the WEU as the basis for the European defense pillar and working to develop a "Common Defense Policy."

This alternative explicitly states what was assumed for the alternative if NATO remains at 16—the EU would grow and expand into CEE and the WEU would also likely grow in terms of converting some of the states presently associated with it to full membership. NATO would not grow, and the focus for security issues could increasingly turn to the EU and WEU. NATO could remain strong and active, and many might continue to emphasize NATO's role in helping to provide the American security guarantee for Europe. On the other hand, as the focus shifted to the EU and WEU and their expansion, attention and support for NATO might diminish, and NATO might wither and perhaps dissolve. If NATO were to wither, so too would U.S. involvement in European security.

Closer security relations between the West on one hand, and Russia and the CIS on the other could be more problematic under this alternative, compared to alternatives for NATO expansion that include establishing unique relations with Russia and Ukraine and cooperative relations with other CIS states. The EU does not appear to be prepared to conclude "associate agreements" soon with states in the CIS and eventually to bring them in as members of the EU, and the WEU has invited only CEE states to join as "associate members," not reaching out to states in the CIS. It may be that only NATO, involving the participation, power, and influence of the U.S., can engage Russia and the CIS. This alternative could lead to a situation in which the EU and WEU expand into CEE, NATO withers, the United States withdraws from Europe, and Russia and the CIS prepare to respond to these developments.

Notes

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3. *Handelsblatt*, 9 Jun 94, 7, in FBIS-WEU-94-113, 13 Jun 94, 3.7.
4. *TRT Television Network*, 10 Jun 94, in FBIS-WEU-94-113, 13 Jun 94, 2.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. AND NATO POLICY

Reaching decisions on the general approaches the United States and NATO should take toward European security alignments and NATO expansion demand the utmost care and sensitivity.

SECURITY ALIGNMENTS

Of the six alternative alignments for security from Vancouver to Vladivostok outlined in the preceding section, the first alternative—a vibrant and growing NATO that continues the NACC and PFP outreach programs and moves beyond these to extend membership to selected states in Central and Eastern Europe—is the best. NATO would be a leading participant in an active, broader web of European security institutions. NATO would not, at least in the near future, extend membership to states in the Commonwealth of Independent States, but it would work to develop effective relations with these states, especially with Russia and Ukraine.

NATO has been the leading, most active, and successful security organization in Europe for the nearly half century of its existence, playing a role, if not the key role, in ensuring security in the North Atlantic area. It is the foundation for the Trans-Atlantic link between North America and Europe. Member states devote more attention and resources to NATO than to any other international, security-related institution. Members engage in daily consultations by permanent representatives to NATO institutions, regular meetings of foreign ministers, infrequent Summit meetings of heads of government and state, commitment

of financial resources to support NATO activities, and, for most members, regular meetings of defense ministers and chiefs of military staffs, commitment of military forces, and participation in the integrated military command structure.

While giving primacy to NATO, the United States and NATO allies should actively encourage and promote the growing, interactive, and cooperative web of European-related security organizations. The United States and NATO should press ahead with or encourage security-related programs to engage and reach out to states in Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, as well as in Western Europe, in the following areas:

- **OSCE:** contributing to the expanded activity and institutionalization of the 53-member OSCE;
- **NACC:** further development and implementation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council work plan, focused primarily on political and economic cooperation among the 38 members of NACC;
- **PFP:** careful and intensive development, support, and implementation of the Partnership for Peace program, focused on defense and military cooperation between the 41 members of PFP;
- **EU and WEU:** encouragement and support for development of a European Security and Defense Identity, a European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, an enhanced Western European Union with a Common Defence Policy; this should be done in a way that strengthens European integration and the European pillar of the Trans-Atlantic relationship, while maintaining open relations with North America and a strong NATO;
- **NATO Expansion:** study, consultations, and decisions on NATO expansion, leading to invitations to selected countries in CEE to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and become members of NATO along with the present 16 members;
- **NATO Relations with Russia and with Ukraine:** study, consultations, and decisions on development of relationships between NATO and, respectively, Russia and Ukraine that will be a basis for openness, confidence, and cooperation.

NATO EXPANSION

NATO, in its ongoing study, should carefully address all the issues involved in possible expansion of membership. On the basis of analysis made to date, the following approach is recommended:

- **Move forward to expand.** NATO should move forward with extending membership to selected states in Central and Eastern Europe.
- **Proceed with utmost care.** The expansion process must be handled with the utmost of care. If handled carefully, NATO expansion will enhance security in Europe and help maintain NATO as a vibrant and vital institution.
- **Do not try to develop and specify new criteria.** NATO should not attempt to go beyond guidelines that already exist to develop and specify a set of explicit criteria on which to base decisions on whether or not to invite states to join NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty provides the essential criteria. This was the basis for the previous accession cases involving Greece and Turkey, Germany, and Spain, and NATO needs to be careful about appearing to develop a double standard, with different or tougher requirements for new democracies of the East. NATO has already suggested more specific criteria in statements on PFP issued at the January 1994 NATO summit. To issue new criteria could give the appearance of moving the goal line further away from those seeking membership.

Efforts to develop detailed criteria beyond what already exists could lead to several problems, including prolonged and perhaps even counterproductive debate in NATO, creating expectations by many states of being invited to join NATO so long as they can make a good case of having met the criteria, tying the hands of NATO allies, stimulating heated legalistic arguments over whether a state has met the criteria and should be invited to join, and, perhaps, even raising challenges as to past or present practices and qualifications of existing member states of NATO. In the final analysis, decisions on inviting new members should be made through judgments and consultations by NATO members, taking into account a broad range of considerations.

- **Address candidate countries individually.** NATO should address expansion on an individual country-by-country

basis. Each prospective candidate should be looked at separately, although the implications for the region or subregion and for other countries should be part of the examination. Protocols for accession should be based on individual countries, although NATO might develop and process more than one protocol at a time. Addressing individual countries would give NATO the greatest flexibility. Compared to an approach that considered a whole group of states, an individual approach would also probably reduce concern, criticism, or adverse reaction from states not being invited to join.

- **Be very selective.** NATO must be very selective in expanding membership, given the political, economic, and military situation in the various candidate countries and the problems for NATO of expanding membership.

- **Invite at least one country to join NATO soon.** Allies should work toward inviting, in the next year or two, at least one country to join NATO, on the assumption that at the time of decision there will be at least one country NATO will view at the time as qualified. The first country should be the one that NATO deems most qualified and prepared and whose admission would be highly in NATO's interest. At present, all factors considered, the author would recommend the Czech Republic. Admitting at least one state as a new member in the near future would demonstrate NATO's vitality and its strength and determination in making and implementing decisions on expansion. Admission of one country, as opposed to several or a large group of countries, would likely be viewed with less concern by states not invited to join.

- **Do not close the door on possible associations with NATO short of full membership.** While NATO foreign ministers appear to have made a decision on a process by which a qualified state would move from PFP directly to full NATO membership, there may be good reasons for not ruling out completely other forms of association with NATO beyond PFP but short of full membership. The EU has a process of negotiating associate agreements as a step toward possible eventual full membership status, and the WEU has several categories of association short of full membership—observers, associate partners, and associate members—with all states in

these categories able to participate with full members at about half of the WEU Council meetings. A more flexible approach would provide opportunities to bring selected states into even closer association with NATO than PFP yet not provide full security guarantees and rights that full NATO membership would provide.

• **Develop unique relationships between NATO and Russia and NATO and Ukraine.** NATO should examine carefully and soon what type of unique relationship it might propose to Russia, going beyond PFP. It should also examine a unique relationship with Ukraine, recognizing its size and importance as a new independent state.

NATO consultations should provide the basis for a dialogue or negotiation separately with Russia and with Ukraine. NATO deliberations should, individually, take into account, among other things, the size and strength of these two states, their geographic locations in Eurasia, the size of their military forces, unique issues related to nuclear weapons, and counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

NATO could look at unique forms of formal relationships and special arrangements for consultations, communications, and cooperative programs. A treaty or other formal agreement between NATO and each of these two states might be considered. Any treaty or agreement between NATO and Russia should *not* have as its focus an official Russian-NATO security guarantee for Central and Eastern Europe, as Russian President Yeltsin has proposed.¹ Such a guarantee or provision could be seen as an effort to establish a Russian-NATO condominium over Central and Eastern Europe.

Nor should any such treaty or agreement deny deployment of forces of other NATO members into the territory of prospective NATO members from Central and Eastern Europe, as Henry Kissinger has proposed. While NATO might not envision any such deployment in the immediate future, such a provision would again imply a condominium and legally inhibit deterrent or defensive deployments to meet any possible threatening situations in the future. Zbigniew Brzezinski has suggested that expansion need not involve deploying NATO forces on the territory of new CEE members of NATO but that periodic joint exercises,

planning, and positioning of equipment would suffice to give substance to NATO guarantees.²

Notes

1. Yeltsin letter, FBIS-SOV-93-231, 3 Dec 93, op. cit.
2. Brzezinski, "NATO -- Expand or Die?," op. cit.

APPENDIX A:

Evolution of Select European Security Institutions Since World War II

Western Europe and NATO

1947: Dunkirk Defense Treaty

—UK & France

1948: Brussels Treaty—UK,
France, Benelux

1949: NATO created with 12
members:

Belgium	Iceland	Norway
Canada	Italy	Portugal
Denmark	United Kingdom	

1952: Greece & Turkey join
NATO

1954: Western European Union
(WEU) created, incl.

Belgium, France,

Luxembourg, Italy,

Netherlands, UK

1955: Federal Republic of
Germany joins NATO and
WEU

Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)

1955: WTO created with 8
members:

Albania	Ger. Dem. Rep
Poland	Bulgaria
Hungary	Romania
Czechoslovakia	
USSR	

1968: Albania withdraws from
WTO

East-West

1973: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
established (35 original states, West and East)

132 NATO EXPANSION

1982: Spain joins NATO

1990: German unification,
expanding NATO and WEU 1990: GDR leaves WTO
area 1991: WTO dissolves

1991: NATO creates North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), inviting Central & East European and New Independent States of the former USSR to join

1992: Greece joins WEU subject to ratification; Iceland, Norway, and Turkey become associate members of WEU; Denmark and Ireland become observers in WEU

1992: WEU creates Forum for Consultation with most CEE states

1994: NATO announces Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, inviting NACC and other CSCE states to participate. WEU offers associate membership to nearly all Cent.& E. European states (except Albania and states of former Yugoslavia), excluding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States

APPENDIX B:

A Growing Institutional Political and Security Network

The following is a graphic representation of the extent to which 54 states of Europe, North America, and Eurasia are members of or associated with institutions related to European politics, economics, and security.

	O S C E	N A C C	P F P	N A T O		W E U	C E	C I S
United States	x	x	x	x				
Canada	x	x	x	x				
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Luxembourg	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Spain	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Denmark	x	x	x	x	x	o	x	x
Iceland	x	x	x	x		am	x	
Norway	x	x	x	x	1	am	x	
Turkey	x	x	x	x		am	x	
Finland	x	o	x		x		x	
Sweden	x	2	x		x		x	
Austria	x	2	x		x		x	
Ireland	x				x	o	x	
Switzerland	x						x	
Czech Republic	x	x	x		3	ap	x	
Hungary	x	x	x		3	ap	x	

134 NATO EXPANSION

Poland	x	x	x	3	ap	x
Slovakia	x	x	x	3	ap	x
Bulgaria	x	x	x	3	ap	x
Romania	x	x	x	3	ap	x
Albania	x	x	x			g
Estonia	x	x	x	4	ap	x
Latvia	x	x	x	4	ap	g
Lithuania	x	x	x	4	ap	x
Russia	x	x	x	5	g	x
Ukraine	x	x	x	5	g	x
Moldova	x	x	x	5	g	x
Azerbaijan	x	x	x			x
Georgia	x	x	x			x
Kazakhstan	x	x	x			x
Turkmenistan	x	x	x			x
Kyrgyzstan	x	x	x			x
Uzbekistan	x	x	x			x
Belarus	x	x	x		g	x
Armenia	x	x	x			x
Tajikistan	x	x				x
Slovenia	x		x			x
Bosnia &						
Herzegov.	x				g	
Croatia	x				g	
F.Y.R.						
Macedonia	o				g	
"Yugoslavia"	6					
Others ⁷	x				7/	

¹ Norwegian referendum rejected accession to EU on 28 Nov 94.

² Austria and Sweden are not members of NACC, but, together with Finland (which has observer status), participate in the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.

³ Signed "associate agreements."

⁴ Negotiations on "associate agreements" began in December 1994.

⁵ Signed "partnership and cooperation agreements."

⁶ "Yugoslavia" has been suspended from CSCE.

⁷ Other states include Cyprus, the Holy See, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, and San Marino. All are members of CSCE. All but the Holy See and Monaco are members of the Council of Europe; the Holy See is an observer.

x = member

o = observer

am = associate member

ap = associate partner

g = guest

OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, est. in 1973 as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; name changed 1 January 1995.
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council, est. November 1991
PFP	Partnership for Peace, est. January 1994. NATO Summit invited all members of NACC and CSCE, able and willing to contribute, to participate in PFP program.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization, est. September 1949.
EU	European Union, formerly European Community, est. April 1965. Name changed January 1994.
WEU	Western European Union, est. October 1954.
CE	Council of Europe, est. May 1949.
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States, est. December 1991.

APPENDIX C: NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: INVITATION AND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INVITATION

We, the Heads of State and Government of the membercountries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the closeand longstanding partnership among the North American andEuropean Allies, are committed to enhancing security andstability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish tostrengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. Wereaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of theWashington Treaty, remains open to the membership of otherEuropean states in a position to further the principles of theTreaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlanticarea. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that woudreach to democratic states to our East, as part of anevolutionary process, taking into account political and securitydevelopments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practicalprogramme that will transform the relationship between NATO andparticipating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogueand cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership forPeace. We therefore invite the other states participating in theNACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute tothis programme, to join with us in this partnership. Activeparticipation in the Partnership for Peace will play an importanrole in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the

authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways toward transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.

2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfillment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:

- (a) facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- (b) ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- (c) maintenance of the capability and readiness to con-

tribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;

(d) the development of cooperative military relations With NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;

(e) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATOAuthorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps theywill take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership andthe military and other assets that might be used for Partnershipactivities. NATO will propose a programme of partnershipexercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership'sobjectives. Based on this programme and its PresentationDocument, each subscribing state will develop with NATO anindividual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individualPartnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at theirown expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary,relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison officewith NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate theirparticipation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, aswell as certain others by invitation. They will also makeavailable personnel, assets, facilities and capabilitiesnecessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed PartnershipProgramme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.

6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:

- those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;

- they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;

- they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;

- those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;

- building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;

- they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

- develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;

- promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.

APPENDIX D:

Chairman's Summary of Meeting of North Atlantic Cooperation Council Meeting, 2 December 1995, and Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation 1994/1995 (for NACC and PFP)

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY OF THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL

2 DECEMBER 1994

1. The Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) met in Brussels today. The Foreign Ministers and Representatives of countries which have joined the Partnership for Peace (PFP) without being NACC members and the Secretary General of the Western European Union also attended the meeting.

2. The Secretary General of NATO informed the meeting about decisions taken in the North Atlantic Council on 1 December.

3. The Ministers reviewed the development of cooperative activities under the NACC Work Plan and the Partnership for Peace programme, on the basis of progress reports by the Chairmen of relevant NACC/PFP Committees. They discussed ways to strengthen further the NACC consultation and cooperation process and endorsed and agreed to publish a revised NACC

Work Plan for 1995. Ministers expressed satisfaction with the practical cooperation so far achieved in Partnership for Peace and exchanged views on how to proceed with further implementation of Partnership for Peace, taking into account the agreed Individual Partnership Programmes and those in preparation. They welcomed the programme of cooperation activities under Partnership for Peace for 1995. They also agreed to publish the latest report of the Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping. In addition, the Ministers noted that NATO would shortly circulate to PFP Partners a set of PFP planning and review procedures, which will be implemented for the first time in 1995 and which will make an important contribution to enhanced practical cooperation. The Ministers exchanged views on the relationship between NACC and PFP with a view to achieving maximum efficiency and effectiveness in partnership and cooperation activities

and to reinforcing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic and CSCE area.

4. The Ministers consulted on the evolution of the European security architecture and ways to strengthen mutually reinforcing cooperation between different institutions concerned with security issues. The Ministers looked forward to the forthcoming CSCE Summit meeting in Budapest as a means to reinforce cooperative security in Europe.

5. The Ministers exchanged views on regional conflicts, particularly the crisis in former Yugoslavia, and on other regional issues.

6. The Ministers agreed to hold their regular NACC meetings in the future in conjunction with the Spring Ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council each year. The next regular meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council will therefore take place in May in The Netherlands.

WORK PLAN FOR DIALOGUE, PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION 1994/1995

Issued at the meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 2 December 1994

Introduction

The Foreign Ministers and Representatives of the member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, with the participation of observer countries, have agreed to the following revision of the Work Plan for 1994 which will also be valid for 1995. It builds on the foundations and principles of dialogue, partnership and cooperation already established, in particular at the Rome Summit in November 1991, the Brussels Summit in January 1994 and NACC Ministerial meetings. Partnership for Peace (PFP) topics and activities to be conducted in the NACC framework are, in accordance with the rules and procedures set out in the PFP Framework Document and other relevant PFP documents, subject to further consideration in that context.

• • • POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATED MATTERS

Topics

- 01 Specific political and security related matters, including regional security issues;
- 02 Conceptual approaches to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, including the security of new non-nuclear weapon states

and the general problems of security related to nuclear issues;

- 03 Strengthening the consultative and cooperation process;
- 04 Practical cooperation with CSCE on security issues.

Activities

- 01 Consultations at Ambassadorial level, including on specific issues in brainstorming format;
- 02 Regular and, as events dictate, ad hoc consultations of the Political Committee with cooperation partners, including as appropriate with experts;
- 03 Early consultations, particularly on regional tensions with a potential to grow into crisis;
- 04 Informal political consultations between NATO and individual partner countries, as appropriate;
- 05 Meetings of Regional Experts Group with experts from partner countries once a year;
- 06 Briefing of cooperation partners, including at the partner's request when possible, on decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council and other important developments in the Alliance having direct bearing on security and stability;
- 07 Continuation of seminars and expert meetings with CFE cooperation partners on implementation of the CFE treaty;
- 08 Building on current programme of joint multilateral inspection teams and joint

inspector/escort training for CFE cooperation partners, including a CFE Course for verification teams' inspectors to be held in the Schooling Centre in Komorni Hradec;

- 09 Continuation of support to CFE cooperation partners in connecting to and in utilizing VERITY.

POLICY PLANNING CONSULTATIONS

Topic
01 Mid- and long-term foreign and security policy issues.

Activity
01 A meeting of NATO's Atlantic Policy Advisory Group with cooperation partners in 1995 in Slovakia.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

A. DEFENCE CONVERSION (INCLUDING ITS HUMAN DIMENSION)

- Topics**
- 01 Conversion and social stability; integration into the civilian economy of the manpower potential used in the military and the armaments industry;
 - 02 Economic aspects pertaining to restructuring armaments production sites and military garrisons and to privatisation of military industries;

- 03 Conversion experiences (in particular in the field of armaments production) and conversion planning.**
- Activities**
- 01 Continued development by the Economic Directorate of the database on technical expertise in defence conversion with a view to its practical use in cooperation partner countries;
- 02 Development of defence conversion pilot projects supported by nations with a view to promoting cooperation between industries of Allied and cooperation partner countries;
- 03 Organization of workshops on practical defence conversion activities, with particular focus on problems encountered in restructuring major armaments production centres and military installations, with participation of local business and administrations and of defence industries (in 1995 to be held in a cooperation partner country);
- 04 Enlarged Economic Committee meetings, as agreed, on topics related to defence conversion, including a meeting with the Industrial Planning Committee to discuss relevant issues related to defence conversion.
- B. SECURITY ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**
- Topics**
- 01 Economic and ecological consequences of defence-related environmental degradation;
- 02 Economic and ecological consequences of nuclear disarmament;
- 03 Economic aspects of migration and refugees affecting security and stability;
- 04 Consequences of the implementation of UN mandated economic sanctions on socio-economic aspects of regional stability.
- Activities**
- 01 Workshops/reinforced meetings on the above themes;
- 02 Economic Committee with cooperation partners seminar on impact and human consequences of defence-related environmental degradation and on economic and ecological aspects of nuclear disarmament supported, as necessary, by Science/CCMS Committees' Experts;
- 03 NATO Economics annual Colloquium to be organised by the Economics Directorate on "Status of Economic Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries in the mid-1990s: Opportunities, Constraints, Security Implications."
- C. DEFENCE EXPENDITURES/DEFENCE BUDGETS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ECONOMY**
- Topic**
- 01 Interrelationship between defence expenditures/budgets and the economy;
- Activities**
- 01 Seminar on Legislative Oversight of National Defence Budgets to be held in an Allied country;
- 02 Enlarged Economic Committee meetings, as agreed, on the economic aspects of topics related to defence expenditures/defence budgets.
- SCIENCE**
- Topics**
- 01 Participation of cooperation partner scientists in NATO science programmes giving emphasis to priority areas of interest to NATO and cooperation partners;
- 02 Ways and means of enhancing the output of scientific cooperation programmes.
- Activities**
- 01 Meeting of the Science Committee with counterparts from cooperation partner countries at least once a year, including holding the 1995 regular annual meeting of the NATO Science Committee with cooperation partners in Budapest;
- 02 Participation of scientists from cooperation partner countries in Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) and Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) as well as the holding of such meetings in cooperation partner countries;
- 03 Participation of scientists from cooperation partner countries in the Collaborative Research Grants, Linkage Grants and Science Fellowships;
- 04 Sending proceedings, in hardcopy or computerized format, of NATO's scientific meetings to a central library in each cooperation partner country and disseminating other literature on the Science programme to scientists in cooperation partner countries;
- 05 Sponsoring visits of experts to cooperation partner demonstration projects and providing other assistance in initiating such projects;
- 06 Sponsoring visits of experts from cooperation partner countries invited by project directors in NATO member countries;
- 07 Assisting cooperation partners through the use of NATO's network of referees and experts;
- 08 Examining how computer networks can facilitate contacts and promote more effective cooperation among scientists through the use of Networking Infrastructure Grants and Networking Supplements to Linkage Grants.
- CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY (CCMS)**
- Topics**
- 01 Defence-related and disarmament-related environmental issues;
- 02 Pilot studies of interest to cooperation partners;
- Activities**
- 01 Meeting of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society with counterparts from cooperation partner countries at least once a year;
- 02 Participation of cooperation partners' experts in pilot study meetings, workshops, conferences, seminars, and holding pilot study meetings in cooperation partner countries;
- 03 Dissemination of information on CCMS pilot studies, workshops, conferences and seminars, as well as approved reports to cooperation partners;
- 04 On-going pilot study topics to be pursued as agreed;**
- 05 Active consideration of new pilot study proposals made by either NATO or cooperation partner countries.**
- INFORMATION**
- Topics**
- 01 Contribution to increased understanding of NATO and its policies and to a more informed debate on security matters;
- 02 Exploration of members' expectations including public expectations of the information programme;
- 03 Dissemination of information by electronic means.
- Activities**
- 01 Meetings of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) with cooperation partners;
- 02 Information about NATO and its policies will be made available to target audiences in cooperation partner countries, including selected institutions and organizations, inter alia through embassies of NATO member countries serving as contact points and other diplomatic liaison channels;
- 03 Continue and further intensify information-related cooperation with institutions established by cooperation partner countries interested and able to provide the necessary facilities, support personnel and services;
- 04 Support the establishment of new NATO-related Information Centres by cooperation partner countries within the context of available resources;
- 05 Visits to NATO by target groups;
- 06 Sponsorship of a number of experts from cooperation partner countries to attend security-related seminars in Allied countries;
- 07 Co-sponsorship with cooperation partners of seminars/workshops in cooperation partner countries;
- 08 Presentations by NATO speakers in cooperation partner countries;
- 09 Democratic Institutions Fellowships (individual and institutional support);
- 10 Increased dissemination of NATO documentation and information materials in languages of cooperation partners.
- PEACEKEEPING**
- PFP Topics and Activities¹⁰**
- Topic**
- 01 Cooperation in Peacekeeping (Conceptual, Planning and Operational) within the framework of PMSC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping;
- Activities**
- 01 Development of a common understanding of operational concepts and requirements for peacekeeping:
- to exchange views on concepts, terminology and national doctrines on peacekeeping, within the NACC/PFP framework;
 - to hold a seminar on legal aspects of peacekeeping in Spring 1995;

- to broaden and deepen contacts and cooperation with the United Nations and CSCE on peacekeeping issues, and to encourage exchanges of information on this subject with other concerned bodies, such as the European Commission, and the Western European Union;

- civil-military interface: to be taken forward as an aspect of work on humanitarian aspects of peacekeeping operations;

- public relations: a seminar to be held during 1995.

02 Cooperation in planning for peacekeeping activities:

- command and control: discussion in the Technical Sub-Group (TSG), reinforced by experts;

- cooperation in planning: further work to await developments in other fora;

- identification of assets: further work in the TSG at this stage needs to await further development of the UN standby arrangements.

03 Development of a common technical basis in peacekeeping:

- communications: support for expert group work to develop a concept of communications and a feasibility study for a communications database;

- equipment implications: possible expert-level discussions of equipment requirements, including critical interoperability issues;

04 Peacekeeping training, education, and exercises:

- support for expert group work on peacekeeping course repertoire;

- consideration by TSG of PJP/NACC joint exercise after-action reports, and of similar reports offered by nations concerning relevant bilateral and multilateral exercises conducted in the spirit of PJP;

- consolidation and analysis of lessons learned in all PJP related peacekeeping exercises.

05 Logistics aspects of peacekeeping:

- update the Compendium of Lessons Learned, based on national inputs;

- briefings on the UN peacekeeping logistics manual and the new SHAPE logistics course.

DEFENCE PLANNING ISSUES AND MILITARY MATTERS

NACC

Topic

01 Air defence related matters, for aspects related to NACC.

Activity

01 Enlarged NADC sessions to consult on air defence aspects of agreed mutual interest.

PJP Topics and Activities¹⁰

Topics

01 Defence planning and budgeting;

02 Defence policy/strategy/military doctrine;

03 The structure, organisation and roles of Defence Ministries;

04 The structure and organisation of the armed forces including command structure;

05 Reserve forces and mobilisation;

06 Personnel issues;

07 Democratic control over the armed forces and promotion of civil-military relations in a democratic society;

08 Legal framework for military forces;

09 Education and training:

- Language training.

- Military education and training.

- Training for crisis management.

- Training on radio frequency management.

- Training for environmental issues.

10 Planning, organisation and management of national defence procurement programmes:

- Governmental organisation for defence equipment procurement.

- Defence procurement planning systems and project management concepts.

- Contracting procedures and methods.

11 Command and control systems and procedures, including communications and information systems and interoperability aspects.

12 Air Defence related matters:

- Air Defence concepts and terminology.

- Air emergency and cross-border air movements.

- Air Defence training concepts.

13 Standardisation and interoperability:

- Material and technical aspects of standardisation and interoperability.

- Procedures and in-service equipment in peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other agreed exercises and operations.

- Military medicine.

14 Logistic issues, in particular logistics aspects of peacekeeping.

15 Crisis management.

16 Exercises in peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, other exercises and related activities.

17 Cooperation in the field of Arms Control and Disarmament.¹¹

18 Aerospace Research and Development.

19 Radio Spectrum Management.

20 Coordination of PJP Military activities.

Activities

01 PJP exercises:

The overall goal of training and exercises between NATO and Partners is to develop cooperative military relations in order to strengthen the ability to carry out combined missions in the field of Peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping activities may include a range of exercises, such as Map Exercises, Staff Exercises, Field Training Exercises, Command Post Exercises, Communications Exercises and Logistic Exercises. Similar exercises should be organised in other fields such as Search and Rescue, Humanitarian Operations, and other areas as may subsequently be agreed.

Exercises will be preceded as necessary by seminars, study periods and workshops to ensure maximum training benefit from the exercise itself. Exercises represent the capstone of a comprehensive programme and will be the final highlight to evaluate training and interoperability in an operational environment.

The following exercises are proposed for 1995:

LAND EXERCISES:

L1 CENTRAL ECLECTIC - A CPX to form HQs and conduct peacekeeping operations based on outcome of workshop (battalion level exercise) scheduled for 16th-20th October on Partner Territory.

L2 LANDEX - FTX exercise peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations at platoon level, on Partner Territory.

L3 COOPERATIVE BRIDGE 95 - a CPX/FTX for training and exercising of selected basic military peacekeeping skills and staff procedures at individual, platoon and company level for a limited number of NATO/PJP contingents participating in a NATO led, regimental/brigade sized task force, 18th-30th June, on Partner Territory.

L4 LANDEX (ESPERIA 1995) - land-based exercise dealing with peacekeeping operations enhancing military interoperability, company/platoon level, May 1995, Tor Di Nebbia Range Southern Italy. (Requires further co-ordination with MNCs).

L5 A possible land-based exercise in continental US is under study with a potential for SACIANT involvement.

MARITIME EXERCISES:

M1 2 to 3 day NATO/PJP seminar-type logistic exercise (Cooperative Support 1995 - COSUP 1995) to be planned and conducted by SACIANT, preferably prior to the first 1995 PJP maritime liveex. Locations to be determined.

M2 Naval Exercise in North Norwegian waters, Barents Sea, under the responsibility of SACIANT probably in Spring/Summer 1995.

M3 MAREX - a live exercise featuring basic training and exercise of maritime surface and maritime air forces in peacekeeping scenario, September, in the Baltic.

M4 MAREX - live exercise to exercise maritime embargo operations in addition to a demonstration of Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) could be provided, Black Sea.

M5 MAREX - Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM) exercise SAR procedures and train for Passing Exercises (PASSEX) during port visit.

M6 MAREX (CLASSICA 1995) - an air/maritime exercise dealing with peacekeeping operations including assistance, search and rescue at sea, embargo, in June/July 1995, Central East Mediterranean Sea (requires further co-ordination with MNCs).

OTHER EXERCISES:

01 PCM 1995 - a Crisis Management Exercise (CMX) highlighting briefings and discussion of Crisis Management practices and experience, as well as consultations on a hypothetical conflict affecting NACC and PJP Countries and Allies, 25th-27th October, at NATO HQ.

02 CPX A - a Command Post Exercise (CPX) to exercise staffs in NATO procedures for decision making process on military action in a peacekeeping operation.

03 SHAPEX - a conference to determine the range of missions implied by peace support

operations and identify the most effective political and military contribution by NATO and PJP nations.

04 PFP Exercise - a conference/workshop to familiarise with exercise programming and planning process and coordinate ACE PW/P exercise activities for 1996/1997, in close coordination with the PCC.

05 Invitation to NAC Sea Day.

06 BALTOP PJP EXERCISE: PJP peacekeeping exercise 6-12 October 1995, involving land, maritime and air forces. Zealand group of Islands, Denmark. (Requires further coordination with MNC's.)

07 Other exercises and related activities: on a case-by-case basis, appropriate phases of a number of exercises within the existing NATO programme may be opened to PJP partners; proposals in this regard have been forwarded by the NMAs and are under consideration by the NATO political authorities.

02 Examples of national exercises under PFP

- In the course of 1995, SAR exercise with active participation of one or two PJP Partners and/or completed by observers programme accessible to other Allies and Partners conducted in Belgium.

- Invitation of PJP observers and/or participants during the training on BELBAT for deployment in former Yugoslavia. The exercise lasts ± 1 week (3 times a year). A ± 3 days visit + presentations to be set up for observers by the Army Personnel Division.

- Invitation of PJP observers to training of BRITBAT for deployment in former Yugoslavia and PJP participants in UK UNMO courses.

- Romanian multinational PJP FTIX "CONFIDENCE 1995", to be conducted on Romanian territory with the participation of subunits (platoon level) from NATO and Partner Nations and observers (September 1995). To enhance the interoperability and the capability of acting in common in the framework of PSOs.

- Romanian multinational maritime PJP exercise "BLACK SEA 1995". To be held in the Romanian territorial sea adjacent to MAN-GALJA harbour, June 1995; each participating state with a vessel (NATO/Partner nations). To establish compatible and viable forms of co-operation regarding the main naval operations in the field of P,H,SAR; observer accommodation on-shore.

- Bulgarian multinational PJP maritime exercise, 1995, in the Black Sea.

03 Examples of national exercises within the spirit of PFP:

- BALTOPS 1995 (phase 1): US invitational maritime exercises in June. Exercise purpose is to enhance navy-to-navy contacts, co-operation, and interoperability with northern European allies and eastern European Baltic Sea littoral states. Activities include seamanship and small boat operations, underway replenishment, personnel exchanges, manoeuvring, SAR demonstrations, medical exchanges, and at-sea rendezvous.

- Quarterly Black Sea Passex: Maritime exercise with navies of US, Romania and Bulgaria.

Three are envisioned. Activities include port calls, seamanship and manoeuvring, and SAR practice.

- US/Ukraine Peacekeeping Exercise: Bilateral command post exercise in the Ukraine, with brigade and below staffs as well as a company size unit from both nations in the field. Planned for April-May 1995, the exercise will involve approximately 200-250 personnel per nation.

- Medical Exercises Central and Eastern Europe (MEDCEUR): Planned for US, Albania and Bulgaria in the first and second quarters of CY 1995. These events provide joint medical and civic action assistance to host-nation military and civilian medical personnel. Activities include mass casualty, evacuation, and emergency medicine training and techniques, as well as medical, dental, and immunization treatment at local facilities.

- Romanian Tactical River Exercise "DANUBE 1995" (August 1995). Each participating state (NATO/Partner Nations) with one river vessel. To improve co-operation for river operations in the field of P,H,SAR and/or embargo monitoring. Accommodation for observers (on-shore).

04 Other military activities, including:

- Courses at the NATO Defence College, Rome.¹⁰

- Courses at the NATO School (SHAPE); Oberammergau.¹¹

- NATO Training Group Courses:

- Various other courses at different locations;

- Meetings/Workshops/Seminars/Conferences;

- Military Agency for Standardisation (MAS) Working Party Seminars;

- Activities of the Advisory Group for Aerospace and Development (AGARD), subject to political approval.

05 Specific co-operation activities in the field of defence procurement and standardisation will be taken forward under the auspices of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) with the aim of:

- Promoting transparency in defence planning and budgeting processes;

- Supporting joint planning, training and exercises in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations;

- Development, over the longer term, of interoperability of NATO and Partner armed forces. These activities will include multinational expert teams, technical workshops, seminars/symposia and special meetings of expert groups.

06 Specific co-operation activities to be developed under the direction of the Senior NATO Logistics Conference (SNLC) in the field of logistics (concepts and procedures), including meetings, courses and exchanges of information and experience between logistic experts.

07 Under the auspices of the NATO Communications and Information System Committee (NACISC) specific activities will aim at promoting common understanding of concepts, policy and planning, and co-operation to improve interoperability in the Communication and Information Systems (CIS) area. These activities will consist of joint meetings, workshops, seminars and expert talks.

08 Under the aegis of the NATO Air Defence Committee (NADC), specific co-operation activities will endeavour to address the common understanding of air defence concepts and philosophy in broad terms as well as air defence planning aspects in general. These activities will consist of one or two workshops, possibly a seminar and group of experts sessions.

09 The NATO Economic Committee to organise an activity aimed at promoting transparency of defence budgets/expenditures, possibly involving procedures for economic analyses of defence expenditures data.

CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING - HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

NACC

Topic

01 Organisation, role and function of Civil Emergency Planning in preventing and responding to emergencies and disasters, and aims, principles and procedures of civil-military cooperation in pre-disaster preparedness arrangements and in responding to emergencies and disasters;

Activity

01 Enlarged meetings of the SCEPC to exchange information and experience on the organisation, role and function of CEP in disaster prevention and disaster response, including civil-military cooperation.

PFP Topics and Activities¹²

Topic

01 Civil Emergency Preparedness.

Activities

01 Exchange of information and expertise to assist in the development of civil emergency preparedness including legislation and civil aspects of crisis management, disaster prevention and disaster management and humanitarian assistance.

02 Under the authority of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, activities will consist of meetings, seminars, courses and exchanges of information and experiences.

AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

NACC

Topic

01 Civil military co-ordination of air traffic management;

Activity

01 Enlarged CEAC Plenary sessions and, as required, subordinate group meetings to improve civil/military co-ordination of the principles and practice of air traffic management;

PFP Topics and Activities¹³

Topic

01 Air traffic management/control:

- Civil-military airspace coordination.

- Multinational air exercise planning.

Activity
 01 Under the supervision of the Committee for European Airspace Co-ordination (CEAC), a seminar, a workshop and joint experts meetings will address the challenges to the civil and military co-ordination of air traffic management, possible technical collaborations and the means to promote further NATO/PfP compatibility in this field, including training.

ANNEX

LIST OF SPECIFIC ITEMS SUBSUMED UNDER AGREED TOPICS AND ACTIVITIES

The Annex is complementary to the Work Plan and contains a list of specific and detailed proposals of particular interest to one or several partners or Allies. These are an elaboration of some general topics and activities included in the Work Plan for the attention by relevant fora. The Annex is not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive. It is understood that these proposals will be carried out in harmony with the ongoing work in other fora, including in the CSCE and the Council of Europe.

• • •

POLITICAL AND SECURITY-RELATED MATTERS

01 Possible sub-topics could include: "Conflicts and issues arising from ethnic and minority problems affecting security in a changing Europe".
 (Topic 01)

ECONOMIC ISSUES

A. DEFENCE CONVERSION (INCLUDING ITS HUMAN DIMENSION)

01 Sub-topic might include: "Problem of the human factor in the defence conversion process in regions endangered by unemployment".
 (Topic 01)

02 Possible topics for discussion at the enlarged Economic Committee might be:

- internal migration from defence to other sectors of the economy;
- intellectual property rights in connection with industry restructuring and defence conversion;
 (Activity 04)

03 Possible topics for workshops/seminars on defence conversion might be:

- International seminar on "Demilitarization & Disarmament in Transition: Socio-Economic Consequences", Minsk, February 1995; Principal sponsor in Belarus: Ministry of Economy;
- International seminar on "Defence Conversion in East-European Countries":

Problems & Prospects", Minsk, 1995;
 Principal sponsor in Belarus: Ministry of Defence;
 - Symposium on the possibilities of harmonizing conversion strategies to be held in Budapest, Hungary, in the second half of 1995.
 - Seminar on partnership experiences of conversion, to be held in 1995 in Poland.
 (Activity 03)

04 Possible subjects include:

- Exchange of experiences in conversion of factories and scientific centres of Defence Industrial Base (DIB);
- Meeting of experts for exchange of views and working out proposals on conversion.
 (Topic 03)

SCIENCE

01 Possible themes for future discussion under priority areas of the Science Committee might be:

- disarmament technologies: scientific problems related to disarmament technologies including the disposal of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and defence industry conversion;
- environmental security: scientific problems related to the environment including the reclamation of contaminated military sites, regional environmental problems and natural and man-made disasters;
- high technology: scientific problems related to high technology including information science, materials science, biotechnology and energy conservation and supply (non-nuclear);
- science and technology policy: problems related to human resources including science policy, technology transfer, innovation, management, intellectual property rights and career mobility (e.g. the redeployment of defence-industry scientists);
- computer networking: strategies to enhance the scientific dialogue between NATO countries and cooperation partner countries using computer networking.
 (Topic 01)

02 Possible topics for ASI and ARW meetings might include:

- International seminar on "Role of International Scientific & Technical Cooperation in Supporting the Development of Science in Medium & Small-Size European Countries", Minsk, 1995; Principal sponsor in Belarus: Ministry of Education & Science.
 (Activity 04)

CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY (CCMS)

01 Pilot study topics to be pursued include:

- Environmental aspects of reusing former military lands;
- Protecting civil populations from toxic material spills during movements of military goods;
 (Activity 07)

- Cross-border environmental problems emanating from defence-related installations and activities;

- Defence environmental expectations;
- Management of industrial toxic wastes and substance research;
- Air pollution transport and diffusion over coastal urban areas;
- Deprived urban areas;
- Evaluation of demonstrated and emerging remedial action Technologies for the treatment of contaminated land and groundwater;
- Indoor air quality (Phase II);
- Methodology, focalization, evaluation and scope of the environmental impact assessment;
- New agricultural technologies;
- Pollution prevention strategies for sustainable development;
- Use of simulators as a means of reducing environmental damage caused by military activities
 (Activity 04);

02 Possible new pilot study topics include the following:

- Seismic protection of installations that are high risk as sources of radioactive, chemical and bacteriological contamination as a result of fires, floods, explosions etc.;
- Seismic protection of buildings and installations supporting vital services such as medical, water, and energy supply systems;
- Environmental considerations in the restructuring of economic and defense activities;
- Prevention, simulation and management of nuclear accidents resulting from earthquakes in general or accidental coolant loss in particular;
- Treatment of naval base oil-contaminated wastewater;
- Defence-related communication and transport systems
 (Activity 05)

INFORMATION

01 The possible following topics for co-sponsored seminars would be forwarded to the appropriate NATO bodies for consideration according to agreed procedures:

- Seminar on Romanian-Hungarian experiences in implementing the Open Skies bilateral agreement to take place in Romania in 1995;
- Seminar on "the National Security Policy of Romania within the present European and regional geo-strategic environment";
- International seminar "Terrorism & Organised Crime: New Threats to International & National Security", Minsk, April 1995; Principal sponsor in Belarus: Development & Security Research Institute;
- International Seminar "Formation of Civil Society in Post-Totalitarian Countries & Problems of Democratic Control of Armed Forces", Minsk, 1995, Principal sponsor in Belarus: National Institute of Humanities.
 (Activity 07)

(1) Topics and activities will be implemented according to guidelines set out in the document NACC-D(94)3.

(2) PfP topics and activities are subject to further consideration in the PfP context.

(3) In the context of the PWP, only conceptual issues referring to conventional arms control are considered.

(4) Organization of these activities will take into account agreed NACC implementation principles.

(5) PfP topics and activities are subject to further consideration in the PfP context.

(6) PfP topics and activities are subject to further consideration in the PfP context.

APPENDIX E: NATO Participation Act of 1994

U. S. Public Law 103-447, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, Title II,
based on H.R. 5246, enacted into law 2 November 1994.

Text of Title II

TITLE II--NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994

SEC. 201.--SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "NATO Participation Act of 1994".

SEC. 202. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

It is the sense of the Congress that--

(1) the leaders of the NATO member nations are to be commended for reaffirming that NATO membership remains open to Partnership for Peace countries emerging from communist domination and for welcoming eventual expansion of NATO
to include such countries;

(2) full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area should be invited to become full NATO members in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty at an early date, if such participants--

(A) maintain their progress toward establishing democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, and the rule of law; and

(B) remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens and respecting the territorial integrity of their neighbors;

(3) the United States, other NATO member nations, and NATO itself should furnish appropriate assistance to facilitate the transition to full NATO membership at an early date of full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace; and

(4) in particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have made significant progress toward establishing democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, and the rule of law since the fall of their previous communist governments.

**SEC. 203. AUTHORITY FOR PROGRAM TO
FACILITATE TRANSITION TO NATO MEMBERSHIP.**

(a) In General.--The President may establish a program to assist the transition to full NATO membership of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other Partnership for Peace countries emerging from communist domination designated pursuant to subsection (d).

(b) Conduct of Program.--The program established under subsection (a) shall facilitate the transition to full NATO membership of the countries described in such subsection by supporting and encouraging, *inter alia*--

(1) joint planning, training, and military exercises with NATO forces;

(2) greater interoperability of military equipment, air defense systems, and command, control, and communications systems; and

(3) conformity of military doctrine.

(c) Type of Assistance.--In carrying out the program established under subsection (a), the President may provide to the

countries described in such subsection the following types of security assistance:

- (1) The transfer of excess defense articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, without regard to the restrictions in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a) of such section (relating to the eligibility of countries for such articles under such section).
 - (2) The transfer of nonlethal excess defense articles under section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, without regard to the restriction in subsection (a) of such section (relating to the justification of the foreign military financing program for the fiscal year in which a transfer is authorized).
 - (3) Assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international military education and training).
 - (4) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (relating to the "Foreign Military Financing Program").
- (d) Designation of Partnership for Peace Countries Emerging From Communist Domination.--The President may designate countries emerging from communism and participating in the Partnership for Peace, especially Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, to receive assistance under the program established under subsection (a) if the President determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that such countries--

- (1) are full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace;
- (2) have made significant progress toward establishing democratic institutions, a free market economy, civilian control of their armed forces, and the rule of law;

(3) are

likely in the near future to be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; and

(4) are not selling or transferring defense articles to a state that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.

(e) Notification.--At least 15 days before designating any country pursuant to subsection (d), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with the procedures applicable under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(f) Determination.--It is hereby determined that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia meet the criteria required in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (d).

SEC. 204. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

(a) Arms Export Control Act.--The President is authorized to exercise the authority of sections 63 and 65 of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to any country designated under section 203(d) of this title on the same basis authorized with respect to NATO countries.

(b) Other NATO Authorities.--The President should designate any country designated under section 203(d) of this title as eligible under sections 2350c and 2350f of title 10, United States Code.

(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, in the interest of maintaining stability and promoting democracy in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and any other Partnership for Peace country designated under section 203(d) of this title, those countries should be included in all activities under section 2457 of title 10, United States Code, related to the

increased standardization and enhanced interoperability of equipment and weapons systems, through coordinated training and procurement activities, as well as other means, undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members and other allied countries.

SEC. 205. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

The President shall include in the report required by section 514(a) of Public Law 103-236 (22 U.S.C. 1928 note) the following:

(1) A description of all assistance provided under the program established under section 203(a), or otherwise provided by the United States Government to facilitate the transition to full NATO membership of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other Partnership for Peace countries emerging from communist domination designated pursuant to section 203(d).

(2) A description, on the basis of information received from the recipients and from NATO, of all assistance provided by other NATO member nations or NATO itself to facilitate the transition to full NATO membership of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other Partnership for Peace countries emerging from communist domination designated pursuant to section 203(d).

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

APPENDIX F:

Extracts relating only to NATO Expansion from Bill H.R. 7, introduced 4 January 1995 into the U.S. House of Representatives 104th Congress, 1st Session

"National Security Revitalization Act"

Mr. SPENCE, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. BRYANT of Tennessee, and Mr. HAYES (for themselves),

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania, Mr. DORNAN, Mr. SAXTON, Mr.

TORKILDSEN, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, Mr. LONGLEY, Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr. ROYCE, Mr. BACHUS, Mr. HOKE, Mr. HASTERT, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. FUNDERBURK, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. KIM, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. POMBO, Mr. NUSSLE, Mr. CRANE, Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. KOLBE, Mr. HALL of Texas, Mr. PAXON, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. COMBEST, Mr. COBLE, Mr. EHRLICH, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. STOCKMAN, Mr. SMITH of Michigan, Mr. BAKER of California, Mr. COX, Mr. SHAW, Mr. HERGER, Mr. HEINEMAN, Mrs. FOWLER, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. HANCOCK, Mr. ZIMMER, Mr. LINDER,

Mr. EMERSON, Mr. HOSTETTLER, Mr. JONES, Mr. ENSIGN, Mr. TIAHRT, Mrs. MYRICK, Mr. HOUGHTON, Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN, Mr. EWING, Mrs. CUBIN, Mr. HASTINGS of Washington, Mr. WELDON of Florida, Mr. GANSKE, Mr. COBURN, Mr. LARGENT, Mr. WELLER, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky, Mr. LAHOOD, Mr. BUNNING of Kentucky, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr.

ISTOOK, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. HOBSON, Mr. CREMEANS, Mr. KNOLLENBERG, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. GOODLING, Mr. HAYWORTH, Mr. FOX, Mr. RADANOVICH, Mr. WAMP, Mr. GILCHREST, Mr. BLUTE, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. STUMP, Mr. EVERETT, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr. LATOURETTE, Mr. FLANAGAN, Mr. BURR, Ms. MOLINARI, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. THORNBERRY, Mr. RIGGS, Mr. GOODLATTE, Mr. CHRISTENSEN, Mr. HILLEARY, Mr. WICKER, Mr. BONO, Mr. COOLEY, Mr. FRISA, Mr. MCINTOSH, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. SHADEGG, Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. CHRYSLER, Mr. CANADY, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. BARTON of Texas, Mr. GILLMOR, Mr. BARR, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. FORBES, Mr. WALDHOLTZ, Mr. TATE, Ms. DUNN, Mr. MICA, and Mr. MCHUGH) introduced the following bill; which was referred as follows:

.....

Title VI, referred to the Committee on International Relations

.....

TEXT:

* Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

*

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.-THIS ACT MAY BE CITED AS THE "NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT".

(B) TABLE OF CONTENTS.-THE TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR THIS ACT IS AS
FOLLOWS:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I-FINDINGS, POLICY, AND PURPOSES

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Policy.

Sec. 103. Purposes.

.....

**TITLE VI-REVITALIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY**

ORGANIZATION

Sec. 601. Short title.

Sec. 602. Findings.

Sec. 603. United States policy.

Sec. 604. Revisions to program to facilitate transition to NATO membership.

Sec. 605. Annual reporting requirement.

Sec. 606. Definitions.

.....

SEC. 102. POLICY.

The Congress is committed to providing adequate resources to protect the national security of the United States.

SEC. 103. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this Act are-

.....

(6) to reemphasize the commitment of the United States to a strong and viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

.....

**TITLE III-REVITALIZATION OF NATIONAL
SECURITY COMMISSION**

SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT.

There is hereby established a commission to be known as the "Revitalization of National Security Commission" (hereinafter in this title referred to as the "Commission").

.....

SEC. 303. DUTIES.

(a) **COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW.**-THE COMMISSION SHALL CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE LONG-TERM NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES. THE REVIEW SHALL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

.....

(10) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF EXPANDING THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

.....

SEC. 304. REPORTS.

(a) **FINAL REPORT.**-THE COMMISSION SHALL SUBMIT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES A REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REFERRED TO IN SECTION 303 NOT LATER THAN JANUARY 1, 1996. THE REPORT SHALL BE SUBMITTED IN UNCLASSIFIED AND CLASSIFIED VERSIONS.

(B) **INTERIM REPORT.**-THE COMMISSION SHALL SUBMIT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AN INTERIM REPORT DESCRIBING THE COMMISSION'S PROGRESS IN FULFILLING ITS DUTIES UNDER SECTION 303. THE INTERIM REPORT SHALL INCLUDE ANY PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS THE COMMISSION MAY HAVE REACHED AND SHALL BE SUBMITTED NOT LATER THAN OCTOBER 1, 1995.

.....

TITLE VI-REVITALIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "NATO Revitalization and Expansion Act of 1995".

SEC. 602. FINDINGS.

The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Since 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has helped to guarantee the security, freedom, and prosperity of the United States and its partners in the alliance.

(2) NATO has expanded its membership on three different occasions since its founding in 1949.

(3) The steadfast and sustained commitment of the member countries of NATO to mutual defense against the threat of communist domination played a significant role in precipitating the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet Union.

(4) In the place of that threat, new security threats are emerging to the shared interests of the member countries of NATO.

(5) Although these new threats are more geographically and functionally diverse and less predictable, they still imperil shared interests of the United States and its NATO allies.

(6) Western interests must be protected on a cooperative basis without an undue burden falling upon the United States.

(7) NATO is the only multilateral organization that is capable of conducting effective military operations to protect Western interests.

(8) The valuable experience gained from ongoing military cooperation within NATO was critical to the success of joint military operations in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait.

(9) NATO is an important diplomatic forum for discussion of issues of concern to its member states and for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

(10) Admission of Central and East European countries that have recently been freed from Communist domination to NATO could contribute to international peace and enhance the security of those countries.

(11) A number of countries, including the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Ukraine, have expressed interest in NATO membership.

(12) In recognition of this interest, the Partnership for Peace proposal offers limited military cooperation to many European countries not currently members of NATO, but fails to establish benchmarks or guidelines for eventual NATO membership.

(13) In particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have made significant progress toward establishing democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of their armed forces, police, and intelligence services, and the rule of law since the fall of their previous Communist governments.

SEC. 603. UNITED STATES POLICY.

It should be the policy of the United States-

(1) to continue the Nation's commitment to an active leadership role in NATO;

(2) to join with the Nation's NATO allies to redefine the role of the alliance in the post-Cold War world, taking into account-

(A) the fundamentally changed security environment of Central and Eastern Europe;

(B) the need to assure all countries of the defensive nature of the alliance and the desire of its members to work cooperatively with all former adversaries;

(C) the emerging security threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them;

(D) the continuing challenges to the interests of all NATO member countries posed by unstable and undemocratic regimes harboring hostile intentions; and

(E) the dependence of the global economy on a stable

energy supply and the free flow of commerce;

(3) to affirm that NATO military planning should include joint military operations beyond the geographic bounds of the alliance under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty when the shared interests of the United States and other member countries require such action to defend vital interests;

(4) that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia should be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area not later than January 10, 1999 (5 years from the date of the establishment of the Partnership for Peace), and, in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty, should be invited to become full NATO members not later than that date, provided these countries-

(A) meet appropriate standards, including-

(i) shared values and interests;

(ii) democratic governments;

(iii) free market economies;

(iv) civilian control of the military, of the police, and of intelligence services;

(v) adherence to the values, principles, and political commitments embodied in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

(vi) commitment to further the principles of NATO and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area;

(vii) commitment to accept the obligations, responsibilities, and costs of NATO membership; and

(viii) commitment to implement infrastructure development activities that will facilitate participation in and support for NATO military activities; and

(B) remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens and respecting the territorial integrity of their neighbors;

(5) that the United States, other NATO member nations, and NATO itself should furnish appropriate assistance to facilitate the transition of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia to full NATO membership not later than January 10, 1999; and

(6) that other European countries emerging from communist

domination, in particular the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and Ukraine, may be in a position at a future date to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area, and at the appropriate time they should receive assistance to facilitate their transition to full NATO membership and should be invited to become full NATO members.

SEC. 604. REVISIONS TO PROGRAM TO FACILITATE TRANSITION TO NATO MEMBERSHIP.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.-SUBSECTION (A) OF SECTION 203 OF THE NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994 (TITLE II OF PUBLIC LAW 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 NOTE) IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.-THE PRESIDENT SHALL ESTABLISH A PROGRAM TO ASSIST IN THE TRANSITION TO FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP OF POLAND, HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND SLOVAKIA AND ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY EMERGING FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION THAT IS DESIGNATED BY THE PRESIDENT UNDER SUBSECTION (D)(2).".

(B) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.-

(1) DESIGNATED COUNTRIES.-SUBSECTION (D) OF SUCH SECTION IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"(D) DESIGNATION OF ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.-

"(1) SPECIFIED COUNTRIES.-THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES ARE HEREBY DESIGNATED FOR PURPOSES OF THIS TITLE: POLAND, HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND SLOVAKIA.

"(2) AUTHORITY FOR PRESIDENT TO DESIGNATE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION.-THE PRESIDENT MAY DESIGNATE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION (AS DEFINED IN SECTION 206) TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER SUBSECTION (A). THE PRESIDENT MAY MAKE SUCH A DESIGNATION IN THE CASE OF ANY SUCH COUNTRY ONLY IF THE PRESIDENT

DETERMINES, AND REPORTS TO THE DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, THAT SUCH COUNTRY-

"(A) HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHING-

"(I) SHARED VALUES AND INTERESTS;
"(II) DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS;
"(III) FREE MARKET ECONOMIES;
"(IV) CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY, OF THE POLICE, AND OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES;

"(V) ADHERENCE TO THE VALUES, PRINCIPLES, AND POLITICAL COMMITMENTS EMBODIED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE; AND

"(VI) COMMITMENT TO FURTHER THE PRINCIPLES OF NATO AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA;

"(VII) COMMITMENT TO ACCEPT THE OBLIGATIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND COSTS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP; AND

"(VIII) COMMITMENT TO IMPLEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES THAT WILL FACILITATE PARTICIPATION IN AND SUPPORT FOR NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES; AND

"(B) IS LIKELY, WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF SUCH DETERMINATION, TO BE IN A POSITION TO FURTHER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.".

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.-

(A) SUBSECTIONS (B) AND (C) OF SUCH SECTION ARE AMENDED BY STRIKING "COUNTRIES DESCRIBED IN SUCH SUBSECTION" AND INSERTING "COUNTRIES DESIGNATED UNDER SUBSECTION (D)".

(B) SUBSECTION (E) OF SUCH SECTION IS AMENDED-

(I) BY STRIKING "SUBSECTION (D)" AND INSERTING "SUBSECTION (D)(2)"; AND

(II) BY INSERTING "(22 U.S.C. 2394)" BEFORE THE PERIOD AT THE END.

(C) SECTION 204(C) OF SUCH ACT IS AMENDED BY STRIKING "ANY OTHER" AND INSERTING "ANY COUNTRY DESIGNATED UNDER SECTION 203(D)(2)".

(C) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE.-

(1) ECONOMIC SUPPORT ASSISTANCE.-SUBSECTION (C) OF SECTION 203 OF SUCH ACT IS AMENDED-

(A) BY REDESIGNATING PARAGRAPHS (3) AND (4) AS PARAGRAPHS (4) AND (5), RESPECTIVELY; AND

(B) BY INSERTING AFTER PARAGRAPH (2) THE FOLLOWING NEW

PARAGRAPH (3):

"(3) ASSISTANCE UNDER CHAPTER 4 OF PART II OF THE FOREIGN

ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND).".

(2) ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE.-

(A) IN GENERAL.-SUBSECTION (F) OF SUCH SECTION IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"(F) ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE.-IN CARRYING OUT THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER SUBSECTION (A), THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN ADDITION TO THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED TO BE PROVIDED UNDER SUBSECTION (C), PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES DESIGNATED UNDER SUBSECTION (D) FROM FUNDS APPROPRIATED UNDER THE 'NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FUND' ACCOUNT.".

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.-THE AMENDMENT MADE BY SUBPARAGRAPH (A) DOES NOT APPLY WITH RESPECT TO FUNDS APPROPRIATED BEFORE THE DATE OF THE ENACTMENT OF THIS ACT.

(D) DISQUALIFICATION FROM ASSISTANCE FOR SUPPORT OF TERRORISM.-SECTION 203 OF SUCH ACT IS FURTHER AMENDED BY ADDING AT THE END THE FOLLOWING NEW SUBSECTION:

"(G) PROHIBITION ON PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS THAT EXPORT LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO COUNTRIES SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.-ASSISTANCE MAY ONLY BE PROVIDED THROUGH THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER SUBSECTION (A) SUBJECT TO THE SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS THAT APPLY UNDER SECTION 563 OF THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1995 (PUBLIC LAW 103-306), WITH RESPECT TO THE MAKING AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED OR OTHERWISE MADE AVAILABLE UNDER THAT ACT.".

(E) ANNUAL REPORT.-SECTION 205 OF THE NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994 (TITLE II OF PUBLIC LAW 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 NOTE) IS AMENDED-

(1) BY INSERTING "ANNUAL" IN THE SECTION HEADING BEFORE THE FIRST WORD;

(2) by inserting "annual" after "include in the" in the matter preceding paragraph (1);

(3) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively;

(4) by inserting before paragraph (2), as so redesignated, the following new paragraph (1):

"(1) An assessment of the progress made by Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and by any country designated by the President under section 203(d)(2) toward meeting the standards for NATO membership set forth in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including-

"(A) an assessment of the progress of each such country toward establishing-

"(i) shared values and interests;

"(ii) democratic governments;

"(iii) free market economies;

"(iv) civilian control of the military, of the police, and of intelligence services;

"(v) adherence to the values, principles, and political commitments embodied in the Helsinki Final Act of the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

"(vi) commitment to further the principles of NATO and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area;

"(vii) commitment to accept the obligations, responsibilities, and costs of NATO membership; and

"(viii) commitment to implement infrastructure development activities that will facilitate participation in and support for NATO military activities; and

"(B) the commitment of each such country to protecting the rights of all its citizens and respecting the territorial integrity of its neighbors."; and

(5) in paragraphs (2) and (3), as so redesignated, by striking "and other" and all that follows through the period at the end and inserting "and any country designated by the President pursuant to section 203(d)(2).".

(f) DEFINITIONS.-THE NATO PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994 (TITLE II OF PUBLIC LAW 103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 NOTE) IS AMENDED BY ADDING AT THE END THE FOLLOWING NEW SECTION:

"SEC. 206. DEFINITIONS.

"For purposes of this title:

"(1) NATO.-THE TERM 'NATO' MEANS THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.

"(2) OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION.-THE TERM 'OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION' MEANS-

"(A) ANY MEMBER OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE THAT IS LOCATED-

"(I) IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS; OR

"(II) IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA; OR

"(B) ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ROMANIA, BULGARIA, OR ALBANIA.

"(3) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL

COMMITTEES.-THE TERM 'DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES' MEANS-

"(A) THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; AND

"(B) THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AND THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS OF THE SENATE.".

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172 NATO EXPANSION

page 172 blank

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

James W. Morrison wrote this manuscript in late 1994 and early 1995 while he was a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU.

Mr. Morrison retired from federal service in early March 1995 after having served in the Department of Defense for nearly 30 years, most of the time in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 1983, he became a career member of the Senior Executive Service. Before coming to the Institute in August 1993, Mr. Morrison was Principal Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Mr. Morrison is the author of *Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist* (McNair Paper No. 30, NDU) and the primary author of the Europe chapter in *Strategic Assessment 1995* (NDU Press). He has edited the proceedings of an NDU co-sponsored symposium on ethnic conflict, soon to be published by NDU Press, and prepared summaries of two roundtables at NDU, both published as NDU *Strategic Forums*.

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